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Since June 2013, we have seen unprecedented security breaches and 
disclosures relating to American electronic surveillance. The nearly daily 
drip, and occasional gush, of once-secret policy and operational information 
makes it possible to analyze and understand National Security Agency 
activities, including the organizations and processes inside and outside the 
NSA that are supposed to safeguard American’s civil liberties as the agency 
goes about its intelligence gathering business. Some have suggested that 
what we have learned is that the NSA is running wild, lawlessly flouting 
legal constraints on its behavior. This assessment is unfair. In fact, the 
picture that emerges from both the Snowden and official disclosures is of an 
agency committed to legal compliance, although both minor and major 
noncompliance is nonetheless frequent. A large surveillance compliance 
apparatus is currently staffed by hundreds of people in both the executive 
and judicial branches. This infrastructure implements and enforces a 
complex system of rules, not flawlessly but with real attention and care. 
Where an authoritative lawgiver has announced rights or rights-protecting 
procedures, the compliance apparatus works—to real, though not perfect 
effect—to effectuate those rights and to follow those procedures.  
 
Of course errors, small and large, occur. But even if perfect 
compliance could be achieved, it is too paltry a goal. A good oversight 
system needs its institutions not just to support and enforce compliance but 
also to design good rules. Yet the offices that make up the NSA’s 
compliance system are nearly entirely compliance offices, not policy offices; 
they work to improve compliance with existing rules, but not to consider the 
pros and cons of more individually-protective rules and try to increase 
privacy or civil liberties where the cost of doing so is acceptable. The NSA 
and the administration in which it sits have thought of civil liberties and 
privacy only in compliance terms. That is, they have asked only “Can we 
(legally) do X?” and not “Should we do X?” This preference for the can 
question over the should question is part and parcel, I argue, of a 
phenomenon I label “intelligence legalism,” whose three crucial and 
simultaneous features are imposition of substantive rules given the status of 
law rather than policy; some limited court enforcement of those rules; and 
empowerment of lawyers. Intelligence legalism has been a useful corrective 
to the lawlessness that characterized surveillance prior to intelligence 
reform, in the late 1970s. But I argue that it gives systematically insufficient 
weight to individual liberty, and that its relentless focus on rights, and 
compliance, and law has obscured the absence of what should be an 
additional focus on interests, or balancing, or policy. More is needed; 
additional attention should be directed both within the NSA and by its 
overseers to surveillance policy, weighing the security gains from 
surveillance against the privacy and civil liberties risks and costs. That 
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attention will not be a panacea, but it can play a useful role in filling the civil 
liberties gap intelligence legalism creates.  
 
Part I first traces the roots of intelligence legalism to the last 
generation of intelligence disclosures and resulting reform, in the late 1970s. 
Part I then goes on to detail the ways in which intelligence legalism is 
embedded in both the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) 
and Executive Order 12,333, which govern American intelligence practices, 
and why the result is a civil liberties gap. Part II discusses the ways in which 
NSA’s compliance and oversight institutions likewise embody intelligence 
legalism. I then move in Part III to some shortcomings of this system, and in 
particular the ways in which the law and NSA’s compliance regulations and 
infrastructure fall short of full civil liberties policy evaluation. In Part IV, I 
examine some of the many reforms that have recently been proposed, 
analyzing those that might fill that gap. In light of the existing institutional 
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The story has now been told many times: On March 10, 2004, 
President Bush’s White House Counsel, Alberto Gonzales, and chief of staff, 
Andrew Card, went to the intensive care unit of the George Washington 
University Hospital to try to persuade the ill Attorney General, John 
Ashcroft, to sign off on continuing massive collection of Americans’ internet 
metadata, a program started in October 2001. Deputy Attorney General 
James Comey had refused to reauthorize the program; its most recent 
authorization was scheduled to expire the next day. However, Comey got to 
his boss first, and Ashcroft refused to sign. Pushed hard by Gonzales and 
Card, and also by Vice President Cheney and his counsel, David Addington, 
Comey and several of his Department of Justice colleagues stood their 
ground and declined to ratify this domestic metadata collection based on the 
President’s bare say-so.1 This 2004 incident, the subject of much admiring 
later press for the DOJ lawyers,2 is part of what won Comey, a Republican, 
his current appointment by President Obama to head the FBI.3 This was a 
group of lawyers who stood up to extreme pressure to tell their client—the 
President—“no,” loudly (if in secret) and backed by threat of group 
resignation. In a speech several years later to Intelligence Community 
lawyers, Comey talked about the need for his listeners to “stand[] in front of 
the freight train” when pushed by their clients to sign off on a collection 
technique or target they believe to be unlawful.4 The hospital bed incident, 
live in audience members’ minds, gave Comey credibility.  
 
But what did this incident actually accomplish? Recent disclosures 
underscore that the dramatics were entirely out of scale to the actual, limited 
result, which was a pause—not a stop—to the challenged collection.5 What 
                                                 
1 For descriptions of the events, see, e.g., David Johnston & Scott Shane, Notes Detail 
Pressure on Ashcroft Over Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007, at A14; Barton Gellman, 
Conflict Over Spying Led White House to Brink, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2008, at A1; JAMES 
BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY: THE ULTRA SECRET NSA FROM 9/11 TO THE 
EAVESDROPPING ON AMERICA 278-286 [hereinafter BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY]; 
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, ST-09-0002 WORKING DRAFT 42 
(2009) [hereinafter 2009 NSA Draft IG Report], http://perma.cc/4E3N-HV7C.  
2  See, e.g., Daniel Klaidman, Palace Revolt, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 5, 2006), 
http://perma.cc/X8TW-NANB (labeling the episode part of a “profile in courage”); Dan 
Eggen & Paul Kane, Gonzales Hospital Episode Detailed, WASH. POST (May 16, 2007), 
http://perma.cc/53D5-YYZ9. 
3 See Associated Press, New Director James Comey Wants FBI ‘Independent of All Political 
Forces,’ THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2013, 4:47 PM), http://perma.cc/53G6-HH3B 
(emphasizing that the 2004 event “symbolized a key piece of Comey’s past”).  
4 James B. Comey, Intelligence Under Law, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 439, 442 (2005). 
5 The most recent disclosures, made in response to an EFF FOIA request, were bundled 
together and posted at the ODNI’s Tumblr (!), as Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence Public Affairs Office, Newly Declassified Documents Regarding the Now-
Discontinued NSA Bulk Electronic Communications Metadata Pursuant to Section 402 of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (Aug. 11, 2014), http://perma.cc/3LJ5-6GD3. 
They evidence the government’s position that the FISA Court was obligated to approve the 
internet metadata program without examination of its justification. Memorandum of Law 




had previously been an entirely executive initiative was pushed into the 
FISA Court’s tent by a massive expansion of FISA’s pen register provision. 
The authority under which the collection proceeded, four months later, was 
new, but the program was the same.6 Comey and his colleagues’ actions 
were less standing down a freight train, and more the ordinary lawyers’ task 
of assisting a client to make adjustments in order to accomplish operational 
goals using different methods. This was a compliance improvement—and it 
served rule-of-law values. But as far as the civil liberties impact, the change 
was all but symbolic.7  
 
The mindset of Justice Department participants in the 2004 hospital 
bed incident—a stance I call “intelligence legalism”—is the topic of this 
Article. In her classic book, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials, 
Judith Shklar defined legalism as “the ethical attitude that holds moral 
conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist 
of duties and rights determined by rules.”8 Legalism, Shklar observed, is the 
central shared commitment of members of the legal profession.9 It is what 
underlies Tocqueville’s much older observations about lawyers: 
 
If they prize freedom much, they generally value legality still 
more. They are less afraid of tyranny than of arbitrary power, 
and provided the legislature undertakes of itself to deprive 
men of their independence, they are not dissatisfied.10 
 
Intelligence legalism brings lawyers’ rule-of-law commitment into 
the realm of national security and surveillance, where secrecy molds its 
impact in a number of important ways. I see intelligence legalism’s three 
crucial and simultaneous features as: imposition of substantive rules given 
the status of law rather than policy, limited court enforcement of those rules, 
and empowerment of lawyers. All three were in evidence in the 2004 drama. 
Yet it is no coincidence that that incident did not catalyze a civil liberties 
advance. In fact, this Article’s core argument is that intelligence legalism, 
                                                                                                                             
and Fact in Support of Application for Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices for 
Foreign Intelligence Purposes 3, Docket PR/TT [redacted] (FISA Ct. 2004), 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0028-0003.pdf [http://perma.cc/D5D4-
2V9Y] (“First, once the Government certifies, as it has here, that the “information likely to 
be obtained” is relevant to the investigation, the Court’s inquiry is properly at an end and the 
Application should be approved. Congress made the Government’s certification on this 
point dispositive.”).  
6 2009 NSA Draft IG Report, supra note 1.  
7 For an even more skeptical view of the incident, see Marcy Wheeler, George W. Bush’s 
False Heroes: The Real Story of a Secret Washington Sham, SALON (Aug. 14, 2014), 
http://perma.cc/B8UP-ZAHF.  
8 JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 1 (1964) 
9 Id. at 1–2, 8 (“Legalism is, above all, the operative outlook of the legal profession, both 
bench and bar.”). 
10 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 250 (Barnes & Noble Publishing 
2003) (1835), quoted in SHKLAR, LEGALISM, supra note 8, at 15. 
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though useful, gives systematically insufficient weight to individual liberty. 
Legalism legitimates liberty-infringing programs. And its relentless focus on 
rights and compliance and law (with a definition of law that includes 
regulation, executive orders, court orders, etc.) has obscured the absence of 
what should be an additional focus on interests, or balancing, or policy. That 
additional focus is necessary, I argue, for optimal policy, which I take to be 
the safeguarding of liberty where there is no cost, or acceptable cost, to 
security. 
 
The 2004 hospital-bed confrontation arose out of what has grown to 
be a large surveillance compliance apparatus, currently staffed by hundreds 
of people in both the executive and judicial branches. This infrastructure 
implements and enforces a complex system of rules, not flawlessly but—at 
least in recent years—with real attention and care.11 Where an authoritative 
lawgiver has announced rights or rights-protecting procedures, the 
compliance apparatus works, to real, though not perfect effect, to effectuate 
those rights and to follow those procedures. Of course errors, small and 
large, occur. Even if perfect compliance could be achieved, however, it is 
too paltry a goal. A good oversight system needs its institutions not just to 
support and enforce compliance but to design good rules. But as will become 
evident, the offices that make up the compliance system of the National 
Security Agency (NSA) are nearly entirely compliance offices, not policy 
offices; they work to improve compliance with existing rules, but not to 
consider the pros and cons of more individually-protective rules and try to 
increase privacy or civil liberties where the cost of doing so is acceptable. 
The NSA and the Intelligence Community (IC) more generally have thought 
of civil liberties and privacy only in compliance terms. That is, they have 
asked only “Can we (legally) do X?” and not “Should we do X?” This 
preference for can over should is part and parcel, I argue, of intelligence 
legalism. More is needed. Additional attention should be directed both 
within the NSA and by its overseers to the basic policy issues, weighing the 
security gains from surveillance against the privacy and civil liberties risks 
and costs. That attention will not be a panacea, but it can play a useful role in 
filling the civil liberties gap intelligence legalism creates.  
 
This Article rests on the unprecedented security breaches and 
disclosures of the past months. These began on June 5, 2013, when the 
British newspaper The Guardian ran the first story revealing information 
from top secret documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward 
Snowden.12 In the months since, a squadron of news outlets—the Guardian, 
the Washington Post, the New York Times, Der Spiegel, Le Monde, CBC—
have between them published dozens of revelations about the NSA’s 
                                                 
11 Here I agree with Michael A. Cohen, Keith Alexander Needs a Hug, FOREIGN POLICY 
(June 5, 2014), https://perma.cc/3SU9-7KJT. As he says, “One of the many ironies of the 
Snowden story is that the modern legal infrastructure that regulates the actions of the NSA 
is a significant liberal accomplishment.” 
12 Glenn Greenwald, NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily, 
THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://perma.cc/7943-FPCS. 




activities. 13  And the federal government has offered unprecedented 
responsive disclosures,14 in part to put out its side of the story, and in part 
because the leaks have eliminated the operational effectiveness of a good 
many secrets. Government officials too have become newly willing to 
discuss the operations of their offices. 15 With the nearly daily drip, and 
occasional gush, of once-secret policy and operational information, it is now 
possible to analyze and understand NSA activities, including the 
organizations and processes inside and outside the NSA that are supposed to 
safeguard American’s civil liberties as the agency goes about its spying 
business. The paper leans heavily on the new disclosures, both official and 
unofficial.  
 
Part I first traces the roots of intelligence legalism to the last 
generation of intelligence disclosures and resulting reform, in the late 1970s. 
Then, it details the ways in which intelligence legalism is embedded in both 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) and Executive 
Order 12,333, which governs American intelligence practices, and why the 
result is a civil liberties gap. Part II discusses the ways in which NSA’s 
compliance and oversight institutions likewise embody intelligence legalism. 
I then move in Part III to explain why intelligence legalism predictably 
underweights civil liberties.  
 
The Snowden disclosures and subsequent governmental policy 
discussions have evidently led to a renewed interest in the “should” question, 
in Congress and in the White House. The President himself responded to a 
question about surveillance at a press conference: “just because we can do 
something doesn’t mean we necessarily should.”16 What will result is still 
                                                 
13 For a chronology of both the disclosures and the underlying events, see Timeline of NSA 
Domestic Spying, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/nsa-
spying/timeline (last visited Nov. 7, 2014). 
14 See Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, IC ON THE RECORD, http://perma.cc/VV8C-
APSS (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).  
15 This Article has benefitted greatly from this willingness, because I was able to conduct 
interviews of numerous current and former government officials. These include telephone 
interviews of: John DeLong, Dir. of Compliance, Nat’l Sec. Agency (Oct. 8, 2013) 
[hereinafter DeLong Interview]; a senior IC attorney (Feb. 26, 2014) [hereinafter IC 
Attorney Interview]; Morton H. Halperin, former Special Assistant to the President (Oct. 14, 
2014) [hereinafter Halperin Interview]; Alex Joel, Civil Liberties Protection Officer, Civil 
Liberties and Privacy Office, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence (Jan. 31, 2014) 
[hereinafter Joel Interview]; Marty Lederman, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Oct. 10, 2014) [hereinafter Lederman 
Interview]; Nancy Libin, former Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
(Oct. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Libin Interview]; Becky Richards, Civil Liberties and Privacy 
Officer, Nat’l Sec. Agency (July 14, 2014) [hereinafter Richards Interview]; and two White 
House officials (Aug. 18 & 22, 2014) [hereinafter White House Official Interviews]. 
16 Full Transcript: President Obama’s December 20 News Conference (Dec. 20, 2013), 
http://perma.cc/D5KF-GG8Q. See also, e.g., Lisa Monaco, Obama Administration: 
Surveillance Policies under Review (Oct. 24, 2013), http://perma.cc/Q7SK-A3UJ (“We 
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unclear. But Presidential Policy Directive 28, the most definite policy 
document thus far, signals the possibility of some new, more liberty-
protective, surveillance rules. PPD-28 also promises several reforms that 
take quite a different approach. Rather than announcing new rules, the 
relevant provisions specify an internal organizational strategy; they 
designate actors and processes to facilitate fuller internal consideration of the 
“should” question, down the line. Other extant reform proposals similarly 
focus on organizational assignments and processes rather than compliance-
ready rules. In light of the existing institutional arrangements, Part IV 
sketches some thoughts on how this swathe of suggested reforms could be 
most effective.  
 




The June 2013 Guardian piece, which explained the NSA’s program 
of wholesale collection of information about domestic phone calls (though 
not the contents of the phone conversations themselves) had an analogue in 
Seymour Hersh’s front-page 1974 New York Times exposure of massive 
domestic surveillance by the CIA, in violation of rules limiting the agency to 
foreign spying.17 As in recent months, Hersh’s first leak-supported exposé 
was followed by additional reporting and many official disclosures.18 The 
lead role in the following “year of intelligence,”19 1975, was played by a 
special Senate Committee chaired by Senator Frank Church,20 whose seven 
                                                                                                                             
want to ensure we are collecting information because we need it and not just because we 
can.”).  
17 Seymour M. Hersh, Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, 
Other Dissidents in Nixon Years, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 1974), available at 
https://perma.cc/FC7V-4WWW 
18  For official reports and disclosures, see, especially, ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION, 
COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES (1975), 
http://perma.cc/3UQH-GCUZ and many volumes of Church Committee Reports and 
testimony, all available at Church Committee Reports, ASSASSINATION ARCHIVES AND 
RESEARCH CTR., http://perma.cc/3T82-TC9R (last visited Oct. 18, 2014). The House 
counterpart to the Church Committee, the Pike Committee, never issued its report, but the 
full document was leaked to the Village Voice and also eventually published in Great 
Britain. See Aaron Latham, The CIA Report the President Doesn’t Want You to Read, 
VILLAGE VOICE (Feb. 16, 1976), at 69; How Kissinger, the White House, and the CIA 
Obstructed the Investigation, VILLAGE VOICE (Feb. 23, 1976), at 59; THE PIKE COMMITTEE, 
CIA: THE PIKE REPORT (1977). For additional leaked disclosures, see, e.g., Seymour M. 
Hersh, Underground for the C.I.A. in New York: An Ex-Agent Tells of Spying on Students, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 1974), available at http://perma.cc/UVJ6-6PMG; Seymour M. Hersh, 
Aides Say Robert Kennedy Told of C.I.A. Castro Plot, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 1975), available 
at http://perma.cc/Q6Y4-RVGB. 
19 Editorial, The Year of Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 1975). 
20  The Church Committee was known formally as the United States Senate Select 
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. See 
S. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT 
COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE 




volumes of reports and recommendations underlay much of the subsequent 
reform—including the formation of the still-operative congressional 
intelligence oversight committees, the passage of FISA, and the drafting of 
executive orders governing the intelligence enterprise.21  
 
Reform took two basic approaches: disclosure and legalism. By 
disclosure I do not mean the kind of leaks and declassifications we have seen 
since 2013. The Church Committee, for example, did not chiefly urge a 
system of direct public accountability. Rather, it recommended that agencies 
running secret operations or intelligence surveillance make a long list of 
disclosures both to Congressional oversight committees and within the 
executive branch to the President and his staff,22 and, as will be seen, to the 
Attorney General. 23 The idea was to defeat “plausible denials” 24 and the 
prior understanding with respect to both the Congress and the President that 
“[i]t’s better for gentlemen not to know what’s going on.”25 This would ease 
the path of accountability to higher-up appointees, who might have better 
judgment than those more deeply involved in surveillance, and to elected 
officials if not to their constituencies.  
 
Legalism was a second reform priority: reformers’ answer to the 
starkly apparent disinterest of federal intelligence officials in legal 
constraints on their activities.26 Again looking to the Church Committee, the 
                                                                                                                             
ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH 
COMMITTEE REPORT], http:// www.aarclibrary.org/publib/church/reports/contents.htm.  
21 See, e.g., Anne Karalekas, History of the Central Intelligence Agency, in THE CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: HISTORY AND DOCUMENTS 11–119 (William M. Leary, ed. 1984); 
LOCH JOHNSON, A SEASON OF INQUIRY: THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION (1985); 
RICK PERLSTEIN, THE INVISIBLE BRIDGE: THE FALL OF NIXON AND THE RISE OF REAGAN 
(2014); KATHRYN OLMSTED, CHALLENGING THE SECRET GOVERNMENT: THE POST-
WATERGATE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE CIA AND FBI (1996); Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., 
The Church Committee and a New Era of Intelligence Oversight, 22 INTELLIGENCE AND 
NAT’L SEC. 270 (2007); KATHERINE A. SCOTT, REINING IN THE STATE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND 
CONGRESS IN THE VIETNAM AND WATERGATE ERAS (2013).  
22 See, e.g., I CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 431, 441, 442, 444, 448–49 
(recommendation 15, 24, 28, 31, 37); II CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 
293, 331 (recommendation 68).  
23 See, e.g., II CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 303, 308, 309, 310, 314, 315, 
333 (recommendations 7(e), 13, 15, 17, 31, 35, 36, 70–74).  
24 See S. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, AN INTERIM REPORT OF 
THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. REP. NO. 94-465, at 11–12, 
277–78 (1975) [hereinafter INTERIM CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT], http://perma.cc/6BWS-
A5XF.  
25 LEROY ASHBY & ROD GRAMER, FIGHTING THE ODDS: THE LIFE OF SENATOR FRANK 
CHURCH 471 (1994) (quoting Senator Leverett Saltonstall, as reported by Church); see also, 
e.g., SAMUEL WALKER, PRESIDENTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES FROM WILSON TO OBAMA: A 
STORY OF POOR CUSTODIANS 190 (2012).  
26 I lean on the evidence cited on the treatment of this issue in PERLSTEIN, THE INVISIBLE 
BRIDGE, supra note 21, at 330–32, 416-19, 520–24, 534–38, 678–79, and Frederick A.O. 
Schwarz, Jr., The Church Committee and a New Era of Intelligence Oversight, 22 
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Committee in its report highlighted testimony of “the man who for ten years 
headed FBI’s Intelligence Division” that “never once did I hear anybody, 
including myself, raise the question: ‘Is this course of action which we have 
agreed upon lawful, is it legal, is it ethical or moral.’ We never gave any 
thought to this line of reasoning, because we were just naturally 
pragmatic.”27 Less dramatic, but perhaps even more telling, was the almost 
uncomprehending testimony of NSA deputy director Benson Buffham, 
facing questioning by Senator Walter Mondale, about a controversial NSA 
program: 
 
Mondale: “Were you concerned about its legality?” 
Buffham: “Legality?” 
Mondale: “Whether it was legal.” 
Buffham: “In what sense? Whether that would have been a 
legal thing to do?”  
Mondale: “Yes.” 
Buffham: “That particular aspect didn’t enter into the discussion.”28 
 
A 1976 book by four civil libertarians, including former NSC staffer Mort 
Halperin, summarized the evidence in its title: The Lawless State: The 
Crimes of the U. S. Intelligence Agencies. 29  Legalistic reforms were 
designed to cure this documented disease.  
 
Those reforms had three crucial and simultaneous features: 
imposition of new substantive rules given the status of law rather than 
policy; some limited court enforcement of those rules; and empowerment of 
lawyers. The first two of these features have received abundant attention: 
intelligence law was really born in the 1970s,30 and has since blossomed.31 It 
now has a body of precedent sufficient to justify a treatise32 and casebooks.33 
                                                                                                                             
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 270 (2007); FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR. & 
AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 
(2013). 
27 II CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 14 (statement of William Sullivan, 
Nov. 1, 1975, pp. 92–93).  
28  5 The National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights: Hearing before the 
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities, 94th Cong. 45 (1976) [hereinafter Church Committee Hearings] (statement of 
Benson Buffham, Deputy Director, NSA). 
29  MORTON H. HALPERIN, JERRY J. BERMAN, ROBERT L. BOROSAGE, CHRISTINE M. 
MARWICK, THE LAWLESS STATE: THE CRIMES OF THE U. S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 
(1976). 
30 See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297 
(1972) (the “Keith case”). 
31 See, e.g., Fred F. Manget, Another System of Oversight: Intelligence and the Rise of 
Judicial Intervention, 39 STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE 43–50 (1996). 
32  DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS & 
PROSECUTIONS (2d ed. 2012); JAMES CARR & PATRICIA BELLIA, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC 
SURVEILLANCE (2d ed. 2012).  




The augmentation of lawyers’ influence has gotten somewhat less 
attention.34 But a crucial aspect of intelligence legalism is that even more 
than shifting power to the courts, it has shifted power to agency counsel and 
the Department of Justice, instituting internal rules governing intelligence 
operations and then deputizing the lawyers to see that those rules are 
implemented. Government lawyers accordingly loom very large in the 
reform documents of the late 1970s and thereafter. Over and over again, with 
dozens of specifics, the Church Committee recommended amplifying the 
authority and influence of lawyers within the executive branch. 35  The 
Committee summarized at the start of its domestic intelligence 
recommendations: 
 
Who should be accountable within the Executive branch for 
ensuring that intelligence agencies comply with the law and 
for the investigation of alleged abuses by employees of those 
agencies? . . . The Committee recommends that these 
responsibilities fall initially upon the agency heads, their 
general counsels and inspectors general, but ultimately upon 
the Attorney General.36 
 
The specific domestic recommendations proposed to obligate the Attorney 
General to review procedures, authorize operations, and conduct 
                                                                                                                             
33 E.g., STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (5th ed. 2011); NORM ABRAMS, 
ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT (4th ed. 2011); STEPHEN DYCUS, WILLIAM 
C. BANKS, & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, COUNTERTERRORISM LAW (2d ed. 2012); THOMAS M. 
FRANCK ET AL., FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, 
AND SIMULATIONS (4th ed. 2011); GREGORY E. MAGGS, TERRORISM AND THE LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2009); WAYNE MCCORMACK, LEGAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 
(2d ed. 2008). 
34  Two major exceptions are JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE 
ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012) [hereinafter GOLDSMITH, POWER AND 
CONSTRAINT], and JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT 
INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007) [hereinafter GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR 
PRESIDENCY]. A few accounts of the work of the affected lawyers are available. See Laura 
A. Dickinson, Military Lawyers on the Battlefield: An Empirical Account of International 
Law Compliance, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010); Dorian D. Greene, Ethical Dilemmas 
Confronting Intelligence Agency Counsel, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 91, 108 (1994); 
Harold Hongju Koh & Aaron Zelinsky, Practicing International Law in the Obama 
Administration, 35 YALE J. INTL. L. ONLINE 4 (2009); Mary C. Lawton, Review and 
Accountability in the United States Intelligence Community, OPTIMUM: J. PUB. SEC. MGMT. 
101, 103 (Autumn 1993); JIM MCGEE & BRIAN DUFFY, MAIN JUSTICE: THE MEN AND 
WOMEN WHO ENFORCE THE NATION’S CRIMINAL LAWS AND GUARD ITS LIBERTIES 310-12 
(1996); Diane Carraway Piette & Jesselyn Radack, Piercing the “Historical Mists”: The 
People and Events Behind the Passage of FISA and the Creation of the “Wall,” 17 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 437, 486 (2006); Afsheen John Radsan, Sed Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes: 
The CIA’s Office of General Counsel? 2 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 201 (2008). 
35 See, e.g., II CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 308–09, 315–16, 332–37. 
The Attorney General had a role, but a lesser one, in prior years. See, e.g., Appendix A., 
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 673–75 (D.C. Cir. en banc, 1975).  
36 II CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 294.  
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investigations. Even more notable, the Church Committee proposed a similar 
role for the Attorney General with respect to foreign intelligence, far afield 
from the Attorney General’s natural bailiwick of law enforcement and the 
FBI (which is at least nominally part of the Department of Justice): 
 
The Attorney General should be required to report the 
President and to the intelligence oversight committee(s) of 
Congress any intelligence activities which, in his opinion, 
violate the Constitutional rights of American citizens or any 
other provision of law and the actions he has taken in 
response. Pursuant to the Committee’s Domestic 
Recommendations, the Attorney General should be made 
responsible for ensuring that intelligence activities do not 
violate the Constitution or any other provision of law. 
 
Additional specifics abounded. For example, the Committee recommended 
that the Attorney General should advise the National Security Council and 
should even chair a counterintelligence subcommittee. 37 And the Church 
Committee’s appreciation for the potential role of lawyers did not stop with 
the Attorney General. The reports included multiple recommendations, as 
well, to enhance the stature of intelligence agency general counsels—making 
their positions Senate confirmed, and requiring that they be consulted, have 
access to more information, and have investigatory powers.38  
 
 I have already mentioned the first reform that came from the Church 
Committee report: Congress’s new permanent intelligence committees, 
established in 1975 and 1976. 39  In addition, the Committee’s approach 
underlay both FISA and Executive Order 12,333. I move now to those two 




As originally enacted, FISA made two key innovations, both highly 
legalizing. First, the Act subjected all domestic foreign intelligence 
surveillance, and some such surveillance abroad, to analogues of domestic 
warrant procedure. Surveillance of covered communications would have to 
be authorized by a judicial officer—under FISA, a federal district judge 
appointed by the Chief Justice to the FISA Court—after the government 
demonstrated probable cause for the surveillance. 40  Second, FISA 
                                                 
37 I CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 429, 431 (recommendation 6, 15).  
38  I CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 459–61; II CHURCH COMMITTEE 
REPORT, supra note 20, at 294, 308, 332–35.  
39 S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976); H.R. Res. 658, 95th Cong. (1977). 
40 The probable cause determination under FISA is not, as in ordinary search warrants or 
Title III surveillance, probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, but 
something less—probable cause “that the target of the surveillance or search is a ‘foreign 
power’ or an ‘agent of a foreign power,’ and that there is a nexus to the facility or place to 
be surveilled or searched.” See 1 KRIS & WILSON, supra note 32, § 11:5. But the definition 




introduced the idea of “minimization procedures”—rules “designed to 
protect, as far as reasonable, against the acquisition, retention, and 
dissemination of nonpublic information which is not foreign intelligence 
information”41 that “concern[s] unconsenting United States persons.”42 The 
statutory “heart of minimization under FISA” 43  is the requirement that 
surveillance and retention processes be “reasonably designed . . . to 
minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of 
nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States 
persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and 
disseminate foreign intelligence information.”44  
 
The FISA warrant requirement was, of course, borrowed from 
American criminal procedure. But the requirement of minimization 
procedures is far less familiar—indeed, it deviates foundationally from non-
intelligence Fourth Amendment doctrine. In American criminal procedure, 
once the government gains lawful access to personal information, that 
information can usually be used for any lawful purpose—including purposes 
that would have invalidated the original access. So the government is 
authorized to search airplane travelers without any individualized suspicion, 
in order to be sure they are not, say, carrying a bomb that might bring down 
a plane. 45  Now, suppose that during that search, the government finds 
contraband that poses no aviation threat (drugs, perhaps, or a suspiciously 
large amount of currency). The evidence may then be used in a subsequent 
criminal prosecution, even though the very same search would have been 
illegal if its original purpose had been criminal prosecution. Likewise, if a 
police officer frisks a pedestrian in order to ameliorate the immediate threat 
of a gun, and along the way “plainly” feels drugs, the drugs are admissible in 
a criminal proceeding.46 The foreign intelligence approach is different.47 As 
                                                                                                                             
of “foreign power” and “agent of a foreign power” generally require some kind of nefarious 
conduct to justify a search targeting a U.S. citizen or resident. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(a), (b); 
1 KRIS & WILSON, supra note 32, § 8:2. 
41 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 731 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).  
42 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1); see also, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1821(4); 50 U.S.C. § 1861(g); 50 
U.S.C. § 1881a(e). In all things, FISA is complicated. For acquisitions under § 704, 
minimization is required for dissemination but not for acquisition or retention.  
43 1 KRIS & WILSON, supra note 32, § 9:1.  
44 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1). Compare § 1821(4)(A) with § 1861(g)(2)(A). 
45 See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000) (noting that the holding, 
which invalidated a vehicle checkpoint program, “d[id] not affect the validity of . . . 
searches at places like airports”); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (“[W]here 
the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless [sic] searches 
calibrated to the risk may rank as ‘reasonable’—for example, searches . . . at airports.”). 
46 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 377 (1993). 
47  See Nathan Alexander Sales, Run for the Border: Laptop Searches and the Fourth 
Amendment, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1091, 1124–27 (2009) (laying out the differences between 
“collection limits” and “use limits,” and setting out a variety of environments in which the 
law implements the latter); BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR 224 (2008) 
(advocating for “relatively easy access” to intelligence information coupled with “stricter 
rules” for “the use of that material.”). I should note that in his 2008 book (published prior to 
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in the administrative search context, the regulation of information 
acquisition or collection is often very loose, with no requirement of 
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing in many situations. But, unlike with 
respect to criminal prosecution uses of evidence obtained by administrative 
search, the minimization procedures constrain what can happen next.48  
 
Prior to the Snowden leaks, only one of the FISA minimization 
procedures—for information collected under a FISA Title I warrant49—had 
been declassified. Over the past months, the government has disclosed the 
terms of several others: for targeted surveillance of foreigners abroad (under 
FISA § 702),50 the now-defunct internet metadata program (under FISA’s 
pen register/trap-and-trace provision), 51  the ongoing telephony metadata 
                                                                                                                             
the FISA Amendments Act and the declassification of the various FISA minimization 
orders), Wittes disagrees with my characterization of surveillance law. He sees that law, 
rather, as “obsessed . . . with defining the circumstances of data acquisition,” and 
disinterested in data use. Id. at 240. 
48  See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(A); 50 U.S.C. § 1824(c)(2)(A); 50 U.S.C. § 1861(g) 
(providing for minimization procedures for FISA warrants involving electronic surveillance, 
physical searches, and business record searches); 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e); 50 U.S.C. § 
1881b(b)(1)(D); 50 U.S.C. § 1881c(b)(4) (minimization procedures for targeted searches 
abroad). The pull of this minimization approach is so strong that when the government’s 
internet metadata program was brought under the umbrella of FISA’s pen/trap provisions, 
minimization procedures were part of the package, even though this part of the Act make no 
reference to minimization. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1848; Memorandum Opinion, No. PR/TT 
[Redacted], at 86 (FISA Ct. approx. June/July 2010) [hereinafter Bates 2010 PR/TT 
Opinion], http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13111 [http://perma.cc/N85U-
UR5Q]; Opinion and Order, No. PR/TT [Redacted], at 43–44 (FISA Ct. July 2004) 
[hereinafter Kollar-Kotelly 2004 PR/TT Opinion], 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13107 [http://perma.cc/8649-AM73].  
49 The current NSA minimization rules for FISA Title I were approved by Attorney General 
Janet Reno on July 1, 1997. See NAT’L SEC. AGENCY ET AL, UNITED STATES SIGNALS 
INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE SP0018 Annex A, App. 1 (Jan. 25, 2011) [hereinafter USSID 18], 
http://perma.cc/VD3M-JP7G (Standard Minimization Procedures for Electronic 
Surveillance Conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA)). The date appears at the 
end of the Appendix, after Section 8. The prior version of USSID 18 is dated July 27, 1993, 
but was released much later—and it includes the same (1997) version of these Standard 
Procedures, although they are differently titled. See NAT’L SEC. AGENCY ET AL, UNITED 
STATES SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 18 Annex A, App. 1 (July 27, 1993) [hereinafter 
1993 USSID 18], http://perma.cc/6Q4A-J9UG. It may be that minimization procedures are 
sometimes varied for different particular warrants. See USSID 18, supra, Annex A, 
Procedures Implementing Title I of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Section 3 (“In 
some cases, the court orders are tailored to address particular problems, and in those 
instances the NSA attorney will advise the appropriate NSA offices of the terms of the 
court’s orders. In most cases, however, the court order will incorporate without any changes 
the standardized minimization procedures set forth in Appendix I.”).  
50 The minimization rules for FISA Section 702 are set forth in In re Proceedings Required 
by § 702(i) of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 2008 WL 9487946, No. Misc. 08-01, at 
10 (FISA Ct. 2008), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0037-0001.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/9SJR-8GDG]. The minimization rules under Section 703 and 704 have not 
been either leaked or released. 
51 Bates 2010 PR/TT Opinion, supra note 48; Kollar-Kotelly 2004 PR/TT Opinion, supra 
note 48, at 43–44. 




program (under FISA’s business records provision), 52  as well as some 
others.53 All of these minimization procedures support the conclusion that 
FISA’s minimization procedure requirement is legalizing in several 
analytically distinct ways.  
 
First, the procedures are themselves highly legalistic; they read like 
statutes or regulations. Second, the minimization procedures frequently use 
the strategy of designating a particular high official to make specified 
decisions.54 Implementation then forces subordinate personnel into using the 
                                                 
52 In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of 
Tangible Things From [Redacted], 2008 WL 9475145, No. BR 08-01 (FISA Ct. Jan. 2008), 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0037-0001.pdf [http://perma.cc/R9EJ-
XJRF]. As this Article goes to press, the most recent of these orders declassified and 
available is In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the 
Prod. of Tangible Things From [Redacted], No. BR 14-125 (FISA Ct. Sept. 2014), 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0067-0001.pdf [http://perma.cc/E888-
3W3C]. An additional December 2014 order has not yet been declassified, but such 
information as is available is described and posted at 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14258 [http://perma.cc/EZJ7-2QFS].  
53 In ongoing litigation before the FISA Court, the United States recently declassified four 
different minimization procedures used by the FBI for physical and electronic searches 
since 1995 and 1997, respectively, as well as 2006 amendments to them. See Standard 
Physical Search Minimization Procedures, Exhibit A. In the Matter of the Application of the 
United States for an Order Authorizing Physical Search of a United States Person Agent of a 
Foreign Power, No. [omitted] (FISA Ct. 1995), 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC0008-0044.pdf [http://perma.cc/JK8D-
FGPY]; Standard Physical Search Minimization Procedures, Exhibit A. In the Matter of the 
Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing Physical Search of a Non-United 
States Person Agent of a Foreign Power, No. [omitted] (FISA Ct. 1995), 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0008-0049.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/6NWL-SABL]; Standard Minimization Procedures, Exhibit A. In the 
Matter of the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing Electronic 
Surveillance of a Non-United States Person Agent of a Foreign Power, No. [omitted] (FISA 
Ct. 1995), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0008-0045.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/Z53S-6HHY]; Standard Minimization Procedures, Exhibit A. In the Matter 
of the Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing Electronic Surveillance of 
a United States Person Agent of a Foreign Power, No. [omitted] (FISA Ct. 1997), 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0008-0048.pdf [http://perma.cc/5SDS-
X34B]; Submission of Amendment to Standard Minimization Procedures, In re Amendment 
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Standard Minimization Procedures for Electronic 
Surveillance and Physical Search, No. [omitted] (FISA Ct. 2006), 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0008-0046.pdf [http://perma.cc/8DSC-
7JUG].  
54 For example, the 702 minimization procedures require: “A communication identified as a 
domestic communication will be promptly destroyed upon recognition unless the Director 
(or Acting Director) of NSA specifically determines, in writing,” that various prerequisites 
for retention are satisfied. US ATT’Y GEN. ERIC HOLDER, EXHIBIT B: MINIMIZATION 
PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH 
ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED § 5 (Oct. 31, 2011) 
[hereinafter SECTION 702 NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES], https://perma.cc/8LBM-
CRRZ.  
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legalistic method of reasoned elaboration,55 as they explain why the outcome 
they favor should be adopted by the official authorized to decide. As Mary 
Lawton, the Department of Justice lawyer who helped to draft FISA and was 
for several decades the most influential bureaucrat of intelligence legalism,56 
explained in 1993, “[i]mplicit in these requirements are certain formidable 
bureaucratic constraints: articulation, consideration, consensus and personal 
accountability,” which together slow down and rationalize actions 
proposed. 57  Both “articulation” and “consideration” are characteristic of 
legalized decisions. Third, the procedures empower lawyers: they must be 
approved by the Attorney General, and therefore first by DOJ lawyers, prior 
to being offered to the FISA Court for its signoff.58 Fourth, once approved, 
the procedures acquire the privileged status of federal court orders. 
Obedience becomes a compliance, rather than a policy, task for the NSA, 
subject to requirements of court disclosure and correction. 59  So if NSA 
fails—particularly if it fails systematically—the court might impose various 
consequences ranging from embarrassment for particular lawyers to 
withdrawing approval for a whole NSA program.60 It is evident that these 
consequences are only loosely coupled with the substantive importance of 
the disregarded minimization feature; the FISA court has sometimes scolded 
                                                 
55 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 143 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey 
eds., 1994). 
56 See Piette & Radack, supra note 34, at 449; Ronald Sullivan, Mary C. Lawton, 58: U.S. 
Official Shaped Intelligence Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 1993), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/30/obituaries/mary-c-lawton-58-us-official-shaped-
intelligence-policies.html; MCGEE & DUFFY, MAIN JUSTICE, supra note 34.  
57 Mary Lawton, Review and Accountability in the United States Intelligence Community, 
OPTIMUM, Aug. 1993, p. 101. I agree with Lawton that these dynamics taken together are 
essentially bureaucratic, in addition to being legalistic; Lawton wrote that in the intelligence 
arena as in so many other policy spaces, “[b]ureaucracy itself is the prime control 
mechanism.” Id. 
58 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (Title I FISA warrant for electronic surveillance); 50 U.S.C. § 
1821(4) (Title III FISA warrant for physical search); 50 U.S.C. § 1861(g) (Title V business 
record/tangible things search); 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e) (Title VII non-U.S. person abroad); 50 
U.S.C. § 1881b(b)(1)(d) (Title VII U.S. person abroad probable cause order); 50 U.S.C. § 
1881c(b)(4) (same, surveillance abroad).  
59 See FISA Court Rule 13, Correction of Misstatement or Omission; Disclosure of Non-
Compliance, http://perma.cc/9DKM-KQ9A (“(b) Disclosure of Non-Compliance. If the 
government discovers that any authority or approval granted by the Court has been 
implemented in a manner that did not comply with the Court’s authorization or approval or 
with applicable law, the government, in writing, must immediately inform the Judge to 
whom the submission was made of . . . the facts and circumstances relevant to the non-
compliance.”).  
60 See, e.g., In re Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 08-13, at 18 
(FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0011-
0005.pdf [http://perma.cc/7PS6-5UGK] (suspending the government’s ability to access 
telephony metadata collected pursuant its Section 215 authority except for the purpose of 
“ensuring data integrity and compliance with the Court’s orders,” and prohibiting the 
government from accessing any telephony metadata for the purpose of obtaining foreign 
intelligence unless the government requests such access from the Court on a case-by-case 
basis). 




the government for noncompliance with minimization orders whose features 
it agrees to relax in the very same opinion.61 
 
Post-September 11 amendments to and interpretations of FISA have 
vastly reduced the warrant-style individuation required for FISA-authorized 
surveillance. Under the FISA Amendments Act, the FISA Court now signs 
off on a massive program of targeted surveillance of foreigners—including 
when their communication is with an American—and on some smaller 
amount of targeted surveillance of U.S. persons abroad, without adjudicating 
the existence of probable cause for the targets.62 And we now know that at 
least two bulk metadata programs—one examining a broad array of domestic 
internet communications, and the other focusing on an even larger share of 
domestic phone calls—have been deemed authorized by FISA without 
individuated suspicion of any party to the communications. Much of FISA 
surveillance, 63  that is, no longer resembles ordinary domestic criminal 
practice. Nonetheless the basic legalizing structure has remained intact: 
lawyers prepare, and judges approve, the proposed surveillance, and it is 
accompanied by court-ratified minimization procedures given the force of 
law.  
 
C. Executive Order 12,333 
 
Executive Order 12,333 (invariably referred to orally as, simply, 
“twelve triple three”) is the “foundational” federal surveillance authority, 
applicable to all activities not otherwise regulated that touch or might touch 
U.S. person information.64 Executive Order 12,333 has been amended three 
times since President Reagan issued it first in 1981, most recently and 
significantly in 2008, but it has retained its basic character. 65  As the 
                                                 
61 In 2009, for example, Judge Reggie B. Walton allowed the government to continue using 
“defeat lists” in its handling of PR/TT metadata, even though those defeat lists “deviated, at 
least in part,” from court-approved procedures. See Supplemental Order, No. PR/TT 
[Redacted], at 2 (FISA Ct. June 22, 2009), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-
DC-0013-0001.pdf [http://perma.cc/9DFW-PJAB]. And in 2012, Judge Bates authorized 
“upstream” collection of internet communications under Section 702, even though he had 
previously held such collection to violate court orders. See Memorandum Opinion, No. 
PR/TT [Redacted] (FISA Ct. 2012), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-
0057-0008.pdf [http://perma.cc/SKU6-QYAS]. 
62  FISA Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 2436 Stat. 122 (2008); 50 U.S.C. § 
1881a(e); 50 U.S.C. § 1881b(b)(1)(D); 50 U.S.C. § 1881c(b)(4) (minimization procedures 
for targeted searches abroad). 
63 For the terms of the internet metadata program, see Bates 2010 PR/TT Opinion, supra 
note 48; Kollar-Kotelly 2004 PR/TT Opinion, supra note 48, at 43–44.  For the terms of the 
telephony metadata program, see the minimization procedures cited supra note 52. 
64 See NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY: MISSIONS, AUTHORITIES, 
OVERSIGHT AND PARTNERSHIPS 2 (August 9, 2013), http://perma.cc/968K-YRXR. 
65 See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 1981), amended by Exec. Order 
No. 13,284, 68 Fed. Reg. 4075 (Jan. 23, 2003); Exec. Order No. 13,355, 69 Fed. Reg. 53594 
(Aug. 27, 2004); and Exec. Order No. 13,470, 73 Fed. Reg. 45325 (July 30, 2008). For 
Exec. Order No. 12,333’s predecessors, see Exec. Order No. 11,905, 41 Fed. Reg. 7703 
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organizing document for the nation’s intelligence operations, it applies to the 
entire Intelligence Community (IC). 66  Individual IC elements then 
implement it via more focused guidelines, which are required to be signed 
by the Attorney General. 67  For the wide swathes of foreign intelligence 
surveillance that are not covered by FISA, regulation under Executive Order 
12,333 occurs without judicial involvement. That is, where FISA does not 
apply, it is 12,333 that limits the collection, retention, use, and dissemination 
of U.S. person information, no matter what the method of surveillance—
even if, for example, the communications are acquired from some foreign 
partner agency. The Executive Order explains that its “general principles . . . 
in addition to and consistent with applicable laws, are intended to achieve 
the proper balance between the acquisition of essential information and 
protection of individual interests.”68 For surveillance, its basic approach is 
two-fold: it insists on in-advance fully vetted written procedures, and it 
authorizes specific surveillance without court approval only if the Attorney 
General approves.  
 
On the first point, surveillance, retention, use, and dissemination 
procedures must be approved in advance at a very high level within the 
administration; the Executive Order does not use the word “minimization” 
but the idea is the same. Such procedures are generally developed by the IC 
element involved, in consultation (in the most recent version) with the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence, and then must be approved by the 
Attorney General.69 Attorney General-approved procedures are required for:  
 
• Coordination of counterintelligence activities and the clandestine 
collection of foreign intelligence inside the United States.70  
• Intelligence collection, retention, and dissemination concerning 
U.S. persons.71  
• Intelligence collection within the U.S. or directed against U.S. 
persons abroad.72  
                                                                                                                             
(Feb. 18, 1976) (Ford administration); Exec. Order No. 12036, 43 Fed. Rev. 3674 (Jan. 24, 
1978) (Carter administration). 
66 Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 3.5(h) (listing the many agencies, departments, and offices that 
comprise the “Intelligence Community”).  
67 Id. § 3.2.  
68 Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 2.2. 
69  See Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 2.3 (procedures governing collection, retention, 
dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons); § 2.4 (procedures governing 
collection within the U.S. or directed against U.S. persons abroad); § 2.9 (procedures 
governing IC element personnel surreptitious participation in an organization in the U.S.); 
§ 3.2 (everything else in Part 2); see also § 2.3(j) (procedures on dissemination of SIGINT 
are to be developed by the DNI, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense; AG approval 
is required). 
70 Id. § 1.3(b)(20).  
71 Id. § 2.3 (developed by IC element, consultation with DNI).  
72 Id. § 2.4 (developed by IC element, consultation with DNI).  




• How information possessed by all the executive agencies is 
provided to or accessed by the IC, and how that information may 
be used or shared.73  
• Dissemination of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).74  
 
Evidently the Attorney General’s disapproval on “constitutional or other 
legal grounds” is final. But the Attorney General is authorized to disapprove 
for other, non-legal reasons as well: “[W]here the element head or 
department head and the Attorney General are unable to reach agreements 
on other than constitutional or other legal grounds, the Attorney General, the 
head of department concerned, or the Director shall refer the matter to the 
NSC [National Security Council].”75  
 
What has emerged from this E.O. 12,333 process is a number of IC-
element-specific “AG Guidelines.” Once issued, these are bureaucratically 
difficult to change.76 For the NSA, as part of the Department of Defense, the 
Executive Order 12,333 Attorney General guidelines were signed in 1982 as 
part of Department of Defense Directive 5240.1-R, and have not since been 
modified. 77  These are joined by other similarly amendment-resistant 
documents. At the NSA, such documents include a (now mostly 
de)classified annex governing NSA’s role and procedures 78 ; another 
document titled U.S. Signals Intelligence Directive 18 (generally referred to 
as USSID 18), which in turn has its own (de)classified annex and was 
apparently last updated in 2011 79 ; and a formal policy document most 
recently issued in 2004, with yet another (de)classified annex. 80 
Substantively, these documents together function like FISA minimization 
procedures, although they are laxer in several ways. Procedurally, however, 
they are very different. For FISA minimization, written justifications and 
                                                 
73 Id. § 1.3(a)(2).  
74 Id. § 2.3(j) (developed by DNI, in coordination with the Defense Secretary).  
75 Id. § 3.2.  
76 For example, the AG Guidelines on Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that 
Affect United States Persons were signed in 1982. See DEP’T OF DEF., PROCEDURES 
GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF DOD INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS THAT AFFECT UNITED 
STATES PERSONS (DoD 5240.1-R, Dec. 1982) [hereinafter DOD DIRECTIVE 5240.1-R], 
http://perma.cc/X9QM-JR8E. For an account of the contentious process of reissuing one set 
of AG Guidelines, governing the National Counter-Terrorism Center, see Margo Schlanger, 
Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 53, 88–92 (2014), and sources cited. 
77 See DOD DIRECTIVE 5240.1-R, supra note 76.  
78 See NAT’L SEC. AGENCY & CENT. SEC. SERV., CLASSIFIED ANNEX TO DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE PROCEDURES UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333, at 9 (ID 3199129, Mar. 11, 2004), 
available at https://perma.cc/EF7J-99CA.  
79 See USSID 18, supra note 49. The 1993 version is also available: 1993 USSID 18, supra 
note 49, at 26, along with its declassified Annex A, at 51–62.  
80  NAT’L SEC. AGENCY & CENT. SEC. SERV., NSA/CSS POLICY 1–23 (Mar. 11, 2004), 
https://perma.cc/4XSA-J2GX. The classified annex was apparently signed by Deputy 
Secretary of Defense William R. Taft and Attorney General Edwin Meese in April and May 
1988, respectively. See id. at A-13. 
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explanations of each program are filed with the FISA Court and undergird 
each eventual court approval. Any change in the underlying processes might 
be material to the Court’s approval, and therefore needs to be explained.81 
For E.O. 12,333 processes, the AG Guidelines are more freestanding; there 
is no subsequent formal implementation check. Thus even apart from the 
greater leeway allowed by the AG Guidelines, compared to FISA-approved 
minimization procedures, the result is substantially more operational 
freedom under 12,333 than under FISA.  
 
In addition to its requirements of Attorney General-approved 
processes, Executive Order 12,333 “delegate[s]” to the Attorney General the 
authority “to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within the United 
States or against a United States person abroad, of any technique for which a 
warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes,” if 
the Attorney General finds “probable cause to believe that the technique is 
directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”82 Under 
this provision, the Attorney General operates essentially like a warrant-
granting magistrate, with operational control of the decision to initiate 
surveillance. (This requirement has been largely superseded by FISA Title 
VII, but it remains operative in some rare situations, and also in 
emergencies.83) While there is no judicial involvement, the process is very 
similar to a judicial one; the same lawyers who prepare FISA applications 
prepare a similar application for the Attorney General to approve (or 
reject).84 
 
As a whole, then, notwithstanding the entire absence of court 
involvement, E.O. 12,333 is a key source of intelligence legalism. It is worth 
noting, too, that its text was one of the sites around which intelligence 
legalism was hotly contested. One of the Order’s drafters, Richard Willard, 
recounted a few years later that when he arrived at the Department of Justice 
early in the Reagan administration, as Attorney General Smith’s Counsel for 
Intelligence Policy, “holdover [career] officials in the intelligence 
                                                 
81 See, e.g., In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the 
Prod. of Tangible Things From [Redacted], No. BR 09-06, at 4 (FISA Ct. June 22, 2009), 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0013-0001.pdf [http://perma.cc/2295-
SDDT] (“First, the government disclosed in its filings in Docket No. PR/TT [REDACTED] 
that NSA has generally failed to adhere to the special dissemination restrictions originally 
proposed by the government, repeatedly relied upon by the Court in authorizing the 
collection of the PR/TT metadata, and incorporated into the Court’s orders as binding on 
NSA.”). See id. at 2 (“As the government has acknowledged, its practices with regard to the 
creation and use of defeat lists for selectors deviated, at least in part, from the procedures 
governing the handling of PRITT metadata. It is important to note that the procedures at 
issue were devised by the government and incorporated into the Court’s orders as binding 
upon the NSA at the government’s suggestion. Had the government initially proposed 
procedures permitting defeat list practices such as those described in the [redacted] 
Response and the [redacted] Declaration, the Court likely would have found them 
reasonable and would have incorporated such procedures in its orders.”).  
82 Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 2.5. 
83 IC Attorney Interview, supra note 15.  
84 Id. 




community were busily drafting a new Executive order on intelligence 
activities that would virtually eliminate the legal oversight role of the 
Attorney General,” because of the “enormous pent-up hostility in the 
intelligence community toward lawyers and legalistic restrictions.”85 This 
“attitude was not an invention of the Republican political appointees—who 
at that time were not yet that numerous—but permeated the career 
service.”86 It was his assignment, he explained, to mold Executive Order 
12,333 into something more “balanced” 87—that is, more pro-lawyer. He 
succeeded; E.O. 12,333 inserted the Attorney General deep into intelligence 
policy and even operations. This intervention marked a sharp change. 
Willard notes that in his time at the department,  
 
[t]he Attorney General was not a full member of the cabinet-
level group that considered these [foreign intelligence and 
policy] matters but was only ‘invited’ to attend. It is my 
understanding that Attorney General Meese was later made a 
member of the group, but that even then some effort was 
made to insist that he was a member in his personal capacity 
and not as Attorney General. . . . As a consequence of the 
Attorney General’s uncertain status in the process, his 
subordinates were generally excluded from working groups 
and subcabinet-level deliberations.88 
  
In total, while the tendency is more extreme for FISA, each of the two 
foundational documents for foreign intelligence surveillance, FISA and 
Executive Order 12,333, has moved surveillance programs in legalistic 
directions, emphasizing rules and empowering lawyers.  
 
The political theories underlying both of the 1970s intelligence 
reform strategies, disclosure and legalism, are obvious: disclosure serves 
accountability, and legalism serves the rule of law. But neither one directly 
seeks the appropriate balance between liberty and surveillance, however 
appropriateness is evaluated. One would therefore expect institutional 
arrangements premised on these two theories to serve disclosure and 
legalism, but to fail to prioritize, or even to weigh, individual’s liberty 
interests when they are in tension with surveillance goals. This produces 
what I call the civil liberties gap. Part II explores whether this gap exists in 
practice, describing the NSA’s existing compliance and oversight systems in 
some detail. 
 
                                                 
85 Richard K. Willard, Law and the National Security Decision-Making Process in the 
Reagan Administration, 11 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 129, 130 (1988).  
86 Id.  
87 Id.  
88 Willard, supra note 86, at 131–32.  
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II. The NSA’s Existing Compliance and Oversight Ecosystem 
 
The NSA’s General Counsel, Rajesh De, has described the NSA’s 
total oversight apparatus as extremely thorough. “It is evident to me,” De 
said in a speech in early 2013, “that I am the general counsel for one of the 
most highly regulated entities in the world.” 89  With more exasperation, 
former NSA General Counsel Stewart Baker has argued that the whole 
system—an “army of second-guessers”—is too constraining:  
 
The judges of the FISA court have cleared law clerks who 
surely see themselves as counterweights to the government’s 
lawyers. The government’s lawyers themselves come not 
from the intelligence community but from a Justice 
Department office that sees itself as a check on the 
intelligence community and feels obligated to give the FISA 
court facts and arguments that it would not offer in an 
adversary hearing. There may be a dozen offices that think 
their job is to act as a check on the intelligence community’s 
use of FISA: inspectors general, technical compliance 
officers, general counsel, intelligence community staffers, 
and more.90 
 
Baker’s estimated dozen offices was, in fact, the precise number:  
 
• NSA Office of the Director of Compliance  
• NSA Office of the General Counsel 
• NSA Office of the Inspector General 
• DOJ National Security Division, Office of Intelligence  
• Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight 
• Intelligence Community Office of the Inspector General 
• ODNI Civil Liberties Protection Office 
• ODNI Office of the General Counsel 
• ODNI Mission Integration Division (Office of the Deputy 
Director for Intelligence Integration) 
• President’s Intelligence Advisory Board, Intelligence Oversight 
Board  
• FISA Court and FISA Court of Review 
• Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
 
Add to that the newest office—NSA’s Civil Liberties and Privacy Office.  
 
                                                 
89 Rajesh De, Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Sec. Agency, Address at Georgetown Law School (Feb. 
27, 2013), http://perma.cc/RP2N-9DB8.  
90  Strengthening Privacy Rights and National Security: Oversight of FISA Surveillance 
Programs: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (July 29, 2013) 
(testimony of Stewart Baker, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson LLP), http://perma.cc/T4Z3-
SQ5W. 




In total, more than a few hundred people spend all or a substantial 
part of their work weeks on NSA compliance and oversight. This enormous 
staffing commitment itself demonstrates real commitment to abiding by the 
FISA and 12,333 rules. (In other topic areas, one might suspect that the 
commitment is to being seen to abide by the rules—but the IC’s secrecy 
undercuts that cynical interpretation.) Nonetheless, inevitably, the agency is 
far from perfectly compliant. On occasion, compliance errors have been 
extremely widespread: In 2009, the government disclosed a series of 
significant compliance failures to the FISA Court affecting both the internet 
and telephony metadata programs. These included systemic failures to 
comply with the reasonable articulable suspicion standard, by use of less-
strictly vetted alert lists and seed accounts; unauthorized sharing of 
unminimized query results with other agency personnel; and collection of 
fields of metadata beyond what was allowed by court order on nearly all the 
internet metadata records.91 In addition, in 2011, the government reported 
that the “upstream” methods it was using to surveil American internet 
communications abroad were incapable of confining NSA access to only 
communications that met the standard for collection.92 These were extremely 
significant failures, and they prompted some moderately robust responses—
creation of the current NSA compliance office,93 augmentation of the Justice 
Department oversight role, 94  and some stern (though for years secret) 
lectures by the FISA Court judges.95  
                                                 
91 NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, BUSINESS RECORDS FISA NSA REVIEW 8, 16 (June 25, 2009) 
(Section 215 telephony metadata), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-
0014-0001.pdf [http://perma.cc/JBB9-R569]; NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, PEN REGISTER/TRAP 
AND TRACE FISA NSA REVIEW (date redacted), 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0065-0002.pdf [http://perma.cc/336Q-
6942].  
92  Memorandum Opinion, No. [Redacted], at 5 (FISA Ct. Oct. 3, 2011), 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0057-0002.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/US7V-7S6B]. 
93 DeLong interview, supra note 15. 
94 Compare In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring 
the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], No. BR 07-16, § 3(E) (FISA Ct. Oct. 
18, 2007), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0036-0001.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/CY7M-UF5K] (requiring the Justice Department to review a sample of the 
NSA’s justifications for querying archived data at least once every ninety days), and In re 
Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of 
Tangible Things From [Redacted], No. BR 08-08 § 3(E) (FISA Ct. Aug. 19, 2008), 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0040-0001.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/BNU9-Q879] (same, every sixty days), with In re Application of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things 
From [Redacted], BR 09-15, § 3(M), (N) (FISA Ct. Oct. 30, 2009), 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0016-0002.pdf [http://perma.cc/ST3K-
TWSY] (requiring the NSA’s OGC to consult with NSD on all significant legal opinions 
that relate to authorizations by the FISA court), and In re Application of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], 
BR 09-19, § 3(O), (P), (Q), (R) (FISA Ct. Dec. 16, 2009), 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0053-0006.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/8JWM-AY34] (requiring the NSA’s OGC to provide NSD with copies of 




It is surely reasonable to expect better than these low points. But it 
would be unrealistic to demand either perfect compliance or perfect 
detection of noncompliance. Both are unattainable for an organization as 
complex as the NSA, governed by rulesets as complex as the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, Executive Order 12,333, and their related 
procedural documents. Error, after all, has many causes. Sometimes the rules 
are misunderstood or miscommunicated. 96  Sometimes someone who 
understands the rules makes a mistake—enters a typo, for example, 97 or 
seeks approval later than the rules require.98 Sometimes, one can imagine, 
systems fail—a computer algorithm that is supposed to distinguish among 
people with different statuses might miscategorize a new status, for example. 
And sometimes people try to defeat the rules.99 In a system as massive and 
                                                                                                                             
all formal briefing and/or training materials used to brief and train NSA personnel in regard 
to the authorizations granted by the order). 
95 See, e.g., In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring 
the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], No. BR 09-13, at 4 (FISA Ct. Sept. 25, 
2009), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0015-0002.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/S44V-72TP] (stating that “[t]he Court is deeply troubled” by compliance 
failures and ordering representatives of the NSA and NSD to appear before the court to 
explain); Order, No. PR/TT [Redacted], at 6 (FISA Ct. June 22, 2009), 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0029-0001.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/7RGY-FML8] (“The Court is gravely concerned . . . that NSA analysts, 
cleared and otherwise, have generally not adhered to the dissemination restrictions proposed 
by the government, repeatedly relied upon by the Court in authorizing the collection of the 
PR/TT metadata, and incorporated into the Court’s orders in this matter [redacted] as 
binding on NSA.”); In re Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], No. BR 08-13, at 
5–8 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0011-
0005.pdf [http://perma.cc/KFT2-WZME] (stating that the government’s justification for its 
non-compliance with the FISA Court’s orders “strain[ed] credulity” and admonishing the 
government for its systemic compliance failures and “material misrepresentations” to the 
Court). 
96 See, e.g., Bates 2010 PR/TT Opinion, supra note 48, at 10–11 (reporting unauthorized 
collection of data that “did not result from technical difficulty or malfunction, but rather 
from a failure of ‘those NSA officials who understood in detail the requirements of the . . . 
[authorization] . . . to communication those requirements effectively to the [redacted] who 
were directly responsible’ for the implementation”).  
97 The Washington Post has reported that a “quality assurance” document (apparently not 
yet made public) says that in 2008, a typo in a program substituting the U.S. area code 202 
for the international code 20-2 led to the collection of metadata about a “large number” of 
calls placed from Washington, D.C., instead of Cairo, Egypt. Barton Gellman, NSA Broke 
Privacy Rules Thousands of Times Per Year, Audit Finds, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2013, 
http://perma.cc/9YNY-DGZ5. For more routine typo errors, see, e.g., SID Oversight & 
Compliance, NSAW SID Intelligence Oversight (IO) Quarterly Report – First Quarter 
Calendar Year 2012 (1 January – 31 March 2012) Executive Summary, (May 3, 2012), 
http://perma.cc/59GV-GD6D.  
98  See ATT’Y GEN. & DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, SEMIANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF 
COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND SURVEILLANCE ACT 24 (Aug. 2013), http://perma.cc/9PG9-
ST3T (describing reporting delays).  
99 See Letter from George Ellard, Inspector General, National Security Agency to Sen. 
Charles E. Grassley, Committee on the Judiciary (Sep. 11, 2013), 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/171424593/NSA-Surveillance-LOVEINT. 




complicated as the NSA’s signals intelligence program, even an extremely 
low rate of error can add up.100 (Although because most of the information 
collected does not involve persons in the U.S. or Americans abroad, these 
errors frequently do not violate anyone’s constitutional rights, under current 
doctrine.) Of course, each type of error can be reduced. But compliance 
errors are often hydraulic—pushing out errors in one place is likely to 
introduce at least some errors in another place.101 The goal, then, is not zero 
errors, but rather, as the NSA’s Director of Compliance puts it, to “assure 
compliance at a reasonable level.” 102 NSA has not always achieved that 
goal—but it musters substantial effort to do so. 
 
A. NSA Offices 
 
Four offices at the NSA address civil liberties and privacy issues: the 
Office of the Director of Compliance, the Civil Liberties and Privacy Office, 
the Office of the Inspector General, and the Office of General Counsel. All 
but the second are compliance offices; the new civil liberties office is a 
policy development shop. I discuss them in turn.  
 
1. NSA Compliance Office  
 
The NSA has a central compliance office, the Office of the Director 
of Compliance, whose current (and founding) head, John DeLong, reports to 
the NSA’s director. The compliance office grew out of several serious 
compliance problems exposed to the FISA Court in 2009,103 and gained its 
statutory authority in 2010. It is assigned “responsib[ility] for the programs 
of compliance over mission activities.”104 Although the office is mentioned 
specifically only in some of the FISA minimization procedures, it seems to 
deal comprehensively not just with FISA-court supervised intelligence, but 
                                                 
100 Consider the estimate that the NSA collects about 100 billion pieces of information from 
the internet monthly. See Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, Boundless Informant: The 
NSA’s Secret Tool to Track Global Surveillance Data, THE GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013), 
http://perma.cc/HL5N-FV3S. The oft-cited “six sigma” business goal of no more than 3.4 
defective parts per million, see, e.g., MIKEL HARRY & RICHARD SCHROEDER, SIX SIGMA: 
THE BREAKTHROUGH MANAGEMENT STRATEGY REVOLUTIONIZING THE WORLD’S TOP 
CORPORATIONS (2000), would mean 340,000 monthly errors in that collection.  
101 For example, if a system guards against typos by offering only normalized inputs, via a 
pull-down menu, then that may greatly reduce the number of typing errors, but it 
simultaneously creates the opportunity for a more significant error if whoever inputs the 
menu options makes a mistake. 
102 Benjamin Wittes, Lawfare Podcast Episode #53: Inside NSA, Part II – Wherein We 
Interview the Agency’s Chief of Compliance, John DeLong, LAWFARE (Dec. 17, 2013), 
http://perma.cc/PP7E-928Y.  
103 See text accompanying supra note 91. 
104 Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2010, 50 U.S.C. § 3602(3) (“There is a Director of 
Compliance of the National Security Agency, who shall be appointed by the Director of the 
National Security Agency and who shall be responsible for the programs of compliance over 
mission activities of the National Security Agency.”).  
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with all the procedures that are approved by the Attorney General under 
Executive Order 12,333—which means all the NSA’s collection activities, 
as well as the retention, analysis, and dissemination of any U.S. person 
information. The NSA’s compliance office is a member of the bureaucratic 
species I have labeled “Offices of Goodness”—it is an office within an 
operational agency that is: advisory rather than operational; tasked with 
furthering a particular value not otherwise primary for the agency in which it 
sits; and internal and dependent on its agency.105 (I label that value with the 
placeholder, “Goodness,” because the creator of the office obviously 
believes the particular value to be good.) For the NSA compliance office, the 
value that infuses its existence is, well, compliance: its mission is to 
facilitate NSA’s compliance with constraints imposed upon the agency, 
detecting noncompliance consistently and rapidly.106 
 
The compliance office has a staff of about 30. A much larger 
contingent of compliance staff—about another 270 employees—work within 
NSA’s various operational units. The chain of command for these employees 
runs up through the heads of their units. But they report secondarily, via “as 
thick a dotted line as can be imagined,” to the central compliance office.107 
The office was revamped and empowered in 2009, when many significant 
compliance problems came to light in FISA proceedings. Before that, there 
were fewer than 100 compliance staff throughout the NSA, including an 
Office of Oversight and Compliance housed deeper in the organizational 
chart, within the NSA’s Foreign Intelligence Directorate. Currently, the 
compliance staff’s tasks include developing procedures; working with 
engineers to hardwire the relevant requirements into computer systems; 
training; certifying procedures to the FISA Court; conducting both routine 
and broad compliance monitoring and reviews; and reviewing incidents of 
non-compliance. Thus NSA compliance staff work in an iterative way on 
non-compliance prevention, detection, and response, using both proactive 
and reactive strategies. DeLong explains that his office’s current incarnation 
is modeled after corporate compliance offices, which frequently (particularly 
since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) are placed outside the general 
counsel’s office and with an office head who reports to the CEO. The work, 
DeLong says, is “organized functionally—for example, collecting, targeting, 
querying, sharing. That makes it easier to build compliance systems; it’s 
good if those are somewhat uniform across activities. We’re not stove-piped 
by authority, except for Section 215 [the telephony metadata program].”108 
                                                 
105 Schlanger, Offices of Goodness, supra note 76. 
106 Email from John DeLong to author (Sept. 6, 2014) (on file with author). 
107 DeLong Interview, supra note 15.  
108 Id. For other sources in which DeLong has described his office, see Aliya Sternstein, At 
NSA, Computers Sometimes Make the Policy Calls, NEXTGOV (Aug. 20, 2012), 
http://perma.cc/7248-KKXC; Aliya Sternstein, Compliance with Wiretap Law is 
Transparent, NSA Says, NEXTGOV (Aug. 29, 2012), http://perma.cc/426M-VW34; Aliya 
Sternstein, Eyes on Spies, GOV’T EXEC. (Oct. 1, 2012) http://perma.cc/7LEF-SJ7X; Aliya 
Sternstein, Meet the NSA Officer Charged With Balancing Surveillance and Civil Liberties, 
NEXTGOV (Oct. 15, 2012), http://perma.cc/G5TN-UAE4; Julia Ziegler, NSA Clears Up 
Misconceptions About Compliance, FED. NEWS RADIO (Nov. 8, 2012), 





The infrastructure that compliance staff use to accomplish this work 
is quite comprehensive. For example, under the applicable minimization 
rules, the NSA’s systems used for FISA surveillance are built to create an 
audit trail. Database queries create a record that can later be reviewed to 
ensure that the person who provided the query had the right credentials and 
the required training, that the query itself met applicable rules, and so on. 
Compliance personnel are responsible for conducting periodic reviews that 
are thus enabled. Non-compliant uses are categorized, analyzed, and 
reported,109 and sometimes new systematic safeguards are put in place as a 
result.110  
 
Incident review systems supplement the periodic reviews. All NSA 
personnel are required to report any compliance mistakes or episodes of 
noncompliance with relevant court orders or other rules. 111 These reports 
then are distributed to the compliance office, as well as to the NSA Office of 
General Counsel (OGC) and NSA Office of the Inspector General (OIG). 
                                                                                                                             
http://perma.cc/PY6Y-B5NM; John M. DeLong, For Agencies, the Intersection of 
Technology and Compliance Is Complex, FEDTECH (Feb. 4, 2013), http://perma.cc/8BYM-
C7TC; Benjamin Wittes, Lawfare Podcast Episode #53: Inside NSA, Part II – Wherein We 
Interview the Agency’s Chief of Compliance, John DeLong, LAWFARE (Dec. 17, 2013), 
http://perma.cc/A3GF-AMZK; NSA Compliance Director on Privacy Regulations, DEFENSE 
NEWS, http://www.defensenews.com/VideoNetwork/2150661626001/NSA-Compliance-
Director-on-Privacy-Regulations (last visited Aug. 16, 2014); NSA Compliance Director on 
Keeping the Spies in Line, DEFENSE NEWS, 
http://www.defensenews.com/VideoNetwork/2150661623001/NSA-Compliance-Director-
on-Keeping-the-Spies-In-Line (last visited Aug. 16, 2014).  
109 For a still-classified example, see NSA Report on Privacy Violations in the First Quarter 
of 2012, http://perma.cc/484V-A84Q. A few 702 compliance reports have been declassified, 
but all but the last are too heavily redacted to provide much information. See Semiannual 
Assessment of Compliance with FISA Amendments Act Procedures and Guidelines, 
Submitted by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (March 2009) 
(reporting period: Sept. 4, 2008–Nov. 30, 2008), https://perma.cc/HY5F-6PB9; Semiannual 
Assessment of Compliance with Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Submitted by the Attorney General and the 
Director of National Intelligence (Dec. 2009) (reporting period: Dec. 1, 2008–May 31, 
2009), https://perma.cc/8LHZ-XMVE; Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with 
Procedures and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, Submitted by the Attorney General and the Director Of National 
Intelligence (May 2010) (reporting period: June 1, 2009–Nov. 30, 2009), 
https://perma.cc/QNN7-DAHD; Semiannual Assessment of Compliance with Procedures 
and Guidelines Issued Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 
Submitted by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence (Aug. 2013) 
(reporting period: June 1, 2012–Nov. 2012), http://perma.cc/RS3R-FKQV.  
110 Delong Interview, supra note 15. 
111 DOD DIRECTIVE 5240.1-R, supra note 76, at C15.3.1.1 (“Each employee shall report any 
questionable activity to the General Counsel or Inspector General for the DoD intelligence 
component concerned, or to the General Counsel, DoD, or ATSD(IO).”); id. at C15.2.1 
(“The term ‘questionable activity’ . . . refers to any conduct that constitutes, or is related to, 
an intelligence activity that may violate the law, any Executive order or Presidential 
directive, including E.O. 12,333 . . . or applicable DoD policy, including this Regulation.”).  
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For the 702 program, NSA OGC also forwards each incident report to the 
Department of Justice and to the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI).112 All FISA compliance errors are to be disclosed to 
the FISA judge who approved the relevant order.113 For non-FISA matters, 
where the NSA OGC “ha[s] reason to believe” that the incident “may be 
unlawful or contrary to executive order or presidential directive,” further 
reports go, via ODNI, to the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board.114 
Each of these incidents requires follow up within NSA: compliance staff 
share the obligation to follow up with the Office of the Inspector General.  
 
Overall, the compliance office performs a blend of compliance 
oversight and what DeLong calls “rules coaching”:  
 
A compliance officer and the compliance organization is 
there really as more of a rules coach, if you will . . . not 
deciding what the rules are—that’s the lawyers and policy 
folks—not building technology, not doing operations, but 
getting in there, rolling our sleeves up, right? Really kind of 
on the field . . . not as a referee, not . . . up in the stands, but 
as . . . a rules coach.115 
 
2. NSA Office of Civil Liberties and Privacy  
 
Within a few weeks of the Snowden disclosures, the President 
announced that the NSA would “put in place a full-time civil liberties and 
privacy officer.” 116  This particular bureaucratic structure is one that has 
developed over the past decade, during which several IC components and 
agencies that include such components—ODNI, CIA, DoD, DHS, DOJ, and 
others—have added Privacy and Civil Liberties Offices.117 Apparently the 
                                                 
112  ATT’Y GEN. & DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, SEMIANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF 
COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND SURVEILLANCE ACT A-7 (Aug. 2013) [hereinafter 
SEMIANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES], http://perma.cc/M7PN-BFX5. 
113 See FISA Court Rule 13, http://perma.cc/ADY8-PGEH.  
114 See Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 1.6(c); Exec. Order No. 13,462 §§ 6(b)(i)(a), 7. (Note that 
Exec. Order No. 13,462 refers to § 1.7 of Exec. Order No. 12,333, which was subsequently 
renumbered.) 
115  NSA Compliance Director on Privacy Regulations, DEFENSE NEWS, 
http://www.defensenews.com/VideoNetwork/2150661626001/NSA-Compliance-Director-
on-Privacy-Regulations (last visited Aug. 16, 2014). 
116 Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in a Press Conference 
(Aug. 9, 2013), http://perma.cc/R8AZ-EP76.  
117 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1(a); see also Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458, §§ 1011, 1061, 118 Stat. 3638, 3658-59, 3688. These positions 
are variously constituted as career or political appointments. In some organizations they 
report directly to the agency head, but in others they are substantially lower down in the 
organization chart. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Office Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of 
Def., Results of the office of the Secretary of Defense Organizational Review, OSD 014014-
13 (Dec. 4, 2013), https://perma.cc/SD3H-U9EL; Biography of Michael L. Rhodes – 
Director of Administration and Management (OSD), U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 




introduction of a civil liberties and privacy officer was not forced upon the 
NSA; officials there sponsored and embraced the idea. 118  The job 
announcement went up in September 2013, 119  and the new NSA Civil 
Liberties and Privacy Officer, Rebecca Richards, began work four months 
later.120  
The role was clearly designed to be a policy job—helping to develop 
the rules, not merely promoting compliance with them. The job posting 
included the following specific duties: 
  
b. As the senior architect for CL/P [civil liberties/privacy], 
ensure that protections are addressed as part of all internal 
strategic decision processes related to the agency’s 
operations, key relationships, tradecraft, technologies, 
resources or policies. . . .  
e. Manage CL/P policy, and advise on related assessment and 
compliance programs. . . .  
h. Provide CL/P reviews and assessments as required of the 
NSA support to the U.S. Cyber Command.121 
 
As one might expect given the novelty of the position at the NSA, 
Richards is still working out her office’s role and procedures. She reports 
that the office, which currently has six other employees, has three main 
functions: providing advice to NSA’s Director, developing civil liberties and 
privacy protections, and enhancing public transparency. Her priority, she 
says, is to “build in” evaluation of civil liberties and privacy interests as part 
of the NSA’s mission processes. The compliance office will continue to 
manage compliance, and the Office of the General Counsel, legal analysis. 
But the new Civil Liberties and Privacy Office should be, she says, “the 
focal point at NSA for assessing mission-related civil liberties and privacy 
risks, helping with mitigation strategies, and communicating as appropriate 
with the public.” The office brings “a different perspective” into NSA 
conversations in furtherance of the goal of “reduc[ing] the impact of 
surveillance on ordinary people.” The job is both procedural and substantive: 
“My job is to bring together mission folks, and others to ask, systematically, 
what are we doing and why, and whether the privacy and civil liberties 
impacts are worth the operational gain.” What’s new about her office, she 
says, is that “we are taking a more comprehensive civil liberties and privacy 
risk assessment process that allows decision-makers to consider a broader set 
                                                                                                                             
http://perma.cc/FFE4-34MX (last visited Nov. 16, 2014); Defense Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Office: Organizational Structure, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., http://perma.cc/6CRR-
CEQS (last visited Nov. 16, 2014). 
118 DeLong Interview, supra note 15. 
119 Edward Moyer, NSA job post for ‘Civil Liberties & Privacy Officer’ goes live, CNET 
(Sept. 20, 2013, 3:28 PM), http://perma.cc/W775-SESB.  
120 Press Release, National Security Agency, NSA Announces New Civil Liberties and 
Privacy Officer (Jan. 29, 2014), http://perma.cc/2B2Z-W9TE. 
121 Moyer, supra note 119.  
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of civil liberties and privacy values beyond the Constitutional 
considerations, the laws and judicial interpretation.” In addition, Richards 
does substantial outreach, spending “quite a bit of [her] time engaging with 
the various privacy groups to better understand their concerns and share that 
within NSA.”122 
 
Richards points to “new presidential direction” as part of the impetus 
for change that underlies her new role. She anticipates that sometimes the 
result will be a decision by the NSA “not to pursue certain mission 
activities.” Other times the advice may not be to avoid an activity, but rather 
“protections that mitigate civil liberties and privacy impacts.”123  
 
 So far, the visible output of the new office has been two unclassified 
papers, one submitted to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board 
(PCLOB), summarizing surveillance under FISA Section 702 and the 
various policies that apply to it,124 and one about non-bulk collection under 
12,333.125 Richards received some criticism from observers who found the 
papers too positive; the surveillance go-to blog Emptywheel described the 
first one as “propaganda” that “doesn’t so much read as an independent 
statement on the privacy assessment of the woman at the NSA mandated 
with overseeing it, but rather a highly scripted press release.”126 Others have 
disagreed. For example, one commentator called the 702 paper “remarkable 
for its transparency.” 127  Richards defends these types of documents as 
appropriate steps towards transparency, pointing out that the NSA has never 
produced such reports in the past. She emphasizes that she does not 
conceptualize public criticism of the NSA as part of her new office’s role. 
The idea, rather, is to advocate internally for and implement civil liberties 
and privacy protections, and then advise the public what those protections 
are. The IG’s office, the PCLOB, and other entities can deliver public 
criticism.128  
 
                                                 
122 Richards Interview, supra note 15.  
123 Id. 
124  NSA DIRECTOR OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY OFFICE, REPORT: NSA’S 
IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT SECTION 702 (April 16, 
2014), http://perma.cc/4785-WRJ2.  
125  NSA DIRECTOR OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY OFFICE REPORT, NSA’S CIVIL 
LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY PROTECTIONS FOR TARGETED SIGINT ACTIVITIES UNDER 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 (Oct. 7, 2014), https://perma.cc/WZ5R-SKAP.  
126 NSA’s New “Privacy Officer” Releases Her First Propaganda, EMPTYWHEEL (Apr. 21, 
2014), http://perma.cc/D6VL-RYUE.  
127 John Kropf, Why the New NSA Section 702 Report Is Remarkable, PRIVACY PERSPECTIVES 
(Apr. 25, 2014), https://perma.cc/US7W-5T5R.  
128 Richards Interview, supra note 15. 




3. NSA Office of Inspector General  
 
The work of the NSA Office of Inspector General is authorized or 
required by statute,129 internal Department of Defense directives,130 and the 
FISA minimization rules themselves. IG staff play no role in NSA 
compliance development work—the engineering, procedure development, 
and the like. But their work with respect to audits and incident investigation 
complements that of the compliance office—absent the “rules coach” 
approach. Instead, the IG’s stance is more independent—such independence 
is, for this as for other federal IGs,131 the basic assignment.132 This kind of 
task-duplication but not role-duplication obtains more generally, too. IG 
inspections related to compliance matters are carried out in tandem, but not 
jointly, with either the compliance office or the Office of General Counsel, 
so that each is done by both ordinary agency and independent staff. When 
the IG investigates potentially criminal misconduct, however, its jurisdiction 
within NSA is generally exclusive.  
 
                                                 
129 See 5 U.S.C.A. App. 3 (generally, and especially § 8H); see also 50 U.S.C. § 3033 
(establishing the Inspector General for the Intelligence Community).  
130 DOD 5240.1-R instructs agency personnel to report “questionable activity” to the IG, 
and instructs the IG to seek out such activity even if not reported, and to promptly 
investigate. DOD DIRECTIVE 5240.1-R, supra note 76, at C15.3.1-.2. The results are then 
passed along in quarterly reports to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 
Oversight. Id. at C15.3.1-3.3. In addition, USSID 18 requires the IG to “[c]onduct regular 
inspections and perform general oversight of NSA/CSS activities to ensure compliance with 
this USSID,” and “[e]stablish procedures for reporting by NSA/CSS signals intelligence 
elements of their activities and practices for oversight purposes.” USSID 18, supra note 49, 
§§ 8.1(a)-(b). It requires the IG (along with the NSA’s Director and General Counsel) to 
report regularly on compliance matters to the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board, id. 
§ 8.2(f) and annually to the NSA’s Director, id. § 8.1(c). And OIG staff meet with 
Department of Justice NSD lawyers about telephony metadata every quarter “to discuss 
their respective oversight responsibilities and assess NSA’s compliance with the Court’s 
orders.” In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the 
Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 11-57, § F(v) (FISA Ct. Apr. 13, 2011) 
[hereinafter 2011 Section 215 Minimization Order], 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0046-0001.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/2EVC-CGN2]. Occasionally, the NSA OIG is also assigned a much more 
precise task. For example, for surveillance under E.O. 12,333, the OIG annually reviews 
NSA’s use of term searching. USSID 18, supra note 49, § 5.2 (“Annual Review by the 
Signals Intelligence Director”); § 5.2(c) (“A copy of the results of the review will be 
provided to the Inspector General (IG) and the GC.”).  
131 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and 
Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1744 (2006). The 
overall framework for Offices of Inspectors General is set by the Inspector General Act of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95–452, 92 Stat. 1101. It establishes that Inspectors General, whether 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, or “administratively appointed” by 
their agency head, have investigative and congressional reporting obligations. In 2006, 
Congress passed technical legislation to bolster the independence and access of the NSA 
and other national security IGs. See 5 U.S.C.A. App. 3 § 8G(a)(2); Pat Roberts, Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, To Accompany S. 3237, S.R. No. 109-259, §433, at 
29 (2006), http://perma.cc/VN9B-JYBV.  
132 See 5 U.S.C.A. App. 3 § 8H.  
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Others have written extensively about Intelligence Community IG’s 
Offices, 133 examining the parameters of their independence and efficacy. 
IG’s Offices clearly vary in their aggressiveness, expertise, and influence.134 
I have little to add here, except to note that IG’s offices are focused in nearly 
all their activity on whether their agencies have followed applicable rules—
and not on evaluation of those rules’ content. Indeed, the joining of 
misconduct investigations and other compliance reviews in the single entity 
of an IG’s office must tend to reinforce this mindset. The current NSA 
Inspector General, George Ellard, confirmed in a rare public appearance that 
he considers his oversight to cover the legality, not the wisdom, of NSA 
operations. Asked what he would have done if Snowden had come to him 
with complaints about the telephone metadata program, Ellard explained that 
he had an obligation to independently assess the program’s constitutionality. 
And discussing the efficacy of existing oversight systems, he emphasized the 
rarity of intentional law violations. Not once, however, did he hint that the 
NSA IG’s Office might ever independently assess program justifications or 
successes, to evaluate whether surveillance’s costs to liberty were 
worthwhile.135  
 
4. NSA Office of General Counsel 
 
NSA’s Office of General Counsel is the heart of intelligence legalism 
at NSA. Its role is more complex than that of the offices described above. 
Like the compliance office and the IG’s office, NSA OGC lawyers promote 
compliance with the applicable rules, including by working on the 
                                                 
133 For discussion of Inspectors General, see Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? 
Inspectors General and National Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027 (2013); Ryan 
M. Check & Afsheen J. Radsan, One Lantern in the Darkest Night: The CIA’s Inspector 
General, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 247 (2010); Kathryn E. Newcomer, The Changing 
Nature of Accountability: The Role of Inspector General in Federal Agencies, 58 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 129 (1998); Michael R. Bromwich, Running Special Investigations: The 
Inspector General Model, 86 GEO. L.J. 2027 (1998); PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING 
GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1993); 
INSPECTORS GENERAL: A NEW FORCE IN EVALUATION (Michael Hendricks et al. eds., 1990); 
Margaret J. Gates & Marjorie F. Knowles, The Inspector General Act in the Federal 
Government: A New Approach to Accountability, 36 ALA. L. REV. 473 (1984); CARMEN R. 
APAZA, INTEGRITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNMENT: HOMELAND SECURITY AND THE 
INSPECTOR GENERAL (2011); MARK H. MOORE & MARGARET JANE GATES, INSPECTORS-
GENERAL: JUNKYARD DOGS OR MAN’S BEST FRIEND (1986). 
134 It may or may not be a comment on the perceived aggressiveness of the NSA IG’s Office 
that the ODNI General Counsel worked in 2007 with congressional staffers to ensure that 
draft legislation did not empower the DOJ IG’s office to “review NSA’s compliance with 
acquisition and minimization procedures,” but rather left that task to NSA’s own IG. Email 
from Brett Gerry (Friday, October 12, 2007 2:40 PM), 
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/foia_C0705278/20091109_oip_group6.pdf. I was alerted 
to this document by The EFF FOIA Working Thread, EMPTYWHEEL (Nov. 12, 2009), 
http://perma.cc/RUE4-QMAA. 
135 Symposium, National Security Law & Policy Journal Symposium, GEORGETOWN LAW 
(Feb. 25, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://perma.cc/DJF5-LF4M (Panel III, A New Paradigm of 
Leaking). See especially the discussions starting at hour 4:23, 4:40, and 5:02. I thank Steve 
Vladeck for bringing this panel to my attention. 




development of compliance training and sharing various reporting 
obligations with the IG’s office staff. But OGC lawyers add to the mix rule 
interpretation: they help to determine what the rules mean by giving legal 
advice and participating in litigation.  
 
Like the compliance office and the IG’s office, NSA’s OGC has 
responsibility—usually but not always partial responsibility—for various 
oversight tasks.136 Under the telephony metadata minimization procedures, 
for example, NSA OGC staff are required to meet with staff from the 
compliance office and the Department of Justice National Security Division 
(NSD), described in the next section, to “assess[] compliance with this 
Court’s orders. Included in this meeting will be a review of NSA’s 
monitoring and assessment to ensure that only approved metadata is being 
acquired.”137 Along with NSD, NSA OGC must also “review a sample of the 
justifications for [Reasonable Articulable Suspicion] RAS approvals for 
selection terms used to query the BR metadata.”138 And when term searching 
is used on communications surveilled under Executive Order 12,333, a 
review of those terms is required to be performed by operational supervisors, 
with “[a] copy of the results of the review . . . provided to the Inspector 
General (IG) and the GC,”139 for their further review. More generally, under 
the DOD rules implementing Executive Order 12,333, the General Counsel 
(along with the Inspector General) is required to submit quarterly reports to 
the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight 
(ATSD(IO)), setting out “significant oversight activities undertaken during 
the quarter and any suggestions for improvements in the oversight 
system.”140 Under the same DOD Directive, the OGC and OIG oversight 
roles extend to compliance problems as well: a quarterly report is required 
“describing those activities that come to their attention during the quarter 
reasonably believed to be illegal or contrary to Executive order or 
Presidential directive, or applicable DOD policy; and actions taken with 
respect to such activities.”141 
 
In fact, observers report that NSA’s Office of General Counsel plays 
very much the lead role within the agency with respect to non-compliance. 
“As a practical matter,” one senior IC lawyer says, “non-compliance 
identification and remediation seem to be driven by the lawyers.”142 When 
                                                 
136 See, e.g., USSID 18, supra note 49, Annex A, App. 1, Sec. 3(g)(2) (Title I minimization 
procedures) (“When any person involved in collection or processing of an electronic 
surveillance being conducted pursuant to the Act becomes aware of information tending to 
indicate a material change in the status or location of a target, the person shall immediately 
ensure that the NSA’s Office of General Counsel is also made aware of such information.”).  
137 2011 Section 215 Minimization Order, supra note 130, § F(iv), at 15.  
138 Id. § F(vi), at 16. 
139 USSID 18, supra note 49, § 5.2(c).  
140 DOD DIRECTIVE 5240.1-R, supra note 76, at C15.3.3.2.  
141 Id. 
142 IC Attorney Interview, supra note 15.  
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an issue of potential non-compliance arises, “it’s really the lawyers driving 
the questions in terms of the factual development, the analysis in terms of 
whether it’s legal, and the subsequent reporting.” Even lawyers describe this 
as perhaps an historical artifact, rather than an ideal organizational 
arrangement: “Maybe once you have a mature robust compliance structure, 
it shouldn’t be driven by the lawyers. But that’s definitely how it works” at 
the NSA.143  
 
By this point, it should be clear that many NSA employees are 
assigned to compliance work—promoting rule-following and detecting and 
preventing rule violations. What NSA OGC adds more uniquely is 
application of law to fact and rule interpretation when there is ambiguity. 
This kind of legal advice is the most basic output of an agency law office. 
Like, I imagine, most federal Offices of General Counsel, NSA OGC 
provides both formal and informal advice. For example, many NSA training 
slides include references to day-to-day informal legal advice available from 
OGC lawyers: “Questions? Office of General Counsel (Operations/Intel 
Law) NSOC [National Security Operations Center] has an attorney on call 
24/7!” And USSID 18 formally assigns NSA’s OGC the role of 
“[r]eview[ing] and assess[ing] for legal implications as requested by the 
DIRNSA/CSS [the NSA Director], Deputy Director, IQ, Signals Intelligence 
Director, or their designees, all new major requirements and internally 
generated USSS [U.S. SIGINT System] activities.”144 In fact, the agency’s 
General Counsel is designated to be the final decisionmaker on certain 
questions framed as legal. For example, under the NSA’s metadata 
programs, OGC reviews any “RAS” (reasonable articulable suspicion) 
determination relating to a U.S. person to ensure that it is not based solely on 
First-Amendment protected activity.145 Similarly, it is OGC that reviews and 
decides the appropriateness of proposed disseminations of U.S. person 
information that might infringe on attorney/client or doctor/patient privilege, 
or that involves criminal activity or judicial proceedings in the United 
States.146 In addition, much advice is provided as part of litigation support, a 
key avenue by which agency lawyers exercise influence. As in many 
agencies, NSA litigation is both affirmative (the FISA docket) and 
defensive, 147  and OGC lawyers are important gatekeepers not only for 
formal litigation but also for its executive analogue under Executive Order 
                                                 
143 Id. 
144  USSID 18, supra note 49, § 8.2(d); see also § 8.2(a) (“Provide legal advice and 
assistance to all elements of the USSS regarding SIGINT activities.”); (c) (“Advise the IG in 
inspections and oversight of USSS activities.”); § 8.2(e) (“Advise USSS personnel of new 
legislation and case law that may affect USSS missions, functions, operations, activities, or 
practices.”). 
145  For Section 215, see 2011 Section 215 Minimization Order, supra note 130, at 
§ 1(b)(3)(C)(i).  
146 USSID 18, supra note 49, § 7.4. 
147 See, e.g., Bates 2010 PR/TT Opinion, supra note 48; Am. Civil Liberties Union v. 
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d. 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  




12,333, even though the Department of Justice has closer to final authority 
for FISA matters, and final authority for non-FISA matters.148  
 
One key question about all this legal advice is whether it is ever 
constraining—whether the lawyers ever tell their clients no. NSA’s lawyers 
do sometimes advise their clients/colleagues not to do specific things. One 
released training document, for example, advises analysts not to use certain 
search techniques, cautioning: “Do Not: Wildcard domains. Wildcard user 
names. Wildcard across domains.”149 One would expect agency counsel to 
say no with relative ease where the rules are clear and when those rules 
govern how and not whether a particular activity can occur. It is crucial to 
remember, however, that agency lawyer advice-giving is not adjudication 
and agency lawyers are not judges. The judicial ideal of even-handedness is 
not, even theoretically, applicable. Rather, the goal of legal advice for 
lawyers within the Intelligence Community, as with any organization’s 
lawyers, is to assist the client. To quote the same senior IC lawyer, “you’re 
hoping to get done what your client wants to get done, so there’s a tendency 
to try to find the most room to get that done.”150 Or, in the less careful words 
of a former NSA chief analyst, “Look, NSA has platoons of lawyers and 
their entire job is figuring out how to stay within the law and maximize 
collection by exploiting every loophole.” 151  Unsurprisingly, then, some 
training slides that say no also include work-arounds—methods for 
achieving various searching or analytic goals that are not covered by the 
stricter FISA rules.152  
 
But what about when the issues are less clear, and the advice is not 
how but whether to undertake some proposed action? Here, one should 
expect lawyers to offer even less constraint on their agencies. Consider a 
2005 speech to the NSA’s lawyers and their colleagues, by then-Deputy 
                                                 
148 Sometimes the gatekeeping function is implicit. For example, USSID 18 specifies that 
the office should “[p]repare and process all applications for Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court orders and requests for Attorney General approvals required by these 
procedures.” USSID 18, supra note 49, § 8.2(b); see also, e.g., DOD DIRECTIVE 5240.1-R, 
supra note 76, at C5.5.2.1.4. The natural (though not quite inevitable) result is that the 
General Counsel and his staff gain decision-making authority about which applications can 
move forward and which cannot. Other times, the gatekeeping function is spelled out. For 
example, the telephony metadata minimization procedures specify “prior to implementation 
of any new or modified automated query processes, such new or modified processes shall be 
reviewed and approved by NSA’s OGC, NSD/DoJ, and the Court.” 2011 Section 215 
Minimization Order, supra note 130, § F(vii), at 16. 
149 See, e.g., NSA Cryptological School Course on Legal, Compliance, and Minimization 
Procedures (Aug. 1, 2009), http://perma.cc/L7MM-MX63 (“Do Not: Wildcard domains. 
Wildcard user names. Wildcard across domains.”). 
150 IC Attorney Interview, supra note 15. 
151 Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data Centers 
Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2013), http://perma.cc/BM7S-
9FTF.  
152 Module 4, OVSC1205 Special Training on FISA, Version 28, at 17, 22 (Oct. 17, 2011), 
http://perma.cc/ZFD3-66AR.  
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Attorney General James Comey, in which he praised the NSA’s lawyers as 
“custodian[s] of our constitution and the rule of law.” Their “commitment to 
the rule of law,” he explained, not only served American constitutionalism, 
but would also protect their agency from “the damage that comes from the 
pendulum swings of American public life, the pendulum swings that pushed 
us so far backwards in the late 1970s, again in the late 1980s.” And, he said, 
their training as lawyers equipped them to develop and act on the 
understanding that “in the long run, intelligence under law is the only 
sustainable intelligence in the country.” Comey’s speech was evidently 
intended to stiffen his audience members’ backbones; he exhorted them to 
say “‘yes’ when it can be,” but “‘no’ when it must be.” That language (“can” 
versus “must”) favors “yes” over “no,” of course. As in all representation 
settings, lawyers’ professional commitments to the rule of law are coupled 
with their professional commitments to serve their clients’ interests and 
projects.153 Agency lawyers are unlikely to lie down on the railroad tracks to 
stop an agency train; they are far more inclined by training, career 
incentives, and professional norms, to construct arguments to justify the 
train’s forward motion. And when at least some of the lawyers’ colleagues 
are arguing that lives are at stake, saying no is particularly hard. To quote 
Comey again:  
 
It can be hard . . . because the stakes couldn’t be higher. Hard 
because we are likely to hear the words: “If we don’t do this, 
people will die.” You can all supply your own this: “If we 
don’t collect this type of information,” or “If we don’t use 
this technique,” or “If we don’t extend this authority.” It is 
extraordinarily difficult to be the attorney standing in front of 
the freight train that is the need for “this.” Because we don’t 
want people to die. In fact, we have chosen to devote our 
lives to institutions whose sworn duty it is to prevent that, 
whose sworn duty it is to protect our country, our fellow 
Americans.154 
 
A recent book by long-time CIA career lawyer (and, at one time, its 
acting General Counsel) John Rizzo encapsulates agency lawyers’ position 
in its title: Company Man.155 Rizzo’s book, in which he simultaneously touts 
his own influence and his disinclination to use it, demonstrates several times 
over that intelligence lawyers are not likely to shut down programs dear to 
their clients. Writing, for example, about the illegal arms-for-hostages deal 
of Iran-Contra, Rizzo ruminates:  
 
                                                 
153 See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral 
Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 11 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 
613 (1986). 
154 Comey, supra note 4. 
155 JOHN RIZZO, COMPANY MAN: THIRTY YEARS OF CONTROVERSY AND CRISIS IN THE CIA 
(2014). 




Perhaps things might have turned out differently if I had 
been given a say—for a time I was pleased to believe that—
but the truth is they probably wouldn’t have. The arms-for-
hostages initiative was conceived and approved at the highest 
levels [and] in all likelihood I would have gone along, 
whatever my private misgivings might have been.”156 
 
Similarly, describing his part in signing off on “enhanced interrogation 
techniques” for captured terrorists, such as waterboarding, Rizzo states, “My 
experience gave me confidence that I could squelch at least the more 
aggressive proposed EITs [enhanced interrogation techniques], then and 
there, if I wanted to. It would have been a relatively easy thing to do, 
actually.”157 But Rizzo did not say no.  
 
The public record does not allow comprehensive assessment of how 
high stakes legal advice has played out at the NSA. When asked not simply 
about application of rules within a program but about that program’s 
permissibility altogether, it may be that one of NSA’s General Counsels has 
said no, counseling the agency that it cannot undertake some program or 
activity to which NSA’s Director or even more senior executive officials are 
committed. No such situations, however, have yet been disclosed. Rather, 
we have abundant evidence that NSA’s lawyers are—as any organization’s 
lawyers would likely be—professionally disposed against even plausible—
though not iron-clad—legal challenges to their agency’s authority. 
Recounting a day spent at the NSA, Steve Vladeck summarizes:  
 
[W]hat became increasingly clear as the day wore on is how 
unable the NSA is to appreciate the possibility that the rules 
themselves might be legally or constitutionally invalid. . . . 
Several of the officials bristled at any suggestion that the 
agency was actually exceeding its legal authority, even 
though there are good arguments on both statutory and 
constitutional grounds. We heard several times how frivolous 
the Fourth Amendment challenge to the metadata program 
must be. Yet, just four days after the visit, the district court in 
Washington issued a decision to the contrary.158  
 
Probably, agency counsel lack the perspectival distance—and perhaps the 
stature—to veto important agency initiatives. We saw this dynamic in effect 
in the case of the brief 2004 shutdown of the “President’s Surveillance 
Program” internet metadata collection. “NSA leadership, including OGC 
lawyers and the IG,” had ratified the program as lawful based on the 
                                                 
156 Id. at 128.  
157 Id. at 186. 
158  Stephen Vladeck, My Day at the NSA: A PR Campaign for Secret Surveillance 
Programs, MSNBC (Dec. 17, 2013), http://perma.cc/K3NM-KL6C.  
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stretched argument that “NSA did not actually ‘acquire’ communications 
until specific communications were selected” for analysis—that is, until 
communications “hit” on a search.159 It was not NSA career lawyers or their 
political appointee boss, NSA General Counsel Robert Dietz, 160  who 
triggered the hospital-bed confrontation that led to the temporary shutdown, 
or who then led the way in persuading the FISA Court to allow this aspect of 
the President’s Surveillance Program to be squeezed into FISA’s Pen 
Register title. 161  The lawyers who first concluded that the program was 
illegal as constituted and then stood up to the President’s counsel and Chief 
of Staff, and to Vice President Cheney and his counsel, 162 were higher-
ranked, and worked at the more prestigious and bureaucratically separate 
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel,163 where they were, in the 
end, supported by Deputy Attorney General James Comey, himself 
supported by the ill Attorney General John Ashcroft.  
 
Putting aside high ranking Department of Justice lawyers, federal 
agency counsel typically lack the stature to flout the views of White House 
lawyers. And this may be particularly true for the NSA. Consider that when 
the NSA’s General Counsel asked to see the first Office of Legal Counsel 
opinion ratifying the initial internet metadata program, the White House 
declined even to share it. 164  Even if NSA’s lawyers, up to the General 
Counsel, wanted to find a given program unlawful, their legal opinion could 
be less influential than that of similarly placed counsel in other agencies, 
because the extremely comprehensive involvement of the Department of 
Justice’s National Security Division depresses the agency lawyers’ ultimate 
authority: NSA OGC functions as something of a junior partner to the NSD 
and its leadership. (On the other hand, NSA OGC’s position as the NSA’s 
ordinary point of contact with the Department of Justice, following the 
bureaucratic logic that likes should link to like, simultaneously augments the 
bureaucratic influence of NSA OGC in more run-of-the-mill situations.) 
 
And so it seems most likely that NSA OGC’s advice in legally 
ambiguous, high-stakes situations poses little obstacle to proposed agency 
activities. The practical reality that lawyers are not very constraining goes 
hand in glove with their growing numbers and dockets inside intelligence 
                                                 
159  NSA Draft IG Report, supra note 1, at 38. This argument is attractive enough to 
intelligence operators that it rears its head periodically, notwithstanding its implausibility as 
a matter of text and policy. In Klayman, for example, the district court rejected the 
argument, proffered by the government, that “‘the mere collection of Plaintiffs’ telephony 
metadata . . . without review of the data pursuant to a query’ cannot be considered a search 
‘because the Government’s acquisition of an item without examining its contents ‘does not 
compromise the interest in preserving the privacy of its contents.’” Klayman v. Obama, 957 
F. Supp. 2d. 1, 29 n.40 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Govt.’s Opp’n at 49 n.33).  
160 See, e.g., BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY, supra note 1, at 116. 
161 NSA Draft IG Report, supra note 1, at 40–42. 
162 BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY, supra note 1, at 280–86. 
163  See Jack L. Goldsmith, III, Memorandum for the Attorney General: Review of the 
Legality of the STELLAR WIND Program (May 6, 2005), http://perma.cc/X8D4-7LXA.  
164 2009 NSA Draft IG Report, supra note 1, at 21.  




agencies. In an article two decades ago, intelligence official Dorian Greene 
repeated Richard Willard’s earlier description of the IC’s negative views of 
lawyers—“enormous pent-up hostility in the intelligence community toward 
lawyers and legalistic restrictions.”165 Greene attested in 1994 that “ten years 
later this general attitude has not shown any remarkable change.” 166 
Switching to the perspective of the lawyers themselves, he described theirs 
as an “uncomfortable position,” because “[s]imultaneously the lawyer is 
both a servant for the [intelligence] community during the course of its 
relations with the remainder of the federal government and an oversight 
functionary within the community itself.”167 But over the past two decades, 
and particularly the latter of them, much has shifted. Lawyers—with their 
interpretive skills combined with their client commitments—have grown to 
be attractive advisors for operators and policymakers,168 and their numbers 
have multiplied accordingly. And it is fair to say that the discomfort Greene 
identifies has been substantially reduced; intelligence community lawyers 
now navigate their oversight and counseling roles with little evident internal 
conflict. 169 The discussion above demonstrates that the basic method for 
bringing the two roles into alignment is that the oversight function focuses 
on errors and the counseling function focuses on clarity and risk. Neither 
asks the NSA’s lawyers to assume a judge-like neutral stance: this is legal 
interpretation within a role of client-service and under significant 
bureaucratic limits. And neither the oversight function nor the counseling 
function asks lawyers to assess, not merely interpret and apply, the rules. 
Neither, that is, prompts lawyers to ask the should rather than the can 
question. The NSA’s OGC thus exemplifies the limited, though important, 
impact of intelligence legalism. 
 
Taken together, these offices instantiate NSA’s strong commitment 
to intelligence legalism—and its strong, although perhaps lessening, 
disinclination to itself weighing interests and evaluating policy. Former NSA 
                                                 
165 Greene, supra note 34, at 91–92. 
166 Id. at 92. 
167 Id. at 91.  
168 Even the famous contests that occurred soon after 9/11 happened on legalistic terrain: 
Vice President Cheney, his aide David Addington, and their DOJ lawyer-of-choice, John 
Yoo, dressed up their power grabs in the guise of law, complete with legal opinions. See, 
e.g., Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, Memorandum for the Attorney General 
(Nov. 2, 2001), http://perma.cc/SK8N-4YU3. Admittedly, though, their central claim—that 
the executive’s national security power is, as a matter of constitutional law, unfettered by 
purportedly constraining statute—is anti-legalistic. See id. (“FISA only provides a safe 
harbor for electronic surveillance, and cannot restrict the President’s ability to engage in 
warrantless searches that protect the national security.”; “FISA purports to be the exclusive 
statutory means for conducting electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence. . . . Such a 
reading of FISA would be an unconstitutional infringement on the President’s Article II 
authorities.”). In the end, though, that claim was a gambit that failed.  
169 For analysis of the dynamics of federal lawyers’ offices, see, for example, sources cited 
supra note 34; Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (1991); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power 
Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1058–62, 1072–73 (2011). 
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(and CIA) Director Michael Hayden put the point clearly when he said in 
July 2013: “Give me the box you will allow me to operate in. I’m going to 
play to the very edges of that box; I’m going to be very aggressive. . . . I’ll 
get chalk-dust on my cleats, I’ll be so close to the out-of-bounds 
markers.” 170  More recently, former NSA Deputy Director Chris Inglis 
framed the point in terms of NSA’s orientation not just towards civil liberties 
but more generally, describing the NSA as “an operational not a policy 
shop.”171  
 
B. Department of Justice National Security Division (NSD) 
 
The offices just described are within the NSA. Currently, the most 
important external executive branch participant in NSA’s compliance 
ecosystem is the Department of Justice, and in particular its National 
Security Division (NSD). NSD, headed by its own Assistant Attorney 
General, was established in 2006 to bring together several previously 
separate offices within the Department of Justice. It has grown substantially 
in the years since; its budget documents about 235 lawyers, divided between 
offices that prosecute national security crimes and offices that deal with non-
prosecutorial intelligence matters. 172  The prominence of NSD in NSA 
matters follows from the basic legalistic approach to intelligence reform in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, as embodied in FISA and Executive Order 
12,333. Infusing intelligence activities with law was accomplished not only 
by a new substantive legal framework in FISA, subject to court enforcement, 
but also by empowering the Department of Justice. Indeed, it is Department 
of Justice lawyers who appear in the FISA court and therefore must sign off 
on any FISA application.173 Thus when the NSA wanted to ask the FISA 
                                                 
170 Interview of former NSA Director General Michael Hayden by Charlie Rose (July 29, 
2013), http://perma.cc/Q83V-422B; see also Testimony of Michael Hayden, Hearing before 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 5, 2008), at 97–98, 
http://perma.cc/K3J2-LLW4. (“Let me say something very clearly, Senator. I really need to 
put this on the record. We will play to the edges of the box that the American political 
process gives us. In the creation of that box, if we’re asked a view, we’ll give a view. But 
the lines drawn by that box are the product of the American political process. Once you’ve 
drawn the box, once that process creates a box, we have a duty to play to the edge of it; 
otherwise, we’re not protecting America, and we may be protecting ourselves. . . . So there’s 
no wink and nod here. If you create the box, we will play inside the box without 
exception.”). 
171  Chris Inglis, Robert S. Strauss Center, NSA at the Crossroads (Apr. 3, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/QDM4-FLVR.  
172 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2013 PERFORMANCE BUDGET CONGRESSIONAL SUBMISSION 
Ex. I (2013), http://perma.cc/5U4A-J9RD. 
173 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION PROGRESS REPORT 22 
(2008) [hereinafter NSD 2008 PROGRESS REPORT], http://perma.cc/7WD7-YGT8 (“The 
Department’s primary oversight in the national security realm has traditionally focused on 
the FBI’s use of FISA and compliance with FISA Court orders—a responsibility that 
derived principally from our obligations as the Government’s representative to the FISA 
Court.”). Currently, this function is carried by the Operations Section of the Office of 
Intelligence, in NSD; prior to NSD’s 2006 creation, it was performed by the Office of 
Intelligence Policy and Review, which sat outside any DOJ Division, and reported directly 
to the Deputy Attorney General. Sometimes this gatekeeping role is made explicit. See, e.g., 




court for permission to restart automated queries of internet metadata, it 
described the first step as “seeking DoJ approval.” 174  Currently, this 
approval role is played by lawyers in the NSD Office of Intelligence. These 
FISA Court dynamics are similar to—although more extreme than—the 
ways Department of Justice lawyers influence legal matters across 
government in any arena subject to very frequent litigation. But even for 
legal questions not immediately addressed in front of the FISA Court, the 
views of NSD lawyers become at least close to authoritative within the 
executive branch, because the issue might eventually end up in the FISA 
Court. Accordingly, NSA frequently seeks legal advice not only from its 
own General Counsel’s office but from DOJ NSD. In fact this is 
occasionally required by FISA minimization rules, 175 a striking departure 
from ordinary agency counsel practice and authority. 
 
Moreover, since the 1980s, there have been many other equally 
important levers of Justice Department influence that are more unusual. The 
Attorney General’s decisionmaking authority over the various process 
documents required by E.O. 12,333, discussed above, is only the most 
obvious example. An important separate avenue is the situations in which 
the Attorney General has approval authority for particular surveillance 
operations.176  
 
In addition, there is a great deal of routine oversight work, most done 
by an oversight group within the NSD Office of Intelligence.177 The NSD 
oversight role is institutionalized in both USSID 18 and several of the FISA 
minimization procedures, and comes in three flavors. First, under each of the 
                                                                                                                             
2011 Section 215 Minimization Order, supra note 130, § F(vii), at 13 (“Prior to 
implementation, all proposed automated query processes shall be reviewed and approved by 
NSA’s OGC, NSD/DoJ, and the Court.”). 
174 Memorandum from La Forrest Williams, Deputy Assoc. Dir., Legislative Affairs Office, 
Nat’l Sec. Agency, to the Majority Staff Director, S. Permanent Select Comm. on 
Intelligence 3 (Apr. 10, 2009), http://perma.cc/Z64Z-DF47. 
175 See, e.g., 2011 Section 215 Minimization Order, supra note 130, § F(iii), at 12 (“NSA’s 
OGC shall consult with NSD/DoJ on all significant legal opinions that relate to the 
interpretation, scope, and/or implementation of this authority. When operationally 
practicable, such consultation shall occur in advance; otherwise NSD shall be notified as 
soon as practicable.”); Primary Order, No. PR-TT § (5)(i)(i) (FISA Ct. [date redacted]) 
[hereinafter Reggie Walton PR/TT Primary Order], 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0063-0002.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/ZA8K-HYK2] (“NSA’s OGC shall consult with the Department of 
Justice’s National Security Division (NSD) on all significant legal opinions that relate to the 
interpretation, scope, and/or implementation of the authorizations granted by the Court in 
this matter. When operationally practicable, such consultation shall occur in advance; 
otherwise NSD shall be notified as soon as practicable.”).  
176 50 U.S.C. § 1805(e); 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (Section 702); USSID 18, supra note 49, §§ 
4.1(b)(1), 4.4(b), 5.4(a) (authorizing surveillance, and retention of certain communications, 
on the authority of the Attorney General). 
177  National Security Division: Sections and Offices, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/nsd/sections-offices#oversight (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).  
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FISA authorities discussed in this Article, the Attorney General owes annual 
or semi-annual reports to Congress.178 These reports are drafted by NSD’s 
Office of Intelligence,179 and necessarily require relevant agencies to report 
to the Attorney General the information to be passed along. Moreover, it is 
NSD that determines (subject, no doubt, to review and negotiation with 
others) how various issues are framed. The office plays a far smaller role in 
non-FISA collection,180 but even then the rules sometimes similarly require 
reporting of particular events to the Attorney General.181 Second, the FISA 
minimization rules sometimes assign DOJ lawyers a specified task. For 
FISA Title I surveillance, for example, NSD is required to establish 
procedures to “protect . . . [attorney-client] communications from review or 
use in any criminal prosecution, while preserving foreign intelligence 
contained therein.”182 And third, at least for those FISA programs we have 
full information on, the minimization procedures require NSD Office of 
Intelligence lawyers to review NSA’s compliance record periodically. The 
review seems to range from quite minimal, for FISA Title I warrants and 
Section 702 foreign targeting,183 to extremely involved, for the Section 215 
                                                 
178  50 U.S.C. § 1808 (electronic surveillance warrants); 50 U.S.C. § 1826 (physical 
searches); 50 U.S.C. § 1846 (pen/trap orders); 50 U.S.C. § 1862 (annual, business 
records/tangible things); 50 U.S.C. § 1871 (all of the above, plus foreign targeting orders); 
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(l) (compliance assessment for Section 702 targeting and minimization); 
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the Attorney General shall fully inform, in a manner consistent with national security, the 
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sought, granted, modified, or denied. 50 U.S.C. § 1807. 
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180 See, e.g., Testimony of John Carlin before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee 
(Feb. 25, 2014), at 44:37, http://perma.cc/62SW-KP6J (“But the collection activities that 
occur pursuant to 12333, if there was incidental collection, would be handled through a 
different set of oversight mechanisms than the [Justice] Department’s–by the [NSA] Office 
of Compliance, the Inspector General there, the General Counsel there, and the Inspector 
General and General Counsel’s office for the Intelligence Community writ large, as well as 
reporting to these committees as appropriate.”). I was alerted to this exchange by Does 
Acting National Security Division Head John Carlin Know about FISA Sections 703 and 
704?, EMPTYWHEEL (Feb. 25, 2014), https://perma.cc/WF5W-5NVU. 
181 USSID 18, supra note 49, § 4.1(e). 
182 USSID 18, supra note 49, Annex A, App. 1, § 4(a)(3)(b).  
183 For FISA Title I, NSD is required to review “at least a representative sampling” of 
disseminated communications, to make sure they comply with the rules on dissemination. 
“The results of each review shall be made available to the Attorney General or a designee.” 
USSID 18, supra note 49, Annex A, App. 1, § 8(d). For FISA 702, see SECTION 702 NSA 
MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 54, § 3(b)(6) (“The Department of Justice’s 
National Security Division and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence will 
conduct oversight of NSA’s activities with respect to United States persons that are 
conducted pursuant to this paragraph.”).  




telephony metadata program. 184  NSD’s role in the now-ended internet 
metadata program also became quite extensive, although that was not the 
case at the start of the program.185 Both the second and third type of work 
have grown substantially since the 2004 FISA Court ratification of the 
internet metadata program, and particularly since 2009 compliance troubles 
in both the internet and telephony metadata programs and 2011 compliance 
troubles involving Section 702 foreign targeting. Whether at the 
government’s behest or originating with the FISA Court judges or staff, the 
minimization procedures approved by the FISA Court keep adding to NSD’s 
role.186  
 
NSD lawyers have been criticized both as too interested in civil 
liberties and not enough in national security, and as unduly aggressive. From 
the right, the office has faced loud accusations that it acquiesced too readily 
to the view of FISA court judges that national security surveillance had to be 
walled off from the criminal justice system; 187  only after 9/11, and the 
enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, did the Department finally appeal the 
issue to the FISA Court of Review, and win. 188 As former NSD lawyer 
Carrie Cordero summarized the history in congressional testimony, 
itemizing several other incidents, “the Department of Justice was accused of 
being too reticent, too cautious, too unwilling to be aggressive under the law 
in order to protect the national security.”189 From the left, however—and 
particularly more recently—the argument is reversed. Again quoting 
Cordero (who describes the shift as “ironic”), it is “that we need more 
lawyers scrutinizing already well-scrubbed applications; and that the 
government should be putting forth more cautious interpretations of the 
                                                 
184 For the telephony metadata program, see 2011 Section 215 Minimization Order, supra 
note 130. NSD reviews all the training and briefing, and the justifications for RAS 
approvals for selection terms used to query the BR metadata. Id. at §§ F(i), (iv). In addition, 
NSD is assigned to meet with the NSA compliance office and General Counsel, to “assess[] 
compliance with this Court’s orders. Included in this meeting will be a review of NSA’s 
monitoring and assessment to ensure that only approved metadata is being acquired.” Id. at 
§ F(iv). Finally, NSD must meet with NSA’s Office of the IG, “to discuss their respective 
oversight responsibilities and assess NSA’s compliance with the Court’s orders.” Id. at § 
F(v).  
185 See Application for Use of Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices for Foreign 
Intelligence Purposes, [Case name and docket redacted] (FISA Ct. 2004), 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0028-0002.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/U5SX-9UL8].  
186 See supra note 94. 
187  STEWART BAKER, SKATING ON STILTS: WHY WE AREN’T STOPPING TOMORROW’S 
TERRORISM 31–39 (2010). 
188 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).  
189 Continued Oversight of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Statement for the 
Record Before the Comm. On the Judiciary (Oct. 2, 2013) (footnotes omitted), 
http://perma.cc/HTF7-9UA4 (statement of Carrie Cordero). Cordero is the former Counsel 
to the Assistant Attorney General for National Security. Benjamin Wittes summarizes the 
same shift in LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR 
221 (2008). 
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law.”190 Cordero herself has written that neither argument is correct. Rather, 
she says, NSD is “a neutral party that evaluates the Intelligence 
Community’s requests for surveillance.”191  
  
Admittedly, Cordero’s “neutral” comment was made in a blog, and 
may have been a little casual. But the description above demonstrates that, 
structurally, NSD’s lawyers are indeed expected to function, simultaneously, 
as lawyers for their client agencies and fair quasi-adjudicators. As Nancy 
Libin, the former Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer for the Department of 
Justice, puts it, the NSD is “this place that the IC goes to get blessed.” Libin 
comments that this creates “a structural problem,” because lawyers 
representing the IC “can get captured by the IC.”192 Libin’s substantive point 
seems to me to be absolutely correct—although the term “capture” is not 
quite apropos, because NSD lawyers in the Office of Intelligence are not IC 
outsiders, but IC lawyers. Their immediate colleagues and their bosses are 
responsible for national security prosecutions using the fruits of the 
surveillance they ratify. Neither their roles, reference groups, nor career 
aspirations support a norm of quasi-judicial neutrality.  
 
Stepping back a bit to evaluate all of this, NSD lawyers bring to their 
FISA and oversight work several key characteristics. One is the lawyerly 
mindset, which merges careful textual analysis and a keen eye for helpful 
ambiguity. Another is a commitment to their client’s operational success. A 
third is a natural desire, as repeat players in front of the FISA court, to 
safeguard their own credibility. And perhaps a fourth is the embracing of 
rule of law values—the ideas of intelligence legalism, that law should matter 
in the realm of intelligence. All four characteristics are reinforced by NSD 
lawyers’ role, reference group, and career aspirations. All four inform their 
approach to being both counsel to the government and officers of the FISA 
court, exhibiting candor and care but pressing aggressive pro-government 
positions unless those positions are rejected by the court or are likely to be 
rejected. Recent accounts suggest that within the Department of Justice, 
NSD at least occasionally takes aggressive pro-surveillance positions. Just to 
cite one example, until the Solicitor General directed a more defendant-
friendly reading, “the division . . . long used a narrow understanding of what 
‘derived from’ means in terms of when it must disclose specifics to 
defendants” explaining that evidence in their criminal case had its origin in 
warrantless wiretaps.193 The point is not that NSD’s lawyers were right or 
wrong about this position. It is that if a credible argument can be made in 
support of their clients’ proposals, and the FISA judges have not rejected 
that argument, one would expect NSD lawyers to make it.  
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And just as it is wrong to expect neutrality from NSD, it would be 
foolish to expect a more thorough-going civil liberties orientation. NSD’s 
lawyers are not civil rights or civil liberties lawyers: they are not hired for 
their civil liberties experience or orientation towards civil liberties; they are 
not asked to perform a civil liberties function; and their next jobs are rarely, 
if ever, civil liberties jobs. It is unsurprising that when the FISA judges were 
building the now-dismantled “wall,” those Department of Justice 
intelligence lawyers who frequently appeared before them would respect and 
even support that approach. But unlike with civil liberties lawyers, there is 
every reason to predict that NSD lawyers would avoid pro-civil liberties 
positions in the face of court indifference to the individual interests at 
stake—and no evidence to the contrary has thus far been disclosed.  
 
It is worth emphasizing that NSD’s lead role within the Department 
of Justice is less than a decade old. NSD’s immediate predecessor was the 
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR), a freestanding office that 
handled FISA and other intelligence matters. 194  OIPR was itself a 1979 
offshoot of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC); prior to its establishment, 
OLC lawyer Mary Lawton was the lead Department of Justice intelligence 
lawyer, and she maintained that role when she led OIPR for a decade.195 
During that period, contemporaries described the new office as a “‘mini 
Office of Legal Counsel’ with respect to any issue concerning intelligence 
policy.”196 The actual Office of Legal Counsel continued to play a crucial 
role as well—this is evident in the hospital bed episode described in the 
Introduction, which were prompted by OLC head Jack Goldsmith’s qualms 
about the President’s surveillance program, 197  and in the first telephony 
metadata application to the FISA Court, whose approval subjected that 
program to judicial supervision, which was, remarkably, signed not only by 
the head of OIPR but also by the head of OLC (which rarely takes formal 
part in litigation).198 As with NSD lawyers, I think it would be implausible 
to expect neutrality from OLC lawyers; their role within the government is, 
in part, to defend executive prerogative.199 At the same time, if it were OLC 
lawyers doing FISA oversight, the dynamics might well be quite different 
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197 See sources cited supra notes 1-2. 
198 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Application for Certain Tangible Things for 
Investigations to Protect Against International Terrorism, Docket redacted (FISA Ct. July 
2009), http://chadmin.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0009-0004.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/A286-GNFW]; Lederman Interview, supra note 15. 
199 For a discussion of OLC and how its lawyers function, see, e.g., Cornelia T. Pillard, The 
Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 710–
717 (2005); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2336–42 (2006); Trevor W. Morrison, 
Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1460–70 (2010).  
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than I have described. Just to name two key differences, OLC lawyers would 
not have the repeat appearances before the FISA Court, and they are often 
called upon to play a quasi-judicial role within the executive branch (their 
legal memoranda are even given the title of “decisions”). But while OLC 
lawyers continue to be extremely involved in legal issues related to national 
security that reach the National Security Council,200 with the establishment 
and growth of NSD, led by a Senate-confirmed Assistant Attorney General, 
OLC’s relative role with respect to FISA and surveillance has shrunk. NSD 
is the key FISA office within the Department of Justice. 
 
C. Other Intelligence Oversight Offices 
 
Other offices oversee some of the tasks and activities already 
described. For non-FISA matters, the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI) receives mandatory reports by each element of the 
Intelligence Community of “any intelligence activities of their organizations 
that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to executive 
order or presidential directive.”201 The reports are shared within ODNI with 
the Office of General Counsel, the Civil Liberties Protection Office, and 
Mission Integration Division. They are then relayed to the Intelligence 
Oversight Board (IOB), in the White House, along with an ODNI 
“assessment of the gravity, frequency, trends, and patterns of occurrences” 
of reportable incidents, a summary of corrective actions taken and related 
recommendations, and an assessment of their effectiveness.202 This process 
simultaneously increases ODNI information about compliance issues across 
the IC, and the salience of compliance incidents within the IC elements 
themselves when the heads of the IC elements (and therefore many other 
lead officials within each element) read the relevant reports. 203 The IOB 
itself, currently a committee of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board, 
brings together non-governmental experts (usually former high-ranking 
government officials) to advise the President 204 ; it is extremely low 
                                                 
200 JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS 
TIMES 311 (2007). 
201 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. (1981) § 1.7(d); see also Exec. Order No. 12,334, 3 
C.F.R. (1981); Exec. Order No. 13,462, 73 FR11805 (2008) §§ 7-8 at 11806-11807 (“[T]he 
DNI shall . . . receive reports submitted to the IOB pursuant to section 1.7(d) of Executive 
Order 12333, or a corresponding provision of any successor order”; “the heads of 
departments concerned shall . . . ensure that the DNI receives . . . copies of reports 
submitted to the IOB pursuant to section 1.7(d) of Executive Order 12333, or a 
corresponding provision of any successor order.”).  
202 Exec. Order No. 13,462 §§ 6, 7, 8; Complaint at 3–4, Elec. Frontier Found. v. Cent. 
Intelligence Agency, No. C 09-3351 SBA, 2013 WL 5443048 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2013) 
(filed July 22, 2009), https://www.eff.org/document/complaint-16.  
203 Joel Interview, supra note 15.  
204 The PIAB has a small professional staff within the Executive Office of the President. See 
About the PIAB, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://perma.cc/S3Y3-LLM8 (last visited Nov. 10, 
2014). The current members of the IOB are also members of the PIAB. President’s 
Intelligence Advisory Board and Intelligence Oversight Board: Members, THE WHITE 
HOUSE, http://perma.cc/L9UL-JL2G (last visited Nov. 10, 2014). They may be less active, 




profile, 205  and there is no public information on what it does with the 
compliance reports it receives, although FOIA requests have led to the 
disclosure of thousands of pages of those reports.206  
 
In addition, under the DOD rules implementing Executive Order 
12,333, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight 
(abbreviated, unfortunately, ATSD(IO)) 207  also receives from NSA’s 
General Counsel and Inspector General a “quarterly report describing those 
activities that come to their attention during the quarter reasonably believed 
to be illegal or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive, or 
applicable DoD policy; and actions taken with respect to such activities,” as 
well as “significant oversight activities undertaken during the quarter and 
any suggestions for improvements in the oversight system.”208  
 
Neither ATSD(IO) nor ODNI has a principal part in FISA 
oversight—DOJ oversight really has pride of place under FISA. 209  The 
                                                                                                                             
currently, than in prior years. See Josh Gerstein, Obama Upends Intel Panel, POLITICO 
(Aug. 15, 2013), http://perma.cc/4RQC-7UWS. 
205 In 2011, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) had to bring a FOIA litigation to find 
out even who the members of the IOB were. See Mark Rumold, The Intelligence Oversight 
Board Has Members—But We Had to Sue the Government to Find Out, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (EFF) (Nov. 9, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/11/intelligence-
oversight-board-has-members-and-all-we-had-do-was-sue-federal; Complaint, Elec. 
Frontier Found. v. Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, No. 4:11-cv-04790-LB, N.D. Cal. 
(Sept. 27, 2011). Its role may have been more robust prior to its 2008 demotion by President 
Bush. President’s Intelligence Advisory Board and Intelligence Oversight Board, Exec. 
Order No. 13,462, 73 FR 11805 (March 4, 2008); Charlie Savage, President Weakens 
Espionage Oversight, BOSTON GLOBE (March 14, 2008), 
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2008/03/14/president_weakens_es
pionage_oversight/?page=full. Some but not all of the authority stripped from the IOB in 
2008 was restored by President Obama in 2009. See Exec. Order No. 13,516, Amending 
Executive Order 13462 (October 28, 2009), 74 FR 56521 (Nov. 2, 2009), 74 FR 57241 
(Nov. 5, 2009). 
206 Intelligence Oversight Board: FOIA Documents Detailing Legal Violations, ELECTRONIC 
PRIVACY INFO. CENTER, http://perma.cc/Q4MR-7WZ8 (last visited Feb. 4, 2014). See also 
Transparency Project: Intelligence Agencies’ Misconduct Reports, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND., https://www.eff.org/foia/intelligence-agencies-misconduct-reports (last visited Feb. 
4, 2014) for the reports so far disclosed as a result of Elec. Frontier Found. v. Cent. 
Intelligence Agency, 4:09-cv-03351-SBA (N.D. Cal. filed July 22, 2009), 2013 WL 
5443048 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2013).  
207  See Organizational Charter, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence 
Oversight), 32 C.F.R. § 378 (1983) (establishing the office of the Assistant to the Secretary 
of Defense for Intelligence Oversight); DEP’T OF DEF., ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (DoD 5148.11, Apr. 24, 2013), 
http://perma.cc/Z9QY-CX5X; DEP’T OF DEF., ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
FOR INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT (DoD 5148.11, May 21, 2004), http://perma.cc/UA6D-
LUCZ; DOD DIRECTIVE 5240.1-R, supra note 76.  
208 DOD DIRECTIVE 5240.1-R, supra note 76, at C15.3.3.2.  
209 See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), Pub. L. 108-458, § 
102A(f)(8), 118 Stat. 3638, 3650 (2004) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 3024(f)(9)) 
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exception is under Section 702, where in the 2008 FISA Amendments Act, 
Congress expressly assigned ODNI as well as the Department of Justice to 
“assess compliance with the targeting and minimization procedures.210 To 
produce semi-annual compliance assessments, ODNI’s Office of General 
Counsel, Mission Integration Division, and Civil Liberties and Privacy 
Office all make regular appearances in the NSA compliance ecosystem, 
dealing with Section 702 foreign targeting and minimization. The work is 
done every 60 days by a small team from ODNI (joined by a larger team 
from DOJ NSD).211  
 
Given the topic of this paper, I am most interested in the ODNI Civil 
Liberties Protection Office because its statutory authorities extend past legal 
compliance to policy development—it is authorized to look at the “should” 
question. One of the Office’s two foundational statutes requires its leader to: 
 
(1) assist the head of such department, agency, or element 
and other officials of such department, agency, or 
element in appropriately considering privacy and civil 
liberties concerns when such officials are proposing, 
developing, or implementing laws, regulations, policies, 
procedures, or guidelines related to efforts to protect the 




(4) in providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance a 
particular governmental power the officer shall consider 
whether such department, agency, or element has 
established— 
(A) that the need for the power is balanced with the need to 
protect privacy and civil liberties; 
(B) that there is adequate supervision of the use by such 
department, agency, or element of the power to ensure 
protection of privacy and civil liberties; and 
(C) that there are adequate guidelines and oversight to 
properly confine its use.212 
 
The reference to “civil liberties concerns” (emphasis added) and 
“balanc[ing]” suggest that this is not simply a compliance mission. ODNI’s 
                                                                                                                             
(“Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as affecting the role of the Department of 
Justice or the Attorney General under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.”).  
210 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(l)(1). 
211  See compliance reports listed supra note 109. See also, e.g., SECTION 702 NSA 
MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 54, § 3(b)(6). The civil liberties office’s quarterly 
reports also tally FISA compliance reviews each quarter beginning in Sept.–Nov. 2010. 
Civil Liberties Privacy Office Reports, OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, 
http://perma.cc/KR9X-MJXZ (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).  
212 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1. 




Civil Liberties and Privacy Office could, with statutory warrant, play a 
policy role. It could push against the information imperatives, the desire to 
“collect it all,” that motivate some at NSA,213 urging more weight be given 
to individual’s liberty and privacy interests as well as rights.  
 
But if there is textual support for the idea that ODNI’s Civil Liberties 
and Privacy Office has been assigned a civil liberties or privacy role that 
runs deeper than compliance, that assignment is equivocal. Other language 
in the office’s founding statutes is geared more towards compliance with 
law. For example, the office is assigned by the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) to “oversee compliance by the Office 
and the Director of National Intelligence with requirements under the 
Constitution and all laws, regulations, Executive orders, and implementing 
guidelines relating to civil liberties and privacy.”214 
 
 Faced with this textual range, those who manage this small office 
have chosen to frame its role, at least publically, primarily in compliance 
terms. Its “enterprise strategy,” for example, states: “We are committed to 
protecting fully the legal rights of all United States persons, including 
freedoms, civil liberties, and privacy rights guaranteed by Federal law.”215 
Other documents, too, omit “balancing” type language or references to 
“concerns,” preferring harder references to “violations” and “law.”216  
 
Alex Joel, the office’s director since its start up, explains that his 
approach is consciously tied to legal requirements:  
 
It’s been attractive to me to run the office as a law shop, 
because we [government personnel] of course have to follow 
the law. We have traditionally defined privacy and civil 
liberties rights with reference to the law (including executive 
orders). It’s important to emphasize that this is not optional, 
that this is what the law requires.217  
 
It is not that Joel takes no position at ODNI and in interagency discussions 
on policy matters; in fact he states that “I try to say, just like the President 
recently said, ‘Just because we can do something, doesn’t mean we 
                                                 
213 See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima & Joby Warrick, For NSA Chief, Terrorist Threat Drives 
Passion to ‘Collect It All,’ WASH. POST (July 14, 2013). http://perma.cc/KDT3-ENU5. 
214 50 U.S.C. § 3029(2)(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
215 OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNITY ENTERPRISE STRATEGY 2012-
2017, http://perma.cc/L3ST-THAX (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).  
216  See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
DIRECTIVE 107: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY (Aug. 31, 2012), http://perma.cc/PN4Z-
TLF7.  
217 Joel Interview, supra note 15. 
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necessarily should.’” 218  But Joel sees persuading colleagues about what 
ought to happen as harder than telling them what is required to happen,219 
and while no doubt he and others on his staff give advice on the “should” 
question, it is evident that with respect to the NSA, the office’s focus is 
primarily compliance. For example, one of the Section 702 semiannual 
compliance reviews has been released in a form that allows evaluation of its 
content. Finalized in August 2013, it does not read very differently from the 
NSA’s own released or leaked compliance work. Both deal with the precise 
requirements of the targeting and minimization rules and the situations in 
which errors have occurred. In fact, Joel has sought out detailees from DOJ 
NSD to serve as his office’s designated staff for Section 702 compliance.220 
Moreover, the office’s public statements have all been defenses of IC 
policies and practices.221  
 
In short, the staff from these DOD, ODNI, and White House 
overseeing offices all conceptualize their role as ensuring that the NSA’s 
activities comply with the rules system that exists. At least as far as one can 
observe from the written record so far released, none take their role to be 
assessing whether the rules are appropriate, or whether conduct that is 
compliant with the rules might nonetheless be ill advised.  
 
D. FISA Court 
 
In general, federal courts perform important, but limited, oversight of 
federal official conduct. Doctrines like ripeness, finality, and standing, and, 
especially, limits on inferred private rights of action, mean that courts are 
closed to many, even most, potential claims of agency illegality. In keeping 
with this ordinary situation, the vast majority of the NSA’s operations lie 
outside court supervision. Executive Order 12,333 implements executive 
rather than federal court involvement, and without a statutory framework, 
court oversight is difficult to justify. Would-be challengers not only lack 
knowledge that they are subject to surveillance and therefore have standing 
to bring a challenge222; as foreigners abroad, under current doctrine, they 
often lack constitutional rights altogether.223 (Although Presidential Policy 
                                                 
218  Id. (quoting President Barack Obama, Press Conference (Dec. 20, 2013), 
http://perma.cc/399F-2U2Z).  
219 Joel Interview, supra note 15. 
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221  Civil Liberties and Privacy Office, ODNI, Civil Liberties and Privacy Information 
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Directive 28, announced by the President in January 2014, requires 
consideration of the privacy interests of foreigners abroad.224)  
 
In the portion of its operations that proceed under FISA, however, in 
many ways, the NSA lives with much more court oversight than do most 
federal agencies. Most federal agencies, after all, do not need before-the-fact 
court approval for routine operations. And while FISA warrants are similar 
to criminal justice warrants, which issue with court approval, FISA metadata 
programs actually involve much more court supervision than do the FBI’s 
National Security Letters. 225  The result has been intense judicial 
involvement in enforcement of the minimization rules—court orders, once 
approved. In opinion after opinion, in both the internet and telephony 
metadata programs and Section 702 targeted surveillance of foreigners 
abroad, FISA court judges have delved into compliance incidents, their 
sources, and their remedies.226 At the same time, FISA judges have devoted 
many fewer pages of the opinions so far declassified to the legitimacy—both 
statutory and constitutional—of those NSA programs. Most starkly, it took 
over seven years before any FISA judge actually wrote an opinion 
explaining the Court’s repeated decisions to uphold bulk telephony metadata 
collection programs.227  
 
The opinions suggest that the court is supervising the surveillance 
process with close attention—but not adjudicating its merit. And in some 
ways, that approach is inherent in the judicial role. I have distinguished 
throughout this Article between “rights” or “compliance” or “law” on the 
one hand, and “interests” or “balancing” or “policy” on the other. Courts, 
including the FISA Court, sit on the law side of that divide. The dynamics of 
judicial law-pronouncement are, however, very different than for executive 
compliance work. Executive branch lawyers’ role commits them to the 
search for “‘yes’ when it can be,” even if they are simultaneously capable of 
delivering “‘no’ when it must be.” And executive lawyers tend to consider 
their clients’ preferences close to binding on policy issues, when such issues 
                                                 
224  See EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRES., PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE 28 – SIGNALS 
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (Jan. 17, 2014) [hereinafter PPD-28], http://perma.cc/3AQQ-
PKE2 (“These limits are intended to protect the privacy and civil liberties of all persons, 
whatever their nationality and regardless of where they might reside.”); id. § 4 (“All persons 
should be treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever they 
might reside, and all persons have legitimate privacy interests in the handling of their 
personal information. U.S. signals intelligence activities must, therefore, include appropriate 
safeguards for the personal information of all individuals, regardless of the nationality of the 
individual to whom the information pertains or where that individual resides.”).  
225 For information on National Security Letters, see, e.g., 1 KRIS & WILSON, supra note 32, 
ch. 19. 
226 See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
227 In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of 
Tangible Things From [Redacted], No. BR 13-109 (FISA Ct. Oct. 11, 2013), 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/NS-DC-0017-0001.pdf 
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arise. Judges, by contrast, begin with a norm of impartiality rather than client 
service, and are far less constrained with respect to whatever policy issues 
bear on their legal decision-making, as well as with respect to legal 
interpretation itself. Thus the FISA Court could serve as a body that engages 
in the “should” question, at least to some extent, as part of the legal 
interpretive process. Other courts examining the permissibility of the NSA’s 
FISA surveillance have done just that.228  
 
That the FISA Court did not take on the “should” question in any 
significant way, prior to the Snowden disclosures, may be in part due to the 
absence of adversarial briefing, as elaborated upon in Part IV.229 But my 
sense is that one-sided briefing is only part of the explanation. The FISA 
Court’s one-party procedures have a deeper impact, as well. The ex parte 
modality alters not just who communicates with the court but how the 
government and court communicate with each other. Sometimes FISA 
judges make their influence felt by the traditional judicial process of issuing 
a decision: the 2009 order suspending the NSA’s access to internet 
metadata230 is one example. But much more often, facilitated by the ex parte 
nature of the proceedings, it seems that the court’s views are delivered in the 
form of less formal advice to the government. ODNI General Counsel 
Robert Litt explained in congressional testimony in 2013: 
 
When we prepare an application for a FISA [order], whether 
it’s under [Section 702] or a traditional FISA [warrant], we 
first submit to the court what’s called a read copy, which the 
court staff will review and comment on. And they will 
almost invariably come back with questions, concerns, 
problems that they see, and there’s an iterative process back 
and forth between the government and the FISA court to take 
care of those concerns so that at the end of the day we’re 
confident that we’re presenting something that the FISA 
Court will approve. That is hardly a rubber stamp. It’s rather 
extensive and serious judicial oversight of this process.231  
                                                 
228 See e.g., Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d. 1.  
229As District Judge William Pauley noted in Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, “The 
two declassified FISC decisions authorizing bulk metadata collection do not discuss several 
of the ACLU’s arguments. They were issued on the basis of ex parte applications by the 
Government without the benefit of the excellent briefing submitted to this Court by the 
Government, the ACLU, and amici curiae. There is no question that judges operate best in 
an adversarial system.” Clapper, 959 F.Supp. 2d at 756. 
230 In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), 
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procedures for accessing such data.”). 
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Adversaries: Hearing before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong. 
(June 18, 2013) (testimony of Robert Litt, Gen. Counsel, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l 
Intelligence), http://perma.cc/77WZ-W9H5 (last visited Nov. 30, 2014). 





One-party process thus accommodates a back-and-forth in which the 
government gets several tries to alter—or, although Litt didn’t say so, 
withdraw—its applications to avoid being turned down. 232 Often, as Litt 
describes, the government is dealing not with a judge but with the FISA 
Court’s handful of “legal advisors.”233 These are long-term lawyer assistants 
to the judges, who likely possess more influence than ordinary law clerks, 
because they are experienced attorneys with government backgrounds in 
surveillance law who serve for years at a time. They may therefore have 
more expertise than the judges themselves, particularly towards the start of 
the judges’ seven-year terms.234  
 
Even when the contact between the government and the court 
involves the judges directly, it is clear that the procedures are sometimes 
closer to a congressional briefing, say, than an ordinary judicial hearing, 
even an ex parte one. For example, the NSA provided Senate Intelligence 
Committee with the following description:  
 
On September 1, 2009, at the request of the FISC, NSA 
hosted Presiding Judge Bates and Judges Walton and Hogan 
for a series of briefings and demonstrations regarding the BR 
FISA program. The presenting included a briefing on BR 
FISA data flow; a demonstration of how analysts log on to 
NSA systems to access BR FISA data; a demonstration of 
technical safeguards that prevent queries based on seed 
numbers that do not mean the Reasonable Articulable 
Suspicion (RAS) standard; and a demonstration of analyst 
queries using RAS-approved telephone identifiers. The 
information was presented in the context of a current 
operation that concerns a potential threat to the U.S. 
homeland. . . . The judges were engaged throughout and 
asked questions, which were answered by the briefers and 
other subject matter experts. At the conclusion, the judges 
expressed their appreciation for the amount and quality of 
information presented to them.235 
 
The briefing included a “working lunch,” and, as with so many such 
sessions, a PowerPoint slide deck, complete with bullet points on the 
                                                 
232 It seems as well that the FISA Court also modifies the orders. See, e.g., Letter from Peter 
J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to Sen. Harry Reid, Majority Leader (Apr. 
30, 2013), http://perma.cc/39U6-6LA2 (reporting that the FISA Court modified 200 of the 
212 applications for Section 215 orders).  
233 Id. 
234 On the legal advisors, see 1 KRIS & WILSON, supra note 32, § 5.3. 
235 Memorandum from Ethan L. Bauman, Assoc. Dir., Legislative Affairs Office, Nat’l Sec. 
Agency to the Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Sept. 10, 2009), 
https://perma.cc/8YEG-S6M8.  
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session’s purpose (“Demonstrate NSA’s dedication to compliance with the 
Court Orders and demonstrate how NSA uses the BR FISA program 
operationally in its counterterrorism missions while appropriately protecting 
U.S. person privacy”).236 It was apparently effective: on September 3, 2009, 
the Court allowed the NSA to resume analysis of the Section 215 telephony 
metadata suspended six months earlier.237 
  
 Of course trial court judges in other courts deal with litigants in a 
variety of contexts and using many approaches. 238 But the episodes just 
described—advice-giving, iterative drafting, briefings—depart significantly 
from the ordinary judicial mode, even while the FISA Court evidently 
maintains enormous influence over FISA surveillance. It seems almost 
unavoidable that this type of collaboration leads to a sense of shared effort 
and enterprise. Other practices, such as an annual lunch bringing together 
FISA Court judges and legal advisors (and the Chief Justice) with the heads 
of the CIA, NSA, and FBI239 likewise encourage the judges to conceptualize 
themselves as participating with the IC in a common project. In any event, 
while the FISA court superintends the surveillance process, clearly it does 
not evaluate whether it should go forward at all. That superintendence is 




Of the oversight institutions thus far described, only NSA’s brand-
new Civil Liberties and Privacy Office engages in policy-type weighing of 
civil liberties interests against the security benefits offered by particular 
surveillance methods. The one office that remains to be discussed is the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), an independent 
bipartisan agency nominally within the executive branch.240 As will be seen, 
and as one would expect from what is essentially a blue-ribbon-commission 
type organization with no enforcement or other executive function, the 
PCLOB seems so far to be functioning at least partially free of the role 
constraints of an executive agency. 
 
In its first incarnation, as part of the Executive Office of the 
President,241 the PCLOB was an unimportant player in NSA’s operations. In 
                                                 
236 Business Records FISA: Presentation for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
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its second, independent, incarnation,242 it started operations only recently. 
President Obama was slow to name the Board’s members, and the Senate 
was even slower to confirm them243 Its budget is tiny; it has only a handful 
of full-time staff members (one on a detail from the Department of Justice), 
in addition to its full-time chair and part-time members.244 But after David 
Medine’s long-awaited confirmation as chair in May 2013,245 the Snowden 
disclosures, one week later, prompted the Board to undertake a review of 
FISA, the first part of which it completed in January 2014.246  
 
The board’s statute commits it firmly to a policy, not compliance, 
function, requiring it to: 
 
(1) analyze and review actions the executive branch takes to 
protect the Nation from terrorism, ensuring that the need for 
such actions is balanced with the need to protect privacy and 
civil liberties; and 
(2) ensure that liberty concerns are appropriately considered 
in the development and implementation of laws, regulations, 
and policies related to efforts to protect the Nation against 
terrorism.247 
 
Nonetheless, in its review of the telephony metadata program, the board 
began with the language of law. Three of its five members—the three 
Democrats—found that Section 215 “does not provide an adequate legal 
basis to support the program,” and that the program also violates the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act.248 The Board acknowledged that 
the FISA Court had approved the program many times, but explained that it 
found that approval unpersuasive: “Having independently examined this 
statutory question, the Board disagrees with the conclusions of the 
government and the FISA court.” 249  Pointing out that the program long 
predated its authorization by the FISA Court under Section 215, the Board 
concluded, after forty-five pages of statutory analysis: “It may have been a 
laudable goal for the executive branch to bring this program under the 
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supervision of the FISA court. Ultimately, however, that effort represents an 
unsustainable attempt to shoehorn a preexisting surveillance program into 
the text of a statute with which it is not compatible.” 250 Accordingly, it 
wrote, the program should be halted.251  
 
The Board also analyzed the constitutional law issues raised by the 
telephony metadata program. It explained that under the Supreme Court’s 
existing doctrine, a Fourth Amendment challenge would fail. “It is possible 
that the third-party doctrine or its scope will be judicially revised,” the Board 
wrote—making clear its own view that this revision would be very welcome. 
“To date, however, the Supreme Court has not modified the third-party 
doctrine or overruled its conclusion that the Fourth Amendment does not 
protect telephone dialing records. Most courts continue to follow those 
precedents, and government lawyers are entitled to rely on them, including 
in their formulation and defense of the Section 215 program.”252 On First 
Amendment associational rights, the Board noted that standing doctrine had 
so far obstructed full court testing of the rights, but that the challenge was far 
from trivial.253  
 
It should be evident, then, that the PCLOB’s perspective on “the 
law” was quite different from that of any federal agency staff. In its first 
report, its members, among them a retired federal court of appeals judge, 
assumed much more the stance of court of appeals judges. Holdings by 
courts that are not the Supreme Court were treated as potentially persuasive, 
but not binding. And even Supreme Court holdings were deemed potentially 
undermined by subsequent changes of circumstances or surrounding 
doctrine. The PCLOB members obviously felt far freer than agency counsel 
do with respect to legal analysis and interpretation; the analysis is not only 
of precedent but also, in more typically judicial mode, of the policy pros and 
cons. The result was that the board took advantage of the authority of the 
law/compliance frame, without many of the constraints that frame usually 
imposes on executive branch officials. Its pronouncement that the telephony 
metadata program is illegal, beyond the statutory authority of the 
administration, is what got by far the most attention.254  
 
The PCLOB’s two Republican appointees disagreed with the three 
Democrats both on the merits and on the Board’s role. One wrote: 
 
This legal question will be resolved by the courts, not by this 
Board, which does not have the benefit of traditional 
adversarial legal briefing and is not particularly well-suited 
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to conducting de novo review of long-standing statutory 
interpretations. We are much better equipped to assess 
whether this program is sound as a policy matter and whether 
changes could be made to better protect Americans’ privacy 
and civil liberties while also protecting national security.255 
 
To be clear, the Democratic PCLOB members also addressed the 
policy considerations on their own merits, and urged that those 
considerations be implemented as new law. Having described the telephony 
metadata program as extending beyond current statutory parameters, the 
PCLOB emphasized that the solution was not simply shoring up FISA:  
 
The Board also recommends against the enactment of 
legislation that would merely codify the existing program or 
any other program that collected bulk data on such a massive 
scale regarding individuals with no suspected ties to 
terrorism or criminal activity. While new legislation could 
provide clear statutory authorization for a program that 
currently lacks a sound statutory footing, any new bulk 
collection program would still pose grave threats to privacy 
and civil liberties.256  
 
The telephony metadata program was insufficiently central to the 
counterterrorism enterprise to justify those threats, the Board argued. “Given 
the significant privacy and civil liberties interests at stake, Congress should 
seek the least intrusive alternative and should not legislate to the outer 
bounds of its authority.”257 It then proceeded to make several smaller gauge 
recommendations about operation of the telephony metadata program, 
presumably in case Congress rejected the first recommendation, and 
continued the program in existence. 
 
No experience facilitates evaluation of the PCLOB’s effectiveness, 
but its 215 report is certainly adding to the current pressure for a new wave 
of intelligence reform. On the other hand, the independence exhibited by its 
first report may induce subsequent appointing Presidents to choose tamer 
members. 
 
The PCLOB’s second report, about targeted surveillance of 
foreigners abroad, under FISA § 702, similarly looked at both law and 
policy. But on this one, a divide among PCLOB members and inconsistent 
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language made the message much less clear. Much of Section 702 
surveillance was appropriate, the report said. But: 
 
Outside of this fundamental core, certain aspects of the 
Section 702 program raise questions about whether its 
impact on U.S. persons pushes the program over the edge 
into constitutional unreasonableness. Such aspects include 
the scope of the incidental collection of U.S. persons’ 
communications, the use of “about” collection to acquire 
Internet communications that are neither to nor from the 
target of surveillance, the collection of MCTs that 
predictably will include U.S. persons’ Internet 
communications unrelated to the purpose of the surveillance, 
the use of database queries to search the information 
collected under the program for the communications of 
specific U.S. persons, and the possible use of 
communications acquired under the program for criminal 
assessments, investigations, or proceedings that have no 
relationship to foreign intelligence.258 
 
The Board declined to decide whether the 702 program was constitutional, 
statutorily authorized, or not. “[R]ather than render a judgment about the 
constitutionality of the program as a whole, the Board instead has addressed 
the areas of concern it has identified by formulating recommendations for 
changes to those aspects of the program.”259 It elaborated:  
 
Because the same factors that bear on Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness under a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test are 
equally relevant to an assessment based purely on policy, the 
Board opts to present its proposals for changes to the Section 
702 program as policy recommendations, without rendering 
a judgment about which, if any, of those proposals might be 
necessary from a constitutional perspective.260  
 
The Board emphasized the room this approach opened to it. Constitutional 
avoidance, it stated:  
 
permits us to offer the recommendations that we believe are 
merited on privacy grounds without making finetuned 
determinations about whether any aspect of the status quo is 
constitutionally fatal, and without limiting our 
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recommendations to changes that we may deem 
constitutionally required.261 
 
But other language the report used sounded rather more accepting. Rather 
than ducking the legal issues, on other pages it seemed that the Board was 
worried not whether the 702 program crossed the constitutional line, but 
whether it skirted a bit too close for comfort, while still remaining on the 
lawful side. For example:  
 
[C]ertain aspects of the Section 702 program push the entire 
program close to the line of constitutional reasonableness. . . 
. With these concerns in mind, this Report offers a set of 
policy proposals designed to push the program more 
comfortably into the sphere of reasonableness, ensuring that 
the program remains tied to its constitutionally legitimate 
core.  
 
This reading of the report as ratifying the legality (rather than 
declining to address the legality) of the 702 program was pushed by the 
Board’s two Republicans, Rachel Brand and Elisebeth Collins Cook, each of 
them a former Bush Administration head of the Justice Department’s Office 
of Legal Policy.262 They emphasized in a separate statement that:  
 
The Board makes a few targeted recommendations to address 
concerns raised by . . . two aspects of the program. We stress 
that these are policy-based recommendations designed to 
tighten the program’s operation and ameliorate the extent to 
which these aspects of the program could affect the privacy 
and civil liberties of U.S. persons. We do not view them to 
be essential to the program’s statutory or constitutional 
validity.263  
 
Two members, Chair David Medine and former Judge Patricia Wald, 
opined in a separate statement that the recommendations were needed not 
merely to avoid a potential legal problem, but to solve both constitutional 
and statutory infirmities already extant: 
 
[W]e feel strongly that the present internal agency 
procedures for reviewing communications and purging those 
portions that are of no foreign intelligence value prior to use 
                                                 
261 Id. 
262  See Biography of Rachel L. Brand--Board Member, Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board, PCLOB, http://perma.cc/F7R9-7VJA (last visited Nov. 17, 2014); 
Biography of Elisebeth Collins Cook—Board Member, Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board, PCLOB, http://perma.cc/2VM4-DRZT (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). 
263 PCLOB, 702 REPORT, supra note 258, at 161. 
Harvard National Security Journal / Vol. 6 
 
172 
of the information are wholly inadequate to protect 
Americans’ acknowledged constitutional rights to protection 
for private information or to give effect to the statutory 
definition of foreign intelligence information, which, as 
discussed below, provides a more stringent test for 
information relating to Americans.264 
 
Evidently, however, they were unable to persuade their colleagues, and their 
legal conclusions were portrayed in media coverage as a dissent-type 
minority position. Indeed, the Board was widely perceived as having blessed 
the program. The Washington Post, for example, summarized the report as 
“conclud[ing] that a major National Security Agency surveillance program 
targeting foreigners overseas is lawful and effective but that certain elements 
push ‘close to the line’ of being unconstitutional.”265 The fairer reading of 
the previously-quoted language of the report—that it avoided any 
determination on the legal question by an incompletely theorized agreement 
as to recommendations—received no play in the media. 
 
The PCLOB’s ten recommendations relating to the 702 program 
have not received nearly as much attention as its 215 recommendations—
lacking the strong legitimating language of rights and compliance, its policy 
ideas seem not to be gaining much traction.  
 
III. The Liberty Gap 
 
I observe above that American intelligence legalism has three 
features: substantive rules, judicial review, and empowerment of lawyers. 
These three together promote the compliance mindset that is evident in Part 
II—a mindset that at NSA is fairly longstanding, prioritized, and adequately 
staffed. Thus far I have offered an organizational account of a concomitant 
civil liberties gap: I have demonstrated that few institutional resources 
relating to the NSA are devoted to asking the “should” question rather than 
the “can” question. But perhaps this is an appropriate allocation of labor. 
Perhaps the “should” question belongs outside the NSA, indeed outside the 
IC—with the courts, the Congress, or the President. If these “upstream” 
actors could harden optimal policy into compliance-ready rules—law—then 
there would be no need for additional policy work within the IC. Instead, 
intelligence legalism might be the best implementation method.  
 
I suggest in Section A, below, that the law alone is not enough; it is 
implausible that constitutional, statutory, and binding executive rules will be 
sufficiently robust to produce the best policy outcomes. There will always be 
liberty gaps—and these will increase with the passage of time from the last 
public outcry and resulting intervention. In Section B, I examine and reject a 
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different argument that intelligence legalism sufficiently furthers liberty: that 
lawyers, empowered by legalism, turn out to be excellent good civil liberties 
guardians. Finally, in Section C, I argue that the compliance focus, and the 
prevalence of rights and law talk, actually dampens the prospects of civil 
liberties policymaking, both by crowding it out and by rendering 
surveillance more politically acceptable and therefore making political or 
policy-based claims for reform less likely to succeed, whether inside the 
Intelligence Community or in the polity as a whole. In sum, intelligence 
legalism may further individual liberty to some extent, but compliance 
matters are apt to receive so much attention and even prestige that law 
functions as a ceiling rather than a floor. To add policy considerations on top 
of law thus requires focused intervention, discussed in Part IV.  
 
A. The Limited, Though Important, Reach of Legality 
 
If the Constitution and statutes (both as interpreted by judges), and 
binding executive orders—taken together, the law—specify optimal 
security/liberty policy, then intelligence legalism might be the best 
implementation method for that policy. But I argue this is not the case; the 
law is likely to be suboptimal with respect to liberty. More analytic precision 
may be useful here. I mean, more exactly, that law is likely to leave 
unregulated many situations when (a) liberty can be enhanced without a 
negative impact on security, or (b) when enhancing liberty would (or might) 
negatively affect security, but on balance the gain to the former is worth the 
hit to the latter.266 Of course, different observers may disagree whether any 
particular scenario qualifies under either criterion. My point is that the 
limited ambitions of constitutional law and the limited political payoff from 
statutory or regulatory enactment of civil liberties protections mean that it is 
implausible on any account that the law achieves policy optimality, even for 
a brief moment in time. Moreover, even if that were not so, the limits in 
coverage of legislative-type rules—which are inevitable, and likely to grow 
over time—inevitably mean that there is space between the standard of 
“liberty where there’s no, or acceptable, security cost” and the compliance-
ready rules. 
 
1. The Constitution  
 
Consider, first, the Constitution, as interpreted by the courts. Those 
who answer charges of surveillance overreach by emphasizing the 
constitutionality of the contested conduct—which is to say, nearly every 
federal official who has defended the NSA in recent months—are essentially 
arguing that constitutional law sets not individual rights minima, but rather, 
perhaps even definitionally, the right civil liberties policy. If this were 
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correct, optimal policy could be implemented by a robust compliance 
infrastructure. The best civil liberties path might, for example, be simply to 
augment judicial review, perhaps by cutting through the large variety of 
litigation barriers (including doctrines of ripeness, finality, standing, 
justiciability, state secrets, and limits on inferred private rights of action) that 
often impede judicial supervision.  
 
The problem is that to assume, as this view does, that 
“constitutional” and “good” are the same is to mistake the role of 
constitutional law.267 The distance between “constitutional” and “good” is a 
matter of both method and purpose. Methodologically, many of the 
constitutional considerations—precedent, text, framers’ intent, and so on—
are irrelevant to policy evaluation. Courts may well also “lack the 
institutional capacity to easily grasp the privacy implications of new 
technologies they encounter,” as Orin Kerr has argued at length.268 But even 
when courts include policy analysis in their decision-making, constitutional 
decisions at least purport to be more about “can” than about “should.” That 
is why Fourth Amendment caselaw, notwithstanding its policy-heavy 
reasonableness inquiry, is formulated to give the government a good deal of 
leeway269—both for mistakes270 and for differences of opinion.271 Indeed, it 
is only to be expected that courts are likely to err on the side of non-
intervention in constitutional cases. The remedial rigor that is at least the 
symbolic entailment of a right must on the margin discourage rights 
declaration 272 ; declaring something to be a “right” ups the stakes 
considerably, discouraging partial solutions.  
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So while constitutional law and court enforcement of it sometimes 
advance individual liberty with respect to particular issue or in some cases, 
there is likely to be considerable distance between optimal policy and the 
constitutional floor. To quote one summary, again by Orin Kerr, “we should 
not expect the Fourth Amendment alone to provide adequate protections 
against invasions of privacy made possible by law enforcement use of new 
technologies. . . . Additional privacy protections are needed to fill the gap 
between the protections that a reasonable person might want and what the 
Fourth Amendment actually provides.”273  
 
This position is not without its high-profile detractors. Most recently, 
many in the George W. Bush administration took the stance that it was 
generally advisable to “act to the edges of the law.”274 Accordingly, Jack 
Goldsmith recounts, “[a] White House confident about what it wanted to do 
. . . used lawyers, and especially legal opinions by OLC lawyers, as a sword 
to silence of discipline a recalcitrant bureaucracy.”275 But for the reasons just 
explained, the approach in question—call it the “chalk on the cleats” 
attitude—systematically fails to subject particular policies to actual merits 
analysis. To quote Goldsmith again, “It got policies wrong, ironically, 
because it was excessively legalistic, because it often substituted legal 
analysis for political judgment, and because it was too committed to 
expanding the President’s constitutional powers.”276 
 
The Bush White House’s ideas notwithstanding, the position that 
“constitutional” and “good” may have quite a distance between them has 
mostly been uncontroversial in the world of intelligence. FISA itself imposes 
a statutory warrant requirement—one that the Supreme Court has never held 
is constitutionally required. In the Keith case, the Supreme Court held that 
domestic national security surveillance required a warrant, but expressly 
declined to examine “the issues which may be involved with respect to 
activities of foreign powers or their agents.”277 The Court expressly invited 
legislation: 
 
Congress may wish to consider protective standards for the 
latter which differ from those already prescribed for specified 
crimes in Title III. Different standards may be compatible 
with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in 
relation to the legitimate need of Government for intelligence 
information and the protected rights of our citizens.278  
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FISA’s passage was spurred in part by the Keith opinion’s implicit threat 
that, absent some kind of institutionalized framework to safeguard 
reasonable expectations of privacy, the Court might subsequently hold that 
Katz’s warrant requirement for electronic eavesdropping covers foreign 
intelligence surveillance of domestic communications. 279  But it was also 
prompted by an emerging view in the lower courts that warrants would not 
be required. 280  As Laura Donohue summarizes in a comprehensive 
forthcoming article about FISA Section 702, “Congress crafted the 
legislation to ensure that domestic electronic foreign intelligence collection 
could not proceed absent prior judicial review, demonstration of probable 
cause, and particularity.”281 When Congress took the Court’s invitation and 
legislated, requiring warrants for foreign intelligence surveillance at home 
(but leaving regulation of surveillance abroad for another day282), it therefore 
went beyond existing caselaw.  
 
Even if one interprets FISA as implementing a constitutionally 
compelled framework, albeit one never articulated by a court,283 it is clear 
that for many other topics in intelligence policy our current understanding of 
appropriate conduct is extra-constitutional. On issue after issue, for example, 
the Church Committee declined to rest on the Constitution (about which, it 
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must have mattered, Senators’ views are not dispositive). Instead, the 
Committee proposed a large number of new substantive rules; this included 
not only rules eventually incorporated in FISA 284  but also rules against 
assassination of foreign leaders; 285  use of academics for CIA operations 
without disclosure to their university presidents;286 non-public sponsorship 
of books, articles, etc. by the CIA; 287  CIA relationships with journalists 
affiliated with U.S. media organizations, or with American clergy; 288 
dangerous and unconsented human drug experimentation; 289  and so on. 
These recommendations constituted the Committee’s views not of what was 
already legally required, but what should be required. Implementation then 
took place via E.O. 12,333. 
 
2. Statutory Law  
 
So there has long been agreement that the Constitution alone is 
insufficient to achieve optimal civil liberties protections with respect to 
surveillance. What about non-constitutional law? Are the statutes that have 
been passed sufficient? Or, even if they are not, might new statutory law—
which can then be implemented via intelligence legalism—be the best way 
to fill the gap that remains after constitutional adjudication?  
 
Start with the small subset of the Church Committee’s proposed 
reforms implemented by FISA. The statutory text imposes a probable cause 
requirement for domestic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, as 
the Supreme Court hinted in the Keith case it might someday require as a 
matter of constitutional law. FISA’s other contributions are procedural rather 
than substantive. I have suggested that optimal policy requires calibration of 
privacy and surveillance—that surveillance should be conducted only when 
its security benefits outweigh its privacy infringement. FISA includes no 
such constraint. Rather, to the extent surveillance requires an invasion of 
U.S. person privacy, FISA allows that invasion to occur, directing 
implementation to “minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the 
dissemination, of non-publicly available information concerning 
unconsenting United States persons” only insofar as such minimization is 
“consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and 
disseminate foreign intelligence information.” 290 Thus FISA categorically 
gives security more weight than liberty; its text directs that any foreign 
intelligence “need” trumps privacy.  
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You may be thinking that the Congress that enacted FISA chose a 
thumb on the scale for security because it disagreed with me on the merits, 
believing that FISA’s trump card for security constituted optimal policy. 
That is, perhaps the 1978 Congress saw FISA as closing whatever civil 
liberties gap there was. The historical record suggests otherwise, however. 
Reformers in the 1970s made clear that they didn’t intend for congressional 
protection of civil liberties against surveillance to end with FISA. Rather, the 
Church Committee’s view was on top of FISA itself, 
executive/congressional disclosure would both minimize the future use of 
liberty-infringing techniques and facilitate future interventions The 
Committee made formal findings that Congressional dereliction of oversight 
responsibilities had “helped shape the environment in which improper 
intelligence activities were possible.”291 Accordingly, it explained:  
 
Procedural safeguards—“auxiliary precautions” as they were 
characterized in the Federalist Papers—must be adopted 
along with substantive restraints. . . . Our proposed 
procedural checks range from judicial review of intelligence 
activity before or after the fact to formal and high level 
Executive branch approval and more effective Congressional 
oversight.292  
 
Committee members (Senators) evidently believed that the congressional 
disclosure it urged would facilitate liberty as well as accountability, allowing 
future lawmakers to intervene where salutary, using either soft or hard 
methods, to appropriately balance liberty and security. As Loch Johnson—
first Senator Church’s special assistant, then the first staff director of the 
House Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight, and then an intelligence 
scholar—has summarized, “The purpose of these new arrangements was to 
prevent a further erosion of American liberties at the hands of the 
intelligence agencies.”293  
 
Congressional disclosure has not in practice fulfilled these hopes. 
New disclosure norms have indeed shifted information, power, and political 
risk to the White House and the Congress 294  (although the mandate, 
                                                 
291 II CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 278. 
292 Id. at 293 (citing Madison, Federalist 51 “If men were angels, no government would be 
necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on 
government would he necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by 
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to 
control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the 
people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught 
mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.”). 
293  Loch K. Johnson, Establishment of Modern Intelligence Accountability, in U.S. 
NATIONAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE AND DEMOCRACY: FROM THE CHURCH COMMITTEE TO 
THE WAR ON TERROR 37, 42 (Russell A. Miller ed. 2008). 
294 See, e.g., Loch K. Johnson, Ostriches, Cheerleaders, Skeptics, and Guardians: Role 
Selection by Congressional Intelligence Overseers, 28 SAIS REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL 




operative since 1980, that the Intelligence Community “keep the 
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all 
intelligence activities, other than a covert action”295 has not always been 
scrupulously honored). But obstacles to development of legislative expertise 
and the ordinarily low political salience of intelligence—both themselves 
rooted in secrecy—have meant that congressional interventions have not 
played much of a civil-liberties-protective role.296 Only once, in 1994, has a 
statute unambiguously increased procedural protections against 
surveillance—and that amendment was passed in large part to shore up 
executive authority. 297  By contrast, the executive branch has been able, 
several times, to elicit congressional acquiescence for statutes to expand 
surveillance authority—the USA PATRIOT Act, the Protect America Act, 
                                                                                                                             
AFFAIRS 93 (2008); Loch K. Johnson, The CIA and the Question of Accountability, 12 
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 178 (2014). I do not mean to take much of a 
position on the longstanding argument about whether the current degree of legislative 
oversight is adequate, only to argue that intelligence oversight reform promoted disclosure 
as one of its principal reforms, and has succeeded in achieving, at least, more such 
disclosure. 
295 National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 413a(a)(1) (1947). This provision was inserted into 
the Act by Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 501(a), 94 Stat. 1975, 1981 (1980). 
296 Others have written at length about the institutional dynamics that undermine effective 
congressional intelligence oversight, not just of civil liberties but of intelligence policy more 
generally. As Amy Zegart summarizes her own findings:  
 
Congress has collectively and persistently tied its own hands in 
intelligence oversight for a very long time. Two institutional weaknesses 
are paramount: rules, procedures, and practices that have hindered the 
development of legislative expertise in intelligence, and committee 
jurisdictions and policies that have fragmented Congress’s budgetary 
power over executive branch intelligence agencies. . . . Ten years after 
9/11, the United States has an intelligence oversight system that is well-
designed to serve the re-election interests of individual legislators and 
protect congressional committee prerogatives, but poorly designed to 
serve the national interest.  
 
AMY B. ZEGART, EYES ON SPIES: CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY 10–11 (2011). See also, e.g., L. BRITT SNYDER, THE AGENCY AND THE HILL: 
CIA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS 1946–2004 (2008); Kathleen Clark, Congress’s Right 
to Counsel in Intelligence Oversight, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 915 (2011) (observing that 
congressional oversight has frequently been hobbled by administration insistence that 
information be shared only with members, not their staff, even staff with appropriate 
security clearances).  
297  Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.103-359 
(1994), 108 Stat. 3454, Sec. 9 (authorizing FISA judges to allow secret physical searches 
within the United States of “the premises, property, information, or material of a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence 
information”); this amendment to FISA substituted FISA Court process for the prior (rare) 
practice of Attorney General authorization of such searches. See MCGEE & DUFFY, MAIN 
JUSTICE, supra note 34, at 342–343; Warrantless Physical Searches Conducted in the U.S. 
for Foreign Service: Statement before the Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence H.R. 
(July 14, 1994), http://perma.cc/8D4G-7G2Z (statement of Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy 
Attorney General). 
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and the FISA Amendments Act. 298  (The last of these included some 
protections along with the expansion of authority.299) It is possible that the 
Snowden disclosures have shifted the political economy enough for 
Congress to pass a rights-protective measure in response, but the current 
prospects of serious legislated reform are dim and getting dimmer.300 .  
 
Thus whatever the Church Committee’s ambitions or expectations 
for their congressional successors, congressional disclosure has increased 
intelligence accountability but has not so far provided an impetus for 
responsive additional civil liberties protections. The civil liberties gap left by 
the limited ambit of constitutional law, and of FISA, remains. Present efforts 
in Congress to update the surveillance rules to be more liberty-protective in 
the era of big data may succeed and align “can” with the reformers’ ideas 
about “should”—for a while and for high-salience issues. But even if this 
happens, it is inevitable that for issues that have not made it into the press, or 
for issues in the future, there will always be a disjunction between what is 
legal and what even members of Congress themselves would find to be, on 
full and public consideration, appropriate policy. Areas of surveillance 
practice that have not so far leaked—or in which executive practice 
changes—will remain, and so, concomitantly, will at least some civil 
liberties gap.  
 
3. Executive Order  
 
Efforts to implement most of the Church Committee’s substantive 
recommendations as statutory law failed; they entered American law instead 
as part of Executive Order 12,333. As already quoted, the Executive Order 
does expressly state (in language unchanged from its 1981 promulgation): 
“Set forth below are certain general principles that, in addition to and 
consistent with applicable laws, are intended to achieve the proper balance 
between the acquisition of essential information and protection of individual 
interests.”301 That is, one of 12,333’s purposes is to fill the civil liberties gap 
left by constitutional and statutory law.  
 
But 12,333 cannot live up to that goal. For one thing, the rules’ status 
as part of an executive order renders them both less visible and more easily 
weakened. The 2008 amendments to 12,333, for example, for the first time 
allowed inter-agency sharing of signals intelligence “for purposes of 
allowing the recipient agency to determine whether the information is 
                                                 
298 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 272 Stat. 115 (2001); Protect America Act, 
Pub. L. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007); FISA Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 2436 
Stat. 122 (2008).  
299 See id. (implementing limited court supervision for targeted foreign surveillance, mostly 
for the first time). 
300  See Spencer Ackerman, Senate Republicans Block USA Freedom Act Surveillance 
Reform Bill, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 19, 2014), http://perma.cc/BVG3-V4Q9.  
301 Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 2.2. 




relevant to its responsibilities and can be retained by it,” pursuant to 
potential “procedures established by the Director in coordination with the 
Secretary of Defense and approved by the Attorney General.”302 This change 
received no attention by non-governmental commentators.303  
 
More important, even if Executive Order 12,333 adequately covered 
civil liberties interests in 1980, it—along with its associated AG 
Guidelines—has grown out-of-date in subsequent decades. Unsurprisingly, 
given the generally low visibility of intelligence matters, there was little 
appetite to update either Executive Order 12,333 or other sources of 
executive self-regulation to address new challenges to liberty, until the 
Snowden disclosures. Thus notwithstanding the enormous changes that have 
taken place in the scope of surveillance since 1980 and the advent of “big 
data” methods, there have been no substantive liberty-protective changes 
ever made to the Executive Order. Some procedural protections have been 
added, 304  and notable efforts to weaken the protection of U.S. Person 
information were fended off.305 But whatever further substantive protection 
might be useful in light of technological or other changes, all that has been 
added since 1980 is new hortatory language swearing fealty to (already 
binding) other laws: “The United States Government has a solemn 
obligation, and shall continue in the conduct of intelligence activities under 
this order, to protect fully the legal rights of all United States persons, 
including freedoms, civil liberties, and privacy rights guaranteed by Federal 
law.”306  
 
Of course, in the rare situation of important disclosures, public 
discontent about surveillance practices might prompt the President to update 
Executive Order 12,333, as public discontent has occasionally prompted 
                                                 
302 Compare Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 2.3(j), amended by Exec. Order No. 13,470, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 45325 (July 30, 2008), with Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 2.3, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 (Dec. 4, 
1981); see also OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY 
OFFICE, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY INFORMATION PAPER: DESCRIPTION OF CIVIL 
LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY PROTECTIONS INCORPORATED IN THE 2008 REVISION OF 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 [hereinafter CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY INFORMATION 
PAPER], http://perma.cc/7WEV-FJAP. No such procedures have been released.  
303 More recently, Emptywheel has analyzed this and other changes. See, e.g., 2008’s New 
and Improved EO 12333: Sharing SIGINT, EMPTYWHEEL (Feb. 28, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/S5QK-R2VU. 
304  In adding the Director of National Intelligence to the Executive Order, the 2008 
amendments did implicitly incorporate the role of the Civil Liberties Protection Officer, 
who reports to the DNI. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 
No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638; Exec. Order No. 13,470, 73 Fed. Reg. 45325 (July 30, 2008); 
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY INFORMATION PAPER, supra note 302. In addition, the 2008 
amendments called for several new procedures, to be approved by the Attorney General.  
305 PROGRAM MANAGER, INFO. SHARING ENV’T, FEASIBILITY: REPORT FOR THE CONGRESS 
OF THE UNITED STATES (2008), http://perma.cc/B8F5-XXC2. 
306 Exec. Order 12,333 § 1.1(b) (as amended by Executive Order 13470, 73 Fed. Reg. 
45325).  
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other policies that back away from the edge of lawfulness.307 Indeed, the 
January 17 promulgation of PPD-28 is a step in this direction. In addition to 
directing the development of policies to give foreigners some of the same 
protections already available to U.S. persons,308 PPD-28 includes some new 
civil liberties—and even civil rights—protective language:  
 
“Privacy and civil liberties shall be integral considerations in 
the planning of U.S. signals intelligence activities. The 
United States shall not collect signals intelligence for the 
purpose of suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent, or 
for disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race, 
gender, sexual orientation, or religion.”309  
 
“Signals intelligence activities shall be as tailored as 
feasible.”310 
 
“In no event may signals intelligence collected in bulk be 
used for the purpose of suppressing or burdening criticism or 
dissent [or] disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, 
race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion . . . .”311 
 
PPD-28’s new language related to “purpose” is limited in its bite (like any 
sole purpose requirement). It is, however, susceptible to implementation 
under a compliance framework. One can imagine a compliance regime that 
requires documentation and audit of the purpose of SIGINT collection, or of 
the use of information collected in bulk, to ensure that those purposes are not 
“suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent,” or “disadvantaging persons 
based on their ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, or religion.” But 
the other language quoted above reveals a very different, supplemental, 
approach. Making “privacy and civil liberties . . . integral considerations in 
the planning of U.S. signals intelligence activities,” and ensuring that 
“[s]ignals intelligence activities . . . [are] as tailored as feasible” are not 
compliance tasks; they are policy tasks. PPD-28, like several other recent 
reform proposals, is thus adding to the existing intelligence legalism regime 
a distinct concept of non-legalistic internal bureaucratic measures—a liberty-
protective infrastructure that can put civil liberties concerns into the policy 
mix, asking the “should” question. This is a new development. Previously, 
the compliance mindset within the Executive branch has failed to 
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Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG). For the history of these documents, 
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encourage—and even discouraged—policy-based consideration of civil 
liberties, for reasons I now explore. 
 
B. Lawyers Are Not Civil Libertarians 
 
Within a particular organization such as the NSA, the impact of a 
rights and compliance frame is to allocate decision-making to lawyers. If 
those lawyers have a civil libertarian orientation, this could be a channel by 
which rights and compliance serve civil liberties interests. That is, one could 
imagine that agency lawyers might systematically exercise a pro-liberty 
orientation, which could fill gaps that might otherwise exist. However, 
multiplying accounts of lawyers in the Intelligence Community suggest 
otherwise. A growing shelf-full of articles and books document and even 
celebrate the lawyers who now populate the military, the CIA, and the 
Department of Justice’s National Security Division. Jack Goldsmith, for 
example, has labeled these lawyers a key part of “something new and 
remarkable,” describing “giant distributed networks of lawyers, 
investigators, and auditors, both inside and outside the executive branch, that 
rendered U.S. fighting forces and intelligence services more transparent than 
ever, and that enforced legal and political constraints, small and large, 
against them.”312 Might all these lawyers push the intelligence enterprise 
towards appropriate balancing of liberty and security, even in the absence of 
specific law or doctrine declaring the required outcome?  
 
I think not. Rather, when lawyers (in an office where they are 
understood to be practicing law) are given policy roles, those lawyers’ legal 
sign-off frequently stands in as sufficient justification to undertake the 
policy. To quote Goldsmith one last time, describing the Bush 
administration’s aggressive stance on a variety of national security topics, 
the role of lawyers was part of why “‘What should we do?’ . . . often 
collapsed into ‘What can we lawfully do?’” 313  The emerging evidence 
suggests that national security agency counsel are implementers of two 
major sets of values—fiduciary/counselor, and rule of law—but not civil 
liberties. Judge James E. Baker’s book-long defense and explication of the 
role of lawyers in the national security state barely mentions the key civil 
liberties values of freedom of speech or religion, the right to travel, or due 
process, but repeatedly emphasizes the centrality of building “a society and a 
government bound by law, and respect for law.”314 Consider one last time 
that 2005 speech to the NSA’s lawyers and their colleagues, by then-Deputy 
Attorney General James Comey, in which he praised the NSA’s lawyers as 
“custodian[s] of our constitution and the rule of law.” Comey did not exhort 
his audience of intelligence lawyers to ask the “should” question, rather than 
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the “can” question. Rather, the commitment he attempted to bolster was to 
legal compliance, not to individual liberty. To quote his revealing phrase 
again, he pleaded for “‘yes’ when it can be, . . . ‘no’ when it must be.”315  
 
And as I pointed out in this article’s introduction, the “no’s” Comey 
praises may make remarkably little difference, in the end. The hospital-bed 
confrontation leading to the brief shut-down of part of the “President’s 
Surveillance Program”—the modern ur-episode of intelligence legalism—is 
a perfect case in point. Lawyers, it seems to me, are far more likely to move 
an organization towards this kind of nearly symbolic compliance than to 
effect any more significant constraint on executive activity, particularly with 
respect to a program important to the President. Indeed, lawyers are 
attractive to intelligence organizations because they are simultaneously able 
to give agency operations an imprimatur of lawfulness and to maintain their 
agency affiliation/loyalty.316 Their occasional “no’s,” which like as not have 
formal rather than major substantive effects, are a price worth paying for 
those traits.  
 
C. The Costs of Intelligence Legalism  
 
Theorists and observers in a variety of fields have developed the 
broad critique that law and its concomitant rights orientation may have the 
counterintuitive impact of decreasing the welfare of the purported rights 
holders—or, in a more modest version of the point, may ameliorate some 
prevalent set of harms but undermine more ambitious efforts. Focusing 
particularly on litigation, they argue that it is inherently a timid enterprise, 
and yet it crowds out other more muscular approaches.317 Even with respect 
to out-of-court rights orientation, or “legalization,” scholars have offered the 
insight that formalizing/legalistic approaches can come with real costs to 
their intended beneficiaries, depending on the context. 318  The issue is 
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316 Cf. Rosa Brooks, The Man Who Knew Too Little, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Jan. 14, 2014), 
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litigation victories can be converted into useful political currency, see MICHAEL MCCANN, 
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whether, in a particular institutional setting, these possibilities have 
materialized. In this Section, I examine two pathways by which intelligence 
legalism tends to impair the prospects of a softer civil-liberties protective 
policy.  
 
1. Intelligence Legalism Crowds Out Interest Balancing 
 
This Article demonstrates the high salience of rights in this realm. 
Several related mechanisms convert that high salience into a devaluation of 
interests:  
 
First, rights occupy the “liberty” field because of the practical issue 
of attention bandwidth, which potentially applies both to agencies and 
advocates. After all, even large organizations have limited capacity.319 NSA 
compliance is such an enormous task that little room remains for more 
conceptual weighing of interests and options. Recall that of the dozen-plus 
offices I described in Part II, just two—the Civil Liberties and Privacy 
Office at the NSA, and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board—are 
currently playing a policy rather than strictly a compliance role. They are 
also, not coincidentally, the two newest and two smallest of the offices 
listed.  
 
I think, though, that this bandwidth issue is driven by a more 
conceptual, less practical, factor: that rights talk hides the necessity of policy 
judgments and, by its purity, diverts attention from that messier field. 
Morton Horwitz explains the point:  
 
A . . . troubling aspect of rights discourse is that its focus on 
fundamental, inherent, inalienable or natural rights is a way 
of obscuring or distorting the reality of the social 
construction of rights and duties. It shifts discussion away 
from the always disputable issue of what is or is not socially 
desirable. Rights discourse . . . wishes us to believe instead 
that the recognition of rights is not a question of social 
choice at all, as if in the normative and constitutional realm 
rights have the same force as the law of gravity.320 
                                                                                                                             
in particular professional advocates. But very few recipients have the knowledge and 
resources of professional advocates and only a few more are able to get representation by 
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319 See, e.g., James G. March & Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (1958). See also RICHARD 
THOMPSON FORD, RIGHTS GONE WRONG: HOW LAW CORRUPTS THE STRUGGLE FOR 
EQUALITY 25 (2011) (“Those working for social justice all too often eschew the difficult and 
unpleasant task of popular persuasion, lured by the false hope of a shortcut by way of 
judicially mandated civil rights. And even policy reform pursued through the democratic 
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320 Morton Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 403–04 (1988). 




Mary Dudziak makes a similar claim in her recent discussion of law and 
drone warfare, “In this context, law . . . does not aid judgment, but diverts 
our attention from morality, diplomacy, humanity, and responsibility in the 
use of force, and especially from the bloody mess left on the ground.”321 
 
Even in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, an area of constitutional 
doctrine explicitly imbued with policy considerations, we talk about rights as 
if they are somehow scientific, to be deduced rather than debated. The 
discussion that must accompany policy claims pales in prestige and 
importance by comparison. And from the perspective of their beneficiaries, 
judicially enforceable rights, with their promise of supremacy over 
competing interests, are shiny and magnetic. This is why the assertion of 
rights can be such a powerful organizing tool322—even if those rights don’t 
turn out to change much on the ground. As Rich Ford has written, “Rights 
are a secular religion for many Americans.”323 Or to quote Alan Freeman’s 
classic article about civil rights, “Rights consciousness can offer sustenance 
to a political movement, however alienated, indeterminate or reified rights 
may be.”324  
 
It is the purity, the apparent apolitical nature, of rights that makes 
them nearly the only coin available. By comparison with judicially 
enforceable rights, other methods of advancing individual liberty look 
feeble, contingent, jury-rigged. An accusation of illegality becomes the 
required first bid for any policy discussion, and a refutation of that 
accusation ends play. This dynamic is very much in evidence in the response 
to the PCLOB’s 702 report, described above. Rights discourse stunts needed 
policy discourse.325 
 
2. Intelligence Legalism and Legitimation 
 
In addition, judicial review legitimates the American surveillance 
system; that is why reference to court supervision is surveillance proponents’ 
first recourse when they want to suggest that everything is fine. It is, for 
example, a rare speech by a government official that fails to make reference 
to the FISA Court and its ratification of the government’s surveillance 
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programs. Below are passages, chosen essentially at random, from a speech 
by President Obama on the topic of signals intelligence reform326:  
 
•  “I ordered that our programs be reviewed by my national 
security team and our lawyers . . . . We increased oversight and 
auditing, including new structures aimed at compliance. 
Improved rules were proposed by the government and approved 
by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.” 
• “[T]he Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court . . . provides 
judicial review of some of our most sensitive intelligence 
activities.” 
 
In language like the above, court involvement is offered as evidence of both 
legality and appropriateness; indeed, the two are conceptually merged.  
 
My point is not that FISA Court legitimation is phony. In fact, 
judicial review has real effects on the system—we know from the recently 
declassified documents that FISA Court review disciplines the surveillance 
system, holding it at least to the government’s own representations.327 Yet 
the oversight gain carries with it a legitimation cost; the existence of judicial 
review makes political change more difficult. Scholars, particularly critical 
legal studies scholars, have made this point in a large number of other 
contexts. For example, Alan Freeman argued that civil rights law—and law 
more generally—exists “largely to legitimize the existing social 
structure.”328 The polity at large is soothed, and the effect is felt even by 
rights beneficiaries, who frame and tame their aspirations to suit the 
inherently limited scope of potential judicial interventions. Freeman 
described his view that American civil rights litigation has amounted to a 
“process of containing and stabilizing the aspirations of the oppressed 
through tokenism and formal gestures which actually enhance the material 
lives of few.”329 He wrote: 
 
Rights are granted to, or bestowed upon, the powerless by 
the powerful. They are ultimately within the control of those 
with authority to interpret or rewrite the sacred texts from 
which they derive. To enjoy them, one must respect the 
forms and norms laid down by those in power. One must 
especially avoid excesses in behavior or demands.330  
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The point is not, for Freeman (and the plentiful literature he 
adduced), that law accomplishes nothing for its purported beneficiaries. If 
that were true, it could not legitimate: “[I]f law is to serve its legitimation 
function, [the] ultimate constraints [that come from politics] must yield up 
just enough autonomy to the legal system to make its operations credible for 
those whose allegiance it seeks as well as those whose self-interest it 
rationalizes.”331 But gains from rights may—and in the surveillance situation 
clearly do—make gains from politics less available. 
 
To sum up this Part, neither the Constitution nor FISA aims to 
optimally balance security and liberty—and frequently analyzed difficulties 
in congressional intelligence oversight mean that new statutes are unlikely to 
fill that gap. Likewise the existing foundational Executive Order, 12,333, is 
at the very least out-of-date. Accordingly intelligence legalism, and its 
compliance mindset, cannot achieve optimal policy. Its concomitant 
empowerment of lawyers is real and important, but does not deputize a pro-
civil liberties force. Indeed, legalism actually both crowds out the 
consideration of policy and interests (as opposed to law and rights), and 
legitimates the surveillance state, making it less susceptible to policy reform. 
Are there, then, non-legalistic reforms that could play a productive part? I 




Since the Guardian’s PRISM story in June 2013, dozens of specific 
reforms have been proposed for the NSA and the FISA court. Bill after bill 
was introduced in the Congress; though none were enacted, one even passed 
in the House.332 The President appointed a blue-ribbon “Review Group on 
Intelligence and Communications Technologies,” which after just five 
months of work offered him 46 recommendations.333 The Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board issued its first two reports, with 22 
recommendations between them.334 Advocacy organizations have weighed 
in, as have blogging scholars, former government officials, and journalists 
and newspaper editorial boards. The President himself has responded by 
                                                 
331 Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination, supra note 328, at 1051. 
332 H.R. 3361 (113th Cong.) (as passed by House, May 22, 2014). For other examples of 
proposed NSA-reform legislation, see: S. 2685 (113th Cong.) (Senator Leahy’s proposed 
USA Freedom Act; cloture motion failed Nov. 18, 2014); S. 1631 (113th Cong.) (as referred 
to the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, Oct. 31, 2013); H.R. 3436 (113th Cong.) (as referred 
to H.R. Comm. on Intelligence, Oct. 30, 2013); S. 1551 (113th Cong.) (as referred to S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Sept 25, 2013); H.R. 2399 (113th Cong.) (as referred to H.R. 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec., and Investigations); S. 1130 (113th Cong.) 
(as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, June 11, 2013); S. 1121 (113th Cong.) (as 
introduced in Senate, June 7, 2013).  
333 Liberty and Security in a Changing World: Report and Recommendations, PRESIDENT’S 
REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES (Dec. 12, 2013) 
[hereinafter REVIEW GROUP REPORT], http://perma.cc/ZM54-5T8Y.  
334 PCLOB, 215 REPORT, supra note 246; PCLOB, 702 REPORT, supra note 258. 




announcing a number of reforms, and a process to evaluate others, as well as 
promulgating a significant new Presidential Policy Directive.  
 
The reforms proposed and announced nearly all cluster into one or 
more of eight categories: 
 
• Deepen surveillance legalism and skepticism towards bulk or 
wholesale data collection, by eliminating it, or in the alternative 
by imposing more court oversight, tighter government access to 
surveillance results, more-individuated showings of need.335  
• Increase public disclosure.336  
• Raise the level of governmental review for a variety of sensitive 
decisions.337  
• Treat foreigners abroad more like (but not just like) U.S. 
persons.338  
• Shrink the NSA’s ambit and perhaps even demilitarize it 
somewhat.339  
• Support global internet openness and security.340  
• Improve personnel and network security.341  
• Create/strengthen governmental offices and procedures directed 
at privacy and civil liberties.342  
 
Much of the reform action is, and should be, devoted to substantive 
interventions. Congress should itself ask the “should” question, and can 
insist on, for example, tighter rules governing bulk collection, requiring 
more-individuated justifications for data acquisition, analysis, and use. Or to 
rephrase the point using the familiar vocabulary of rules and standards,343 
                                                 
335 E.g., REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 333, recommendations 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 20; 
PCLOB, 215 REPORT, supra note 246, recommendations 1, 2; PCLOB, 702 REPORT, supra 
note 258, recommendations 1–7, 9; USA FREEDOM Act, S. 2685, 113th Cong. (2013–
2014), § 101.  
336 E.g., REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 333, recommendations 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 28; 
PCLOB, 215 REPORT, supra note 246, recommendations 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12; PCLOB, 702 
Report, supra note 258, recommendations 8, 9. 
337 E.g., REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 333, recommendations 11, 16, 17, 18, 30, 44; 
PCLOB, 215 REPORT, supra note 246, recommendations 4, 10. 
338 E.g., REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 333, recommendations 19, 21. 
339 E.g., id., recommendations 22, 23, 24, 25. 
340 E.g., id., recommendations 29, 30, 31, 32, 33. 
341 E.g., id., recommendations 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46. 
342 E.g., id., recommendations 26, 27, 28, 35, 36; PCLOB, 215 REPORT, supra note 246, 
recommendations 3, 5, 8, 10; USA FREEDOM Act, S. 2685, 113th Cong. §§ 401, 504 
(2013–2014). 
343 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1685 (1976); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: 
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).  
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Congress, and the President, can design and promulgate new rules to serve 
the overarching standard—that liberty should be prioritized where it carries 
no, or acceptable, cost to security—and these rules can then be enforced by a 
compliance regime.  
 
But what about implementation of the underlying standard itself: the 
idea that liberty should be prioritized where it carries no, or acceptable, cost 
to security? I argued in Part III that surveillance secrecy and the very 
significant changes over time mean that some opportunities to further that 
standard are likely to remain untouched by the Constitution, statutes, and 
executive order. So while I am far from opposed to additional statutory and 
regulatory-type rules, there remains an additional opportunity to further 
individual liberty and privacy with less legalistic, more standard-like 
interventions. This opportunity is the thrust of the last category of reforms, 
which propose to institutionalize within the Executive branch, the question 
of “should” rather than “can”:  
 
• The President announced in August 2013 that the NSA would 
“put in place a full-time civil liberties and privacy officer.”344 
The job announcement went up in September,345 and as already 
described, the new NSA Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer, 
Rebecca Richards, began work in January.346  
• The President’s Review Group also recommended “the creation 
of a privacy and civil liberties policy official located both in the 
National Security Staff and the Office of Management and 
Budget.”347 The President has agreed; this is included in PPD-
28,348 and several White House staffers are now assigned to this 
role, including one each at the Office of Management and 
Budget, National Security Council staff, and the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy. 349 
• The President’s Review Group delved further into the type of 
work product that would promote consideration of privacy and 
civil liberties, recommending that the government use Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Impact Assessments for “big data and data-
mining programs directed at communications,” in order to ensure 
that such efforts are statistically reliable, cost-effective, and 
                                                 
344 Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in a Press Conference 
(Aug. 9, 2013), http://perma.cc/GB8K-6DJE. 
345 Moyer, supra note 119. 
346 Richards Interview, supra note 15. 
347 REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 333, recommendation 26. 
348 PPD-28, supra note 224. The “new privacy officer” is assigned two tasks related to DNI 
oversight in a “disclosures action tracker” used by White House staff to manage deadlines 
and progress on proposed and promised surveillance reforms. Draft: Disclosure Action 
Tracker (Jan 25, 2015, 9:16 PM), http://perma.cc/8D5U-5RST. 
349 White House Official Interview, supra note 15. Counselor to the President John Podesta 
also plays a role. Id. 




protective of privacy and civil liberties. 350  NSA’s new Civil 
Liberties and Privacy Office is working through how to conduct 
assessments along these lines.351  
• The President’s Review Group also recommended that “program 
reviews” be instituted, external to the IC elements in question, 
“to assess and respond to emerging privacy and civil liberties 
issues”; these might be done by the PCLOB or some other 
way.352 The USA Freedom Act, the leading reform bill—which 
though it died in the Senate, will likely be the starting point for 
any congressional intervention in 2015—would have required 
the Intelligence Community Inspector General to do a similar 
kind of review.353  
• A reform proposal endorsed by nearly everyone354 (with some 
cavil by former FISA presiding Judge John Bates355) is to adjust 
FISA proceedings by introducing some kind of public advocate 
with a systematic role. In the President’s Review Group 
formulation: create a “Public Interest Advocate to represent 
privacy and civil liberties interests” in the FISA Court, allowing 
the Court to invite participation, but also allowing the Advocate 
to “intervene on her own initiative.” 356 The President agreed, 
“calling on Congress to authorize the establishment of a panel of 
advocates from outside government to provide an independent 
voice in significant cases before the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court.”357 This was included in the Senate version 
of the USA Freedom Act.358 
• The PCLOB, in its report on 702 surveillance, urged the 
government to “develop a comprehensive methodology for 
                                                 
350 REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 333, recommendation 35. 
351 Richards Interview, supra note 15. 
352 REVIEW GROUP REPORT, supra note 333, recommendation 36. 
353 USA FREEDOM Act, S. 2685, 113th Cong. (2013-2014), § 108.  
354  PCLOB, 215 REPORT, supra note 246, at 183 (recommendation 3); REVIEW GROUP 
REPORT, supra note 333, recommendation 28; USA FREEDOM Act, S. 2685, 113th Cong. 
§ 401 (2013–2014); President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Review of 
Signals Intelligence, supra note 326.  
355 Letter from Judge John D. Bates, Director of the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts, to Senator Dianne Feinstein, Chairman, Senate Intelligence Committee (Jan. 
13, 2014) [hereinafter Bates-Feinstein letter], http://perma.cc/T9TN-AQWM; see also Letter 
from John D. Bates, Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to 
Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary (Aug. 5, 2014) [hereinafter 
Bates-Leahy letter], http://perma.cc/49PB-MZNU; John D. Bates, Comments of the 
Judiciary on Proposals Regarding the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (Jan. 10, 2014) 
[hereinafter Bates, Comments on FISA Proposals], http://perma.cc/5UJC-DH85; H.R. REP. 
NO. 113-452, at 41–43, https://perma.cc/2WZG-QVQQ (including letter from John D. Bates 
to Congressman Mike Rogers). 
356 PCLOB, 215 REPORT, supra note 246, at 204.  
357 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence, 
supra note 326. 
358 USA FREEDOM Act of 2014, S. 2685, 113th Cong. § 401 (2013–2014).  
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assessing the efficacy and relative value of counterterrorism 
programs,” in order to effectively weigh the interests of the 
government in conducting a program against the intrusions on 
privacy and civil liberties that it may cause.”359 
 
Each of these proposals would designate either an office, person, or 
process to prioritize privacy and civil liberties—values that, as we have seen, 
otherwise lack advocates within the NSA’s governance structure. So might 
they really change anything at the NSA? I next look at three new/proposed 
offices.  
 
I have suggested that rights discourse tends to sweep under the rug 
the messiness of civil liberties protections—the policy issues that lie at the 
core of civil liberties interests. That messiness will be apparent in what 
follows; there are no magic bullets here. But a measure can be useful even if 
messy or compromised. It is possible that that none of the offices described 
below will accomplish very much. It seems to me, however, that soft 
administrative measures are useful tools in the civil liberties toolkit, well 
worth trying by a principal—whether that principal is the President or the 
Congress—who wants to give more priority to civil liberties but lacks the 
institutional capacity to do so directly and repeatedly over time. Each of 
these three offices might represent civil liberties interests more 
systematically than current arrangements, and might advocate for more 
liberty protective government protocols and programs. It is worth 
emphasizing, too, that measures such as these might have not just 
cumulative but also mutually reinforcing effects, creating a civil liberties 
cadre with security clearances, who might assist each other in a variety of 
ways.360 In addition to promoting civil liberties/privacy interstitially, offices 
like these assist other more authoritative rulemakers to understand the civil 
liberties implications of their choices. For example, they can help Congress 
in its otherwise very difficult oversight task, flagging issues that need more 
congressional attention.361 And in several different ways, they may increase 
public access to otherwise secret matters, which in turn increases pressure on 
those authoritative rulemakers: They generate reports—both public and 
private—which can be used by Congress and the public.362 And they build 
relationships with non-governmental organizations that promote increased 
official disclosure. My argument is not that offices like these are a cure-all 
                                                 
359 PCLOB, 702 REPORT, supra note 258, at 148.  
360 Cf. ABRAHAM L. NEWMAN, PROTECTORS OF PRIVACY: REGULATING PERSONAL DATA IN 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 81 (2008) (describing the influential role of national privacy 
authorities in creating a European pro-privacy regulatory regime; domestic authorities built 
powerful networks both within their own countries and transnationally).  
361 This kind of office can serve a congressional “fire-alarm” oversight strategy. See Mathew 
D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols 
versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984). 
362 Consider, along these lines, Ben Wittes’s 2008 writing about the importance of “a body 
of material—public and classified—that enables ongoing debate as to whether the 
counterterrorism bang of a given surveillance tactic or policy is worth its civil liberties 
buck.” WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR, supra note 47, at 253. 




for achieving optimal policy, but that they may be a useful part of a 
complicated ecology.  
 
A. NSA Office of Civil Liberties and Privacy 
 
I describe the NSA’s new Office of Civil Liberties and Privacy above 
in Section II.A. Here I ask what steps might maximize the chances that the 
office could succeed, or at least make a real impact. The twin dangers of 
impotence and capture/assimilation threaten all such Offices of Goodness.363 
The extraordinarily high stakes of counterterrorism work increase both 
dangers at NSA: nobody wants to be the person whose prioritization of 
liberty led to someone’s death. And yet both could be ameliorated by certain 
organizational choices:  
 
1. Maintaining Influence 
 
Any internal office whose mission is to constrain its agency runs the 
risk of losing influence and being ignored, whether by being excluded from 
working groups and processes or by having its attempted contributions 
rebuffed. This dynamic might be particularly strong at the NSA, because 
internal actors have up until now identified compliance problems as the 
threat to privacy/civil liberties. If the NSA’s new civil liberties office is 
going to add anything distinctive, it will need to embrace interests rather 
than rights, policy rather than compliance. But as discussed above, the 
attraction of the compliance frame is the legitimation it provides. When the 
new office takes on policy tasks, lacking that legitimation, it will be 
especially bureaucratically vulnerable to being frozen out.  
 
Moreover, many of the tools usually available to an Office of 
Goodness to augment its own influence will be unavailable because of the 
secrecy that surrounds NSA activities. In many circumstances an Office of 
Goodness asked to publicly ratify particular agency choices (activities, 
approaches, rules) can pressure agency leadership into making, or shading, 
certain choices in exchange for that ratification. But the NSA civil liberties 
office will often be unable to provide publicly-visible ratification, because 
the programs in question are secret. Accordingly, office leadership will lack 
that pressure point. Offices of Goodness can often cultivate external 
advocacy organization support, but the NSA civil liberties office’s access to 
this tool is similarly undermined by secrecy. Offices of Goodness can gain 
influence by generating documents that then become public, whether 
because they are officially released, leaked, or turned over because of a 
Freedom of Information Act or litigation discovery request. But in the 
classified environment these avenues of communication, too, are extremely 
narrow, which means that agency flouting of office views is less costly than 
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it would otherwise be.364 All three of the strategies just mentioned rely on a 
public constituency to bolster an Office of Goodness’s influence—because, 
as James Q. Wilson summarizes, for federal agencies, “[t]he principal source 
of power is a constituency.”365 The NSA civil liberties office will have a 
public constituency, but secrecy cannot but undermine how much help that 
constituency can provide.  
 
So in order to remain empowered, the NSA civil liberties office will 
need to cultivate alternative allies, with security clearances—at ODNI, DOJ, 
at the White House, and in Congress. I imagine this too will be a challenge. 
Beginning with ODNI and DOJ, the most obvious potential sources of 
support will be from those agencies’ Civil Liberties and Privacy Officers. 
But neither is able to carry much water. The ODNI civil liberties office, as 
already described, has chosen to function more as a compliance-type than a 
policy office. At DOJ, the Civil Liberties and Privacy Office lacks influence 
over foreign intelligence matters, which are allocated instead to the National 
Security Division. Indeed, no list of relevant offices or proposal of potential 
actors to increase oversight of which I’m aware have even mentioned this 
office.366 And the National Security Division lawyers are so committed to 
intelligence legalism, so firmly embedded in a compliance system, that they 
are unlikely to be very sympathetic to policy arguments that the government 
could but should not undertake some step or activity. Besides, a policy 
orientation would reduce NSD’s influence. Congress is also a somewhat 
hopeful prospect. But an NSA civil liberties office is unlikely to lean far 
enough to the left to hold the support of the most vocal congressional critics 
of the NSA. And yet the most conservative members of the Intelligence 
Committees are not natural allies either. In addition, all the obstacles to 
sustained congressional attention to and oversight of intelligence, discussed 
above, must obstruct fine-gauge interventions that might be useful to the 
office’s influence. In short, the new NSA civil liberties office will be hard 
pressed to cement the alliances on which, like every Office of Goodness, it 
will depend for influence. (I discuss the possibility of a White House 
alliance in the next section.) 
 
The institutional design of the new office should take account of 
these difficulties in gaining a constituency or allies. The office’s mandate 
                                                 
364 I develop the ideas summarized in this paragraph in Schlanger, Offices of Goodness, 
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from the NSA’s director should include a stable set of situations in which it 
can have access to the policy making process, and opportunity to participate, 
without needing sharper elbows than it is likely to have. The President’s 
Review Group’s recommendations about impact assessments are helpful, 
even vital, in this regard and should, in fact, be substantially expanded. The 
Review Group report explains that the kind of impact assessment it proposes 
“should be broader and more policy-based that has usually been the case for 
PIAs [Privacy Impact Assessments]. For instance, policy officials should 
explicitly consider the costs and benefits of a program if it unexpectedly 
becomes public.” 367  But the recommendation covers only “the broader 
programs that may constitute multiple systems.” For impact assessments368 
to play the role I am sketching of bolstering the access and influence of an 
NSA civil liberties office, they would need to be required for more 
programs.  
 
Other types of institutionalized access might also assist. For example, 
perhaps the operational offices could be required to report every year to the 
new civil liberties office how, precisely, each type of surveillance authority 
that touches U.S. persons has contributed to the NSA’s foreign intelligence 
mission—intelligence requirements satisfied, leads generated, etc. The office 
could use those reports to do an annual assessment for the NSA’s director of 
costs and benefits of the various programs. Certainly, one would want to 
ensure that the new office receives notice and an opportunity to comment369 
on all operational changes that potentially impact privacy or civil liberties—
that is, that sweep in more data or data for more people, particularly U.S. 
persons. Institutionalizing these processes—impact assessments, annual 
reports, clearance inclusion—would protect the new office’s access, a 
prerequisite to influence if not influence itself. That would further legitimate 
its inquiries and its recommendation role, protecting it from the accusation 
of self-aggrandizement or what a lawyer might call “officious 
intermeddling.”  
 
There is a danger to all this access, however. The more involvement 
in decisionmaking the new NSA civil liberties office has—at both staff and 
leadership levels—the more pressure it will receive to go along, to ratify 
whatever it is that the operational staff is requesting. Suppose, for example, 
the NSA civil liberties officer has the power to non-concur in some situation 
and have that non-concurrence push the issue to NSA’s director for decision. 
Forcing the director to choose between what his operational staff and his 
civil liberties staff propose is putting him in a no-win situation; the pressure 
to avoid that will be intense. What counters that pressure, if anything, is the 
new official’s commitment to her assigned values, privacy and civil liberties. 
I now move to this topic. 
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2. Maintaining Commitment 
 
The NSA’s civil liberties office will be able to bolster civil liberties 
only if its leader and staff stay committed to this “precarious value,” 370 
notwithstanding the value’s oppositional nature within the NSA. 
Maintaining commitment means resisting both collegial and careerist 
pressures, both born of normal desires to get along with colleagues and to 
earn their approbation. The goal is to avoid a special kind of “capture”—not, 
as the term usually indicates, by outsiders, but by colleagues. What is needed 
are careful and multi-pronged efforts to tie NSA civil liberties staff to a 
professional privacy and civil liberties community that can serve as a highly 
salient reference group; this should use a combination of hiring, networking, 
and fostering of career paths that value privacy/civil liberties expertise and 
commitment. 371  People whose primary professional predilections lean 
towards civil liberties have both personal and professional incentives to 
make sure that commitment does not erode. Again, however, the classified 
setting will make this more difficult than elsewhere. For example, bringing 
in new employees directly from advocacy groups is a common strategy for 
Offices of Goodness that seek to ensure staff commitment.372 But for the 
NSA civil liberties office, the top secret clearance process can take many 
months, which puts sharp pressure on hiring managers to hire already-
cleared federal employees, not external advocates. Even if civil liberties 
advocates get hired, they may well run into particularly lengthy clearance 
investigation delays, based on prior associations, travel, and activities. 
Office Director Becky Richards reports that five people she has so far 
brought on board are from within the NSA, to minimize hiring delays (as 
well as help her get a better understanding of how the NSA works). She has 
so far hired just one privacy expert from outside the NSA.373  
 
Moreover, as I have explained generally about Offices of Goodness 
staff, “even if they were hired from a Goodness organization, as staff gain 
experience within the government, that affiliation is likely to fade and their 
reference group to shift to their more immediate peers.”374 To oppose this 
shift, an Office’s leader can consciously connect its staff to Goodness 
advocates, for example, by sending them to conferences or other public or 
private events. This works in two different ways. First, it reinforces Office 
staff commitment to its assigned value simply by exposure and example. But 
in addition, outside events can have a disciplining function, penalizing 
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Office capture with harsh questions or criticisms, both public and private. As 
Sallyanne Payton has written, “[s]tarch for the backbone of weak 
professional groups generally must come from outside.”375  
 
Even if the new NSA civil liberties officer expends real attention to 
situating herself and her staff in networks of privacy and civil liberties 
advocates, harnessing those networks as reference groups will be difficult to 
do. Intelligence law professional networks exist—there is a bar association 
group 376  with conferences, newsletters, and continuing legal education 
sessions377; there are journals,378 centers,379 and like markers of professional 
group-building. Yet none of these is quite on point. As I argued at length 
above, the shared commitment of members of the national security bar is not 
to strengthening civil liberties, but rather to technocratic expertise with 
respect to the very complex legal rules at issue, and perhaps to a strong 
national security state. At the conferences and in the newsletters, civil 
liberties get remarkably little attention, although the role of lawyers receives 
a bit more.380 It is hard to imagine organizations like the ACLU, Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, or the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) 
embracing full participation in their events by NSA staff.381 Moreover, as 
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always, secrecy makes everything more difficult. The new civil liberties 
office’s staff will not be able to talk much about its work, and that makes 
them less likely to have their feet held to the civil liberties fire at public 
events.  
 
A method for avoiding capture that is more promising would use the 
new NSA civil liberties staff’s expectation about their own career paths. If 
the possibility for career advancement exists chiefly in other NSA jobs, that 
would be unhelpful; the prod to be a team player and not a constraint would 
be unduly sharp. (On the other hand, if commitment could be maintained, 
sending civil liberties/privacy staff back into the NSA’s operational offices 
would be a way to seed civil liberties values across the agency.) It will be far 
easier for the NSA civil liberties office staff to maintain their civil liberties 
commitment if a sufficient number of national security jobs develop, both 
within the new office itself and outside, in which demonstrated civil liberties 
commitment is a prerequisite. Perhaps that will happen; the Snowden 
disclosures and the natural maturation of this new bureaucratic strategy of 
civil liberties offices mean that numerous government institutions are 
gaining civil liberties staff. The PCLOB has a tiny staff, for example, and 
may well grow. As discussed in the next section, the White House has 
designated privacy/civil liberties staff. And of course, as the prior discussion 
makes clear, there are already some such jobs scattered around the 
government, at ODNI, DOJ, DHS, etc. For example, the new NSA civil 
liberties officer came from a privacy compliance job at DHS.382 There are, 
as well, non-governmental opportunities, as well, at universities, advocacy 
organizations, etc. The success of the new NSA office and other offices like 
it may depend on whether this job network reaches critical mass; currently, 
national security civil liberties jobs within the government are 
extraordinarily scarce.  
 
In short, to maximize the chances that the new NSA Civil Liberties 
and Privacy Office will maintain both influence and commitment, the NSA 
and other government officials should take the following steps: 
 
• Embrace a policy rather than a compliance role for the Office of 
Civil Liberties and Privacy. 
• Foster relationships of Office of Civil Liberties and Privacy staff 
with civil liberties offices elsewhere throughout the Intelligence 
Community, with White House personnel, and with Congress. 
• Mandate civil liberties impact assessments that assess costs and 
benefits of surveillance programs. 
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• Require periodic reporting by operational offices to the civil 
liberties office of the security contribution made by each type of 
surveillance authority. 
• Require the Office’s express comment on all proposed 
operational changes that sweep in more data or data for more 
people, particularly U.S. persons. 
• Use hiring and networking to encourage Office of Civil Liberties 
and Privacy staff to consider civil liberties advocates as key 
professional reference group. 
• Promote career paths for office staff that require demonstrated 
civil liberties expertise and commitment.  
 
B. Civil Liberties/Privacy Official(s) in the White House 
 
From 1999 to 2001, the Clinton Administration Office of 
Management and Budget had a political appointee “Chief Counselor for 
Privacy.” Peter Swire, one of the members of the President’s Review Group, 
served in that position, and the Review Group proposed that it be recreated, 
with the fancier title of “Special Assistant to the President” and the added 
authority that the appointee sit jointly in OMB and the National Security 
Council staff, and chair a Chief Privacy Officer Council “to help coordinate 
privacy policy throughout the Executive branch.”383 The Review Group’s 
report explained:  
 
There are several reasons for creating this position: First, the 
OMB-run clearance process is an efficient and effective way 
to ensure that privacy issues are considered by policymakers. 
Second, a political appointee is more likely to be effective 
than a civil servant. Third, identifying a single, publicly 
named official provides a focal point for outside experts, 
advocacy groups, industry, foreign governments, and others 
to inform the policy process. Fourth, this policy development 
role is distinct from that of ensuring compliance by the 
agencies. 384 
  
Again, this is an Office of Goodness strategy seeking to foreground the 
contested values of privacy/civil liberties, this time in inter-agency 
processes. The President has agreed at least in part, directing designation of 
one or more senior “Privacy and Civil Liberties Policy Official[s]” on the 
National Security Council staff, the Office of Management and Budget, and 
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at the Office of Science and Technology Policy.385 These officials were duly 
designated in spring 2014.386  
 
The designation of White House civil liberties officials poses a risk: 
it seems to me that it would be nearly impossible, bureaucratically, for an 
agency’s civil liberties officer to sustain a position even a little bit to the left 
of such officials on any issue with a high enough profile to receive White 
House attention. Perhaps this risk is not too significant, at least in a 
Democratic administration, when White House officials are unlikely to be to 
an NSA officer’s right. After all, advocacy groups could complain 
vociferously if they deem the persons chosen unsuitable. In addition, White 
House officials are under less pressure to be collegial with agency staff, and 
also can meet more comfortably with outsiders. There is, in fact, a new 
committee bringing together advocacy organizations to meet with White 
House officials and share their views and priorities.387 Finally, the fact that 
there are three such officials named might allow them to reinforce each 
other’s commitments, even in the face of pushback by the operational 
agencies. So the newly designated White House staffers may be able to 
maintain civil liberties values in the policy debate at the White House, 
countering the ever-present pressure to focus on the more limited realm of 
law, compliance, and rights.  
 
Assuming they are able to sustain both their own commitment and 
influence, White House civil liberties staffers can also serve as key allies to 
civil liberties officials within individual agencies, including the NSA. In 
addition, while some inter-agency councils are not terribly effective, in this 
situation, where part of what is needed is a secure reference group for a 
contested value, inter-agency councils or committees might be quite 
useful. 388 The point is to create a federal civil liberties bureaucracy that 
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encourages its members to maintain their civil liberties commitment, 
including by offering some career prospects for its members with backbone. 
This proposal seems to me a useful piece of that strategy. 
 
The President has not, however, committed to leaving these officials 
in place. Their main assignment currently is overseeing the implementation 
of PPD-28, which set a one-year deadline for the intelligence community 
agencies to issue policies implementing its new approach: “our signals 
intelligence activities must take into account that all persons should be 
treated with dignity and respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever 
they might reside, and that all persons have legitimate privacy interests in 
the handling of their personal information.”389 The three White House civil 
liberties officials are marching the agencies towards that deadline, in January 
2015.  
  
But the White House needs people like these, officially assigned a 
civil liberties role, permanently. Otherwise, as Morton Halperin, who served 
on the National Security Council staff from 1994-1996 explains, civil-
liberties-minded staffers are apt to get shut out of national security policy 
development processes. Halperin explains that he was able to bring a civil 
liberties perspective into domestic national security policy debates on an 
issue or two when he was specifically asked to do so, but not more 
generally—his ordinary docket was foreign.390 “The legitimacy of what you 
put forward is based on being able to say, well that’s my role in the 
bureaucracy,” Halperin says; “even someone [on the NSC staff] with those 
instincts needs that mandate to participate.”391 And at the White House, as 
elsewhere, Halperin says, it has sometimes been thought that “the lawyers 
are supposed to cover civil liberties.” But, really, “they don’t: they think of 
their job as making a legal case for what the policy people want.”392 So at 
the White House as elsewhere, if a civil liberties perspective is desired, the 
role of providing it needs to be assigned. 
 
C. A Public Advocate in the FISA Court 
 
Finally, it seems highly likely that in the near future, the FISA Court 
will gain a new process for occasional appearance of a public or special 
advocate. This proposal has been endorsed in varying forms by the Director 
of National Intelligence,393 the President’s Review Group,394 the PCLOB,395 
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and the President.396 It was included in the recently-defeated Senate’s USA 
FREEDOM Act bill, which will be one source for the next Congress’s work 
on the issue. 397 Even former FISA presiding Judge John Bates, now the 
Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, agrees in part.398 
There is, however, substantial disagreement about details—and the details 
matter.  
 
The argument for such an advocate is straightforward: even if the 
government exhibits exemplary candor as to facts, it cannot be relied upon to 
brief against its own authority. Because the issues are complex and 
important, they deserve full adversarial development in support of better 
judicial decision-making. The arguments against are likewise easily 
summarized: There’s not enough for a special advocate to do, since most 
issues before the FISA Court are not legally complex, and the facts will not 
be available to the advocate. Adversarial process will be slower and more 
cumbersome without leading to better decision-making. Indeed, it might lead 
to worse decision-making, because “adversarial process in run-of-the-mill, 
fact-driven cases may erode” the government’s compliance with a 
“heightened duty of candor to the Court.”399 Indeed, “intelligence agencies 
may become reluctant to voluntarily provide to the Court highly sensitive 
information, or information detrimental to a case, because doing so would 
also disclose that information to a permanent bureaucratic adversary.”400 
 
The consensus for some form of public advocate does not encompass 
key details. The largest open question is about access. Under the House 
version of the USA Freedom Act, FISA court public advocates could have 
been excluded from factual or even legal presentations by the government to 
FISA judges and their legal advisors.401 The Senate version of the bill, by 
contrast, specified that public advocates would receive “access to all relevant 
legal precedent, and any application, certification, petition, motion, or such 
other materials as are relevant to the duties of the special advocate.”402 Judge 
Bates, who served for six years as a FISA Court judge, has written several 
letters to Congress,403 purportedly on behalf of the judiciary,404 opposing a 
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full-time, autonomous special advocate in the FISA Court. Those letters 
pointed out, as a disadvantage, that inclusion of adversarial process would 
make the FISA Court more court-like. Judge Bates explained that “FISC 
judges currently have substantial flexibility in deciding how best to receive 
from the government information they consider relevant to a particular 
case.” That flexibility, he suggested, could not survive inter partes 
procedural requirements: 
 
In order for the FISC to abide by the procedural and ethical 
requirements that apply in adversarial proceedings, and for 
the advocate to appear on equal footing with the applicant, 
the FISC would have to ensure that the advocate was 
involved in all such interactions in any case in which the 
advocate may participate. . . .We expect that the logistical 
challenges of administering such a three-way process for 
more than a handful of cases would be considerable.405 
 
The Obama Administration, unfortunately, seems to be favoring limiting 
access, as well: In a letter to Senator Pat Leahy about the Senate bill, 
Attorney General Eric Holder and Director of National Intelligence James 
Clapper opined that “the appointment of an amicus in selected cases…need 
not interfere with…the process of ex parte [that is, one-party] consultation 
between the Court and the government.”406 
 
In fact, the FISA court and the public would be best served by a more 
empowered public advocate—one who is authorized to appear even without 
invitation from the government or the court, and, still more important, who 
is entitled to full access to information relevant to her duties. This would no 
doubt alter the current one-party procedures before the FISA court. But 
that’s a feature, not a bug. The FISA Court’s current procedures allow 
meetings quite unlike ordinary judicial hearings, even ex parte ones. In-
advance advice from court staff to the government and iterative drafting are 
common. The 2009 PowerPoint slide deck already described is similarly odd 
for a judicial forum.”407 Other practices such as an annual lunch bringing 
together FISA Court judges and legal advisors (and the Chief Justice) with 
the heads of the CIA, NSA, and FBI likewise encourage the judges to see 
their own role as co-workers in the administration of the intelligence 
community’s surveillance programs, supervising, for sure, but almost from 
within. If a public advocate’s procedural rights disrupted this cozy 
relationship, that would be all to the good. The salutary effect might be to 
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reinforce the FISA judges’ role as arbiters of surveillance legality, not co-
workers in the administration of the IC’s surveillance programs. 
 
If designed properly, this variation of an Office of Goodness could be 
essentially free from the ordinary threats to that kind of organization’s 
influence and commitment. After all, the role of government-paid court 
opponent is utterly familiar from the criminal justice system. Unlike 
agencies, where staff must negotiate for a seat at decision-making tables, 
most courts have firm inter partes norms requiring access for all parties.408 If 
Congress applies these norms to the FISA court, as it should, 
implementation will be very familiar. As for capture, the analogous public 
defenders certainly sometimes allow organizational or situational 
imperatives to subvert their assigned courtroom role,409 but there seems far 
less reason to worry about capture in this litigation setting than inside of 
agencies, at least if the public advocates are not otherwise beholden to the 
agencies. If anything, the problem here might be too much single-minded 
commitment, a strict preference for civil liberties over security—but of 
course the court, which would remain the decider, is unlikely to become 
unduly single-minded. I therefore see a FISA Court public advocate as a 
variant on an Office of Goodness whose institutional setting would—if it is 
well designed—shield it from many of the landmines that usually threaten 




The development of intelligence legalism has been a major and 
salutary change in American governance over the past 35 years. Informed by 
recent unprecedented disclosures, this Article has traced the institutional 
arrangements that constitute the NSA’s compliance ecology. Rights 
enunciation and compliance serve crucial rule-of-law values, and also 
sometimes further civil liberties. And yet they are insufficient to ensure 
appropriate civil liberties policy. 
 
In his opinion for the Court last term, holding that the Fourth 
Amendment forbids warrantless searches of cell phones, absent exigent 
circumstances, Chief Justice Roberts poked some mild fun at internal 
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government processes as sufficient safeguards of constitutional rights. 
“[T]he Founders did not fight a revolution to gain the right to government 
agency protocols,” he wrote. But he continued, and I agree, that such 
protocols are nonetheless “[p]robably a good idea.”410 In this post-Snowden 
moment, Congress can and should protect Americans’ privacy and civil 
liberties by clamping down on bulk surveillance, creating legal rules that can 
then be enforced by the courts and the intelligence community’s large 
compliance bureaucracy. But Congress and the President should not be 
limited by intelligence legalism. They should also follow the quite different 
strategy of amplifying voices inside the surveillance state who will give 
attention in internal deliberations and agency operations to civil liberties and 
privacy interests. But institutional design is important; civil liberties offices 
need deliberate and careful arrangements to safeguard their influence and 
commitment. If civil liberties and privacy officials inside the NSA, at the 
White House, and at the FISA Court can walk the tightrope of maintaining 
both influence and commitment, they might well make a difference—both in 
debates we now know about and others that remain secret. And they may 
help create a document trail useful for public oversight, too.  
 
Intelligence legalism has proven unequal to the task of opposing the 
“collect everything” mindset. We need to add libertarian officials inside the 
surveillance state to nurture its civil liberties ecology. If that ecology doesn’t 
improve, the next big leak, in five or ten or twenty years, may reveal 
invasions of Americans’ privacy that dwarf anything we have heard about so 
far. 
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